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General introduction 
The goal of this doctoral dissertation is to contribute to the unravelling of management 
control system (MCS) design for supplier relationships in the relatively under-explored 
manufacturing phase of the supply chain. To that end, this dissertation contains three 
manuscripts describing, comparing and analyzing MCS design based on the latest inter-
organizational management control theory. More specifically, the first manuscript studies 
how the MCS of manufacturer-supplier relations is designed, how important informal 
controls are in that design and whether the MCS design fits situational contingencies. The 
second manuscript investigates whether this MCS contingency fit is associated with 
operational performance by specifically focusing on MCS dynamics over time. Finally, the 
third manuscript looks into the role of resembling organizational culture in contributing to 
the speed of MCS change, so that temporary MCS misfits due to changing circumstances 
are less likely to occur. Although every manuscript has its own research design, all 
manuscripts’ empirics result from an in-depth explanatory case study. In particular, we 
studied MCS design for supplier relationships of the automotive manufacturer Volvo Cars 
Gent, which outsourced many manufacturing activities and therefore has numerous 
suppliers to control.  
The aim of this general introduction is to give an overview of the research in this 
doctoral dissertation and provide the necessary theoretical and methodological background. 
To that end, the remainder of this introduction is organised as follows. In the first section, 
we position and motivate our research in the inter-organizational management control 
literature. The second section presents the theoretical background, concerning our 
conceptualization of MCS design and our contingency theory lens to study this design. 
Third, we present our theoretical framework, which will be studied in practice, and explain 
how the research questions of the three manuscripts are connected and related to this 
framework. Finally, the fourth section describes the case research methodology for the 
three manuscripts. 
1.  Research motivation 
The current economic environment demands an effective supply chain, when companies 
strive for sustainable competitive advantage. Due to globalisation, deregulation, enhanced 
levels of competition, empowerment of customers and the diffusion of new technologies, 
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many organizations acknowledge the difficulties of developing and maintaining the range 
of expertise necessary to compete successfully (Gulati, 1995; Kulmala et al., 2002; 
Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Nixon & Burns, 2005; van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2006). However, there exist various forms of inter-organizational cooperation, 
like outsourcing activities to suppliers, which provide access to the needed specialised skills 
(Das & Teng, 2001). Not surprisingly, numerous studies show that inter-organizational 
relationships (IORs) have a high potential impact on the organization’s performance (e.g. 
Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Elmuti, 2002; Groves & Valsamakis, 
1998; Harrison & New, 2002; Ittner et al., 1999; Timme & Williams-Timme, 2000; Trent 
& Monczka, 2002).  
In spite of that, the literature also argues that a lot of IORs do not provide the 
expected benefits and are often broken up because of management difficulties (Ireland et 
al., 2002). For example, the failure rate of alliances appears significantly higher than that of 
a single firm (Das & Teng, 2000). Besides goal divergence (Ireland et al., 2002), academics 
often propose lack of coordination and opportunistic behaviour of partners as the two main 
reasons for this relatively high failure rate (e.g. Das & Teng, 1998; Gulati & Singh, 1998; 
Dekker, 2004). Therefore, the governance structure of an IOR is argued to be critical for its 
success (Ittner et al., 1999). Effective governance even appears to be a source of inter-
organizational competitive advantage (Ireland et al., 2002). Hence, control systems might 
play a crucial role in relationship management and the prevention of failure by establishing 
governance mechanisms to monitor and control the relationship to the benefit of all parties 
(Hutt et al., 2000).  
Nevertheless, the management control literature traditionally focused on controls 
of one firm within the supply chain (e.g. Degraeve & Roodhooft, 2001). Indeed, despite 
being an indispensable part of business relationships, inter-organizational MCSs only 
recently received substantial interest in the literature (Dekker, 2003). Not until the mid-
nineties, scholars started calling for more attention towards this topic (e.g. Hopwood, 1996; 
Munday, 1992; Otley, 1994; Scapens & Bromwich, 2001), but they have not stopped since 
(e.g. van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2006). As a result, the role of inter-
organizational MCSs has recently been studied from several angles, including outsourcing 
relations (e.g. Anderson et al., 2000; Donada & Nogatchewsky, 2006; Gietzmann, 1996; 
Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Mouritsen et al., 2001; Nicholson et al., 2006; Sartorius & 
Kirsten, 2005; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000), inter-organizational cost 
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management relations (e.g. Carr & Ng, 1995; Cooper & Slagmulder, 1999; Cooper & 
Slagmulder, 2004), partnerships (e.g. Christopher & Jüttner, 2000; Scannell, Vickery & 
Dröge, 2000; Seal et al., 1999; Seal et al., 2004), strategic alliances (e.g. Birnberg, 1998; 
Dekker 2004; Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Singh, 1998; Tomkins, 2001), networks (e.g. 
Hakansson & Lind, 2004; Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005; Kulmala et al., 2002; Mouritsen & 
Thrane, 2006) and joint ventures (e.g. Chalos & O’Connor, 2004; Kamminga & van der 
Meer-Kooistra, 2007).  
Yet, the main emphasis lied on relational collaboration during the procurement 
and R&D phases of the supply chain (e.g. Cooper & Slagmulder 2004; Dekker 2004; 
Gietzmann, 1996; Mouritsen et al., 2001). This historical focus is justified for three reasons. 
First, it is widely accepted that up to 80% of the product costs are committed during the 
product and process planning and design phase, implying that a lot of cost reductions can 
be achieved during that phase (Cooper & Kaplan, 1999). Second, the common use of target 
costing in case of outsourced design (Mouritsen et al., 2001) reinforces the trend towards 
cost reductions in this supply chain phase by imposing a maximum allowable cost price 
from the start. Third, research shows that extensive collaboration with suppliers is very 
effective in reducing the buyer’s R&D costs to up to 15% (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004). 
Especially automakers use suppliers to accelerate and rationalize the development process 
(Ittner et al., 1999).  
MCSs in other supply chain phases, however, remain relatively under-explored. 
For example, Cooper & Slagmulder (2004) suggest studying other forms of company 
interaction, besides procurement and R&D, that trigger inter-organizational cost 
management. Manufacturing is such a supply chain phase, of which further study is 
justified (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Scannell et al., 
2000). Purchased products and services for manufacturing account for more than 60% of 
the average company’s total costs (Degraeve & Roodhooft, 2001). In their case study of a 
strategic supply partnership, Seal et al. (1999) even document externally purchased 
materials accounting for 80% of total manufacturing costs. Consequently, decreasing 
procurement costs for manufacturing possibly result in a significant performance increase 
(Degraeve & Roodhooft, 2001). Timme & Williams-Timme (2000) calculate a possible 
25% increase in stock prices due to a combination of rising revenues, decreasing 
operational expenses, better utilization of fixed assets and decreasing stocks and customer 
credits. As a result, the manufacturing phase is subject to numerous joint cost reduction 
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programs with suppliers that also require effective management control (Carr & Ng, 1995; 
Gietzmann, 1996; Lamming, 1993; Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005; Seal et al., 1999). Therefore, 
this dissertation specifically studies MCS design of supplier relations in the manufacturing 
phase of the supply chain, which we refer to as “manufacturer-supplier relationships” 
(MSRs). 
2.  Theoretical background 
2.1.  Management control system design  
The fundamental goal of MCSs is to induce desired behaviour, in other words to influence 
decision making in attaining strategic objectives (Nixon & Burns, 2005). In an inter-
organizational setting, this implies creating bilateral incentives to pursue mutual goals, for 
which numerous control structures exist. Studies looking into these control structures are, 
among others, Anderson et al. (2000), Anderson & Dekker (2005), Chalos & O’Connor 
(2004), Cooper & Slagmulder (2004), Dekker (2004, 2007), Ireland et al. (2002), 
Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra (2007), Langfield-Smith & Smith (2003), Speklé 
(2001), Sartorius & Kirsten (2005), Seal et al. (1999), van den Bogaard & Speklé (2003) 
and van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman (2000, 2004).  
All these studies utilize transaction cost economics (TCE) theory, originally 
developed by Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985, 1991, 1993, 1996), as theoretical foundation 
for the design of inter-organizational MCSs. In essence, TCE argues that parties are only 
boundedly rational and behave opportunistically. Therefore, the total cost of outsourcing is 
the sum of the supplied component costs and the transaction costs, including costs for 
negotiation, drawing up contracts, coordination, control and risk of opportunistic behaviour 
(van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). Based on the notion that the boundaries of 
the firm are defined by cost minimizing choices, TCE provides a framework for inter-
organizational MCS design that was further developed in studies like Langfield-Smith & 
Smith (2003), Speklé (2001) and van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman (2000). More 
specifically, TCE identifies three forms of governance structures: markets, hierarchies and 
hybrids, in which separate structures of market and hierarchy are combined (Williamson, 
1991).  
In TCE terminology, MSRs are hybrid relations, of which the number has risen 
significantly in the last two decades (van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2006). On the 
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one hand, the outsourcing of a certain manufacturing activity to a supplier renders vertical 
integration in a hierarchy unsuitable as governance mechanism. On the other hand, the 
manufacturing phase of the supply chain occurs after commercial negotiations have taken 
place. Hence, in the manufacturing phase, price is considered fixed and influenced by 
outside parties earlier in the supply chain, namely the manufacturer’s purchase department 
and the supplier’s sales department. Obviously, this situation renders the market mechanism 
inappropriate for governing the MSR. Previous research, however, has put forward some 
important objections to TCE’s hybrid type of governance structure. Without contesting the 
theoretical benefits and case analysis possibilities of TCE in management control studies 
(e.g. Speklé, 2001; van den Bogaard & Speklé, 2003; Sartorius & Kirsten, 2005), we agree 
with the two following critiques.  
First, TCE considers hybrid governance a homogeneous alternative for market and 
hierarchy. Hybrid IORs, however, show numerous governance structures serving multiple 
goals, in which reducing transaction costs only takes part (Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997). 
Powell (1990), for example, puts “network organization” between the structures of market 
and hierarchy, and defines its most important goals as reducing uncertainty and realizing 
fast access to information. To this end, parties engage themselves to build up a long term 
network (Powell, 1990). In other words, hybrid IORs are rather heterogeneous and require 
more than TCE to be effectively studied (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006; Chiles & McMackin, 
1996; Dekker, 2004). One useful theory to supplement TCE and not uncommon in inter-
organizational MCS studies is organization theory (e.g. Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Cooper 
& Slagmulder, 2004; Dekker, 2003, 2004; Seal et al., 1999). The main proposition of this 
theory is that in order to create transactional value, partners cooperatively perform value 
creating activities (Dyer & Singh, 1998). That way, they become interdependent, because 
they can not achieve their goals without reliance upon another (Rousseau et al., 1998). 
More specifically, by jointly pooling resources, determining tasks to be performed and 
deciding on labour division, partners create interdependent activities. In order to attain their 
objectives, these activities need to be coordinated across organizational boundaries (Gulati 
& Singh, 1998; Dekker, 2004). 
Second, TCE does not consider the social mechanism of governance, within which 
transactions are embedded (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). Because of the importance 
given to opportunism propensity, MCSs for hybrid governance are exclusively formal and 
primarily aimed at contracts (Nooteboom et al., 1997). Nevertheless, Williamson (1993) 
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agrees that rational actors do accept risk without setting up formal controls. Yet, according 
to him, this is the result of calculated risk taking instead of, for example, trust in the other 
party. Thus, by considering the social context as part of the environment, Williamson 
(1996) denies the possibility of social controls as a means to reduce opportunism. 
Therefore, TCE neglects social controls, such as trust, personal relationships and 
reputational devices in a social network (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gietzmann, 1996). However, 
there exists considerable evidence that these more informal controls serve an important 
role, especially in IORs with large interdependence and high relational uncertainty 
(Nooteboom et al., 1997). Such climate creates limitations in drawing up a complete 
contract, because all future contingencies can not be foreseen, are too expensive to foresee 
or are too expensive or impossible to contract upon. These limitations affect inter-
organizational governance choices and increase the role of social controls to discipline 
suppliers (Gietzmann, 1996). For that reason, our study of hybrid MSRs supplements TCE 
with relational perspectives, so that our conceptualization of a MCS includes both formal 
and informal control types. Although MCSs have been conceptualised and categorised in 
various ways, the current intra- and inter-organizational management control literature, has 
reached a consensus on these two management controls types (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 
2003; Dekker, 2004).  
Formal controls are explicitly set up to coordinate the MSR and include outcome 
controls and behaviour controls. Outcome controls involve the measurement and evaluation 
of operational outcomes against pre-defined targets, by using several performance 
measurement techniques (Merchant, 1998; Ouchi, 1979). The most important outcome 
metrics for MSRs are percentage of defects, quality and on time delivery (Gunasekaran, 
Patel & McGaughey, 2004). Behaviour controls concern specifying, monitoring and 
evaluating compliance with pre-specified planning, procedures, rules and regulations 
(Merchant, 1998; Ouchi, 1979). Informal controls are not explicitly designed, but are grown 
out of shared norms and values, shaped by frequent interaction, meetings and management 
attitude (Merchant, 1998; Ouchi, 1979). Especially trust building has emerged as a very 
important informal control instrument in inter-organizational MCSs (e.g. Dekker, 2004). 
While formal controls reduce risks by altering the incentives for underperformance or 
opportunism, trust building mitigates these risks by minimizing the fear of 
underperformance or opportunism to occur (Das and Teng, 2001). Besides trust building, 
MSRs are governed by clan control (Ouchi, 1979). Based on shared norms, values and a 
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common goal, a supplier is motivated to achieve that goal (Das & Teng, 2001) because of 
inter-organizational social pressure (Speklé, 2001) exerted by the manufacturer. More 
specifically, poor supplier performance leads to unpleasant confrontations with 
manufacturer management, personal humiliation and a damaged reputation. By acting as 
negatively valued social sanctions (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005), these social 
consequences create incentives for satisfactory supplier performance and behaviour 
(Speklé, 2001). 
2.2.  Contingency theory 
To study this MCS design, we use contingency theory. This theory originated with the aim 
of explaining the structure of organizations by particular circumstances (e.g. Lawrence & 
Lorsch, 1967). Later, management accounting researchers adopted and further developed 
the theory in order to explain the design of MCSs in organizations (Donaldson, 2001; 
Chenhall, 2003; Fisher, 1998; Luft & Shields, 2003). Also in inter-organizational studies, 
contingency theory is frequently utilized, although some authors not always explicitly 
mention using the theory (e.g. Chalos & O’Connor, 2004; Dekker, 2004; Kamminga & van 
der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). Consequently, these studies reveal several situational 
characteristics influencing MCS design of different IORs, like strategic alliances (Birnberg, 
1998; Dekker 2004), joint ventures (Chalos & O’Connor, 2004; Kamminga & van der 
Meer-Kooistra, 2007), inter-organizational cost management relations (Cooper & 
Slagmulder, 2004), outsourcing relations (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; van der Meer-
Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000) and networks (Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005). Yet, to our 
knowledge, little inter-organizational management control research specifically investigated 
contingency theory’s explicative power for supplier relations during the manufacturing 
phase of the supply chain. Obviously, some papers study influences on MCS design in 
manufacturing environments, like the impact of manufacturing flexibility (Abernethy & 
Lillis, 1995), customization and related interdependence (Bouwens & Abernethy, 2000), 
profit centre strategy (Lillis, 2002), production strategy and production technology (van 
Veen-Dirks, 2006). However, all these studies investigate characteristics influencing MCS 
design within the boundaries of only one organization. Consequently, the design of MCSs 
that govern different types of inter-organizational supplier relationships involved in the 
manufacturing of complex products (Gietzmann, 1996) remains under-explored. Therefore, 
more attention towards explaining this type of MCS design is called for (Cooper & 
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Slagmulder, 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 
2006). This dissertation answers that call by tailoring contingency theory to the setting of 
MSRs. 
To that end, this dissertation utilizes Donaldson’s (2001) categorization of 
contingency theory elements, which, applied to MSR management control, are the 
following. First, certain contingencies such as task uncertainty and environmental 
uncertainty are associated with MCS design. Second, these contingencies determine MCS 
design, because changing contingencies cause the manufacturer to change the MCS design. 
Third, a fit of the MCS design and the influencing contingency variables results in higher 
operational performance, whereas a misfit decreases performance (Donaldson, 2001). This 
third contingency theory element lies at the heart of the contingency theory paradigm, 
because it explains the other elements in the following way. When a MSR is confronted 
with a contingency change, it moves into a situation where the existing MCS, which fitted 
the previous situation, does not fit the new contingency level. Based on the third element, 
performance decreases. When this performance drop is sufficiently large, the manufacturer 
changes the supplier MCS to fit the new situational characteristics in order to avoid further 
loss. In other words, the MCS moves towards fit because of the performance loss of a 
misfitted MCS. Hence, a change in contingencies leads to a change in the MCS, which 
represents the second contingency element. This way, the MSR’s contingencies and MCS 
move towards fit, which results in the association between contingencies and MSC, or 
contingency theory’s first element (Donaldson, 2001). Thus, it must be clear that 
performance forms the central variable in the contingency theory of organizations, which 
aims at explaining organizational success or failure (Donaldson, 2001).  
As a result, our study assumes a contingency approach to fit instead of a 
congruence approach, which are two very different approaches to fit with respect to the link 
between fit and performance (Gerdin & Greve, 2004). More specifically, the congruence 
approach assumes that a MCS fit on contingencies is the result of a natural selection 
process. Consequently, only the best performing firms survive and are therefore observable 
at any point in time. As there are no low performers, the congruence approach has no 
interest in the link with performance. The contingency approach, however, assumes that 
both high and low performers exist, because more or less successful MCS fits occur for 
extended periods of time. Hence, the goal of the contingency approach is to study 
performance fluctuations that depend on the fit between the MCS and its situational 
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contingencies (Gerdin & Greve, 2004; Luft & Shields, 2003). This fit-performance 
association has been studied with respect to management accounting techniques, like 
Activity Based Costing (e.g. Cagwin & Bouwman, 2002; Ittner, Lanen & Larcker, 2002) 
and the Balanced Scorecard (e.g. Hoque & James, 2000; Maiga & Jacobs, 2003). Other 
studies investigated the performance effect of a fit between strategy and management 
accounting systems (e.g. Gerdin & Greve, 2004; Ittner, Larcker & Randall, 2003). Yet, 
empirical evidence on the validity of the fit-performance association of MCS design for 
MSRs remains limited. Most investigations on contingency associations of inter-
organizational MCSs only assume the fit-performance association to hold, so that further 
research on this association is justified (Dekker, 2004; Kamminga & van der Meer-
Kooistra, 2007). This doctoral dissertation fills that research gap, as will be clarified in the 
next section. 
3.  Overview of manuscripts and theoretical framework 
The dissertation consists of three manuscripts, each investigating a different research 
question of MCS design for MSRs. Each manuscript is written to be read independently of 
the others. Nevertheless, all manuscripts are inextricably linked, so that there is a certain 
degree of overlap in their theoretical and methodological sections. For example, each 
manuscript contains a specific theoretical contingency framework. Yet, these frameworks 
are dependent on each other, in the sense that the frameworks of the second and third 
manuscript are extended versions of the ones in the first and second manuscript 
respectively. Consequently, all specific frameworks can be captured in one generic 
framework, indicating which part of the framework is studied in each manuscript. This 
generic framework can be found in figure 0.1 and will be used to provide an overview of 
the manuscripts and indicate the connections between them. For each manuscript, we 
discuss and motivate the research questions and introduce their theoretical framework by 
referring to figure 0.1. 
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Figure 0.1: Generic theoretical framework General introduction 
3.1.  Manuscript 1 – Management control of supplier relationships in 
manufacturing: A case study in the automotive industry 
In the first manuscript, we investigate how the MCS of MSRs is designed. In particular, we 
study how important informal controls are in that design, as prior literature offers different 
MCS designs for MSRs with respect to the level of informal control. On the one hand, 
empirical research on IORs, such as R&D collaboration (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), 
strategic alliances (Dekker 2004) and joint ventures (Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 
2007), found MCSs that combine both formal controls and more informal controls. Also the 
execution of outsourced services, like industrial maintenance (van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000), IT (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003) and accounting (Nicholson, Jones 
& Espenlaub, 2006) is governed by a MCS combining formal and informal controls. On the 
other hand, differences between MSRs and other types of IORs, could lead to a different 
MCS design. Prior research argued that manufacturing is more formal than procurement 
and R&D, so that formal controls are suited mechanisms to control MSRs (Das & Teng, 
2001). Moreover, manufacturing concerns knowledge exploitation, instead of knowledge 
exploration, which is most effectively controlled by formal controls (Bijlsma-Frankema & 
Costa, 2005). Based on these characteristics, MSRs could be expected to be governed by 
primarily formal controls with little informal controls.  
Yet, besides illustrating how manufacturers design supplier MCSs and to what 
extent this design differs from designs in other IORs with respect to the level of informal 
control, the first manuscript also aims at explaining MCS design. With respect to 
Donaldson’s (2001) categorization of contingency theory elements, manuscript 1 regards 
the first element, proposing that certain contingencies are associated with MCS design. To 
investigate this proposition, we suggest a refined theoretical contingency framework for 
MSRs, set up from the position of the manufacturer and based on recent inter-
organizational management control theory. With reference to figure 0.1, this framework 
concerns the three constructs in the centre of the generic framework. These constructs 
visualize the associations between contingency variables influencing the level of risks and 
management control techniques governing the risks. MSRs are subject to performance risk 
and relational risk (Das & Teng, 2001) and these risks are increased by several 
contingencies, like task uncertainty (Woodward, 1965) and environmental uncertainty 
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(Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). As mentioned before, MCSs contain two types of 
control, namely formal and informal control techniques (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). 
In order to illustrate the validity of the framework associations in practice and 
answer how and why manufacturers design their MCS, the first manuscript contains an in-
depth case study of the MSRs between a facility (VCG) of the automotive manufacturer 
Volvo Cars Corporation and a selection of first-tier supplier facilities. As the automotive 
industry is characterized by high levels of component outsourcing and extreme competitive 
pressure, manufacturers initiate continuous improvement projects with suppliers, which 
require appropriate MCSs to organize and manage the MSR (Alford, Sackett & Nelder, 
2000; Carr & Ng, 1995; Cooper & Slagmulder, 1999; Scannell et al., 2000). In that respect, 
one particular automaker, namely Toyota, is known for partnering with suppliers and 
installing softer forms of control including trust (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). Other 
automakers, however, govern the search for continuous improvement by heavily formalized 
supplier relations (Alford et al., 2000). In other words, also automotive practice shows 
evidence of high and low levels of informal control. Therefore, the first manuscript 
investigates MCS design of automotive MSRs. To that end, we collect cross-sectional data 
on VCG’s MCS of MSRs with good performance. The findings of this manuscript provide 
a clear picture of VCG’s management control techniques for different types of suppliers. 
That way, our findings provide qualitative insight into the importance of informal control in 
VCG’s MCS and into the explicative power of contingency variables on MCS design. 
3.2.  Manuscript 2 – The impact of inter-organizational management control 
systems on performance: A longitudinal case study of a supplier relation in 
automotive 
The second manuscript is a follow-up study that further investigates the contingency effects 
of MCS design. In particular, this manuscript studies contingency theory’s third element 
(Donaldson): a MCS design, contingent on situational characteristics, is associated with 
better performance, compared to a situation where the contingency fit would be temporarily 
out of place (Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). Like the association between 
MCS design and situational contingencies, which was studied in the first manuscript, this 
fit-performance association remains under-explored (Chenhall, 2003; Dekker, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the fit-performance association deserves further research, validating its 
assumption in prior studies (e.g. Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Dekker, 2004), because it 
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forms contingency theory’s main interest (Donaldson, 2001). Therefore, this study aims at 
illustrating the validity and refining the dynamics of this assumption in practice.  
For that purpose, we extend the theoretical contingency framework of manuscript 
1 with two constructs, as depicted on the right hand side of figure 0.1. First, the degree of 
fit conceptualizes the degree to which the level of management control fits the level of 
risks. In essence, it serves the same purpose as the arrow from risks to MCS in the 
framework of manuscript 1, namely conceptualizing the association between risks and 
MCS design. Still, the extra construct is introduced, because it allows specifying a varying 
degree of fit over time, which was not needed in the framework of manuscript 1. Second, 
we add operational performance. This variable is measured by means of product quality, as 
this KPI is emphasized more than timeliness and cost (Waters-Fuller, 1996). The arrow 
from degree of fit to operational performance represents the fit-performance association. 
With respect to this association, we propose that if a supplier is incapable of dealing with 
changed contingencies, a misfitted MCS is associated with poor performance. Besides 
illustrating this static proposition, the second manuscript also refines the fit-performance 
association by investigating the following dynamic proposition. If a supplier is incapable of 
dealing with changed contingencies, a misfitted MCS only temporarily aggravates 
performance, until the MCS is changed towards a design fitting the changed contingencies 
and risks and therefore contributing to performance (Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 
2007; van Veen-Dirks, 2006).  
We investigate these propositions by means of a follow-up case study at VCG. 
Contrary to the case study of manuscript 1, aimed at investigating the “average” MCS of 
VCG via cross-sectional data on several MSRs at one point in time, this case study is an in-
depth study of one particular MSR based on longitudinal data. As the fit-performance 
association is only visible in changing MSRs experiencing fluctuating performance over 
time, we specifically investigate a MSR that was subject to considerable change and severe 
operational difficulties. Findings of this study confirm both our static and dynamic 
propositions and that way contribute to refining inter-organizational management control 
theory. Furthermore, our longitudinal case study offers the opportunity to refine the either 
complementary or substitutive relation between trust and formal control (Das & Teng, 
1998), called for by e.g. Anderson & Dekker (2005) and van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman (2006).  
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3.3.  Manuscript 3 – The impact of cultural resemblance on management control of 
supplier relations: Longitudinal evidence in the automotive industry 
The third manuscript continues our line of research on MCS design by exploring the role of 
organizational culture, a variable unaddressed in manuscripts 1 and 2. These manuscripts 
provide evidence that MCSs are contingent on situational characteristics and that this MCS 
fit is associated with good performance, both statically and dynamically (Donaldson, 2001). 
So, with reference to performance, manuscript 2 shows the negative consequence of a 
misfitted MCS, namely decreasing performance, and illustrates a manufacturer’s attempts 
to change the MCS and regain a MCS fit. Following up on these findings, we believe it is 
worthwhile to investigate variables influencing the speed of MCS change, so that temporary 
misfits and decreasing performance, due to changing circumstances, are less likely to occur 
(Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007; van Veen-Dirks, 2006). Since the 
manufacturer’s MCS is the material artefact of its underlying organizational culture 
(Rousseau, 1990), organizational culture might be such a variable (Harrison & McKinnon, 
1999). Nevertheless, studies on organizational culture, especially in IORs, are scarce 
(Chenhall, 2003; Scheytt & Soin, 2006; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). The 
third manuscript fills that research gap. In particular, the focus lies on the degree to which a 
supplier’s culture resembles the manufacturer’s culture, as the impact of cultural 
resemblance on MCS dynamics remains unaddressed (Harrison & McKinnon, 1999; Henri, 
2006). Therefore, the aim of this manuscript is to illustrate whether the degree of cultural 
resemblance between manufacturer and supplier affects MCS dynamics, and that way the 
degree of MCS fit, in times of changing contingencies. 
To that end, we further extend the theoretical contingency framework of 
manuscript 2 with the construct supplier cultural resemblance on the left hand side of figure 
0.1. Provided that we take on the position of the manufacturer, this variable is defined as 
the degree to which a supplier culture is hierarchical or developmental and resembles a 
developmental manufacturer culture. Whether an organizational culture is hierarchical or 
developmental depends on the organization’s preference for the values control versus 
flexibility and external focus versus internal focus of the Competing Values Model (CVM) 
(Quinn, 1988; Quinn & Kimberly, 1984; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). Supported by this 
conceptualization of organizational culture, we propose that supplier cultural resemblance 
is associated with a MCS that changes fast enough to fit changed contingencies and that 
way contributes to operational performance.  
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We study this proposition by means of another follow-up case study at VCG. The 
third manuscript investigates the same contingency changes and MCS dynamics as in 
manuscript 2 for a second MSR. This additional MSR is similar to the MSR studied in 
manuscript 2, except for the degree of supplier cultural resemblance. More specifically, the 
culture of the additional supplier is of the developmental type, resembling VCG’s culture, 
while the culture of the manuscript 2 supplier is of the hierarchical type. That way, these 
MSRs allow adequately comparing the effect of high and low supplier cultural resemblance 
on the MCS design, while keeping contingency effects, as shown in manuscript 1, constant. 
Obviously, these contingencies do considerably change over the period under study in order 
to explore the effect of supplier cultural resemblance on MCS dynamics. Yet, their change 
is similar for both MSRs, so that a constant external effect is preserved over time. The case 
findings confirm our theoretical proposition by illustrating the positive impact of 
resembling organizational cultures on the speed of MCS change, and hence the level of 
MCS fit and performance. Furthermore, the case contributes to the inter-organizational 
management control literature by showing the mechanisms by which cultural resemblance 
enhances management control. As these findings benefited from conceptualizing 
organizational culture via the CVM, the third manuscript also demonstrates the usefulness 
of applying the CVM for describing organizational culture in qualitative studies (Bhimani, 
2003). 
4.  Research methodology 
The research methodology of this doctoral dissertation is case based. In this part of the 
general introduction, we first motivate our choice for the case study method, clarify our 
research goals and indicate the case’s unit of analysis. Second, we discuss our case 
company selection criteria and motivate our choice for the automotive industry and a 
specific original equipment manufacturer (OEM), namely VCG, of which this section also 
provides a brief description. Third, we describe our main data collection techniques. Fourth, 
we provide some details concerning the data analysis. 
4.1.  Case study research 
Yin (2003) defines a case study as “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. The case study inquiry copes with the 
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technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than 
data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to 
converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 2003, 
p. 13-14). Hence, a case study is an investigation of a real life phenomenon, relying on 
multiple sources of evidence and benefiting from prior development of theoretical 
propositions. Especially an explanatory case suits this dissertation’s research setting, 
because it concerns explaining complex phenomena within their real life context and 
finding answers to how and why questions about these phenomena. Furthermore, case study 
research is appropriate for studying phenomena of which empirical evidence is relatively 
limited. Finally, case studies suit investigating the dynamics of processes, which is also an 
important research goal of this dissertation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003).  
In Keating’s (1995) terminology, this dissertation aims at “theory refinement”, 
which involves seeking “to establish the plausibility of a specific theoretical perspective by 
demonstrating its capacity to illuminate some previously unappreciated aspect of 
management accounting practice” (Keating, 1995, p. 69). This goal represents the middle 
ground between “theory discovery”, i.e. describing novel phenomena, and “theory 
refutation”, i.e. disconfirming well specified theories by bringing in negative evidence. A 
specific way to establish theory refinement is “theory illustration”, by identifying “aspects 
of the illustrated theory that require reformulation or more rigorous specification” (Keating, 
1995, p. 71). Based on this categorization, the research aims of the three manuscripts in this 
dissertation are defined as follows. The aim of the first manuscript is refining existing inter-
organizational management control theory for the relatively under-explored manufacturing 
phase of the supply chain, by illustrating how manufacturers design supplier MCSs, how 
important informal controls are in that design and how the design can be explained by 
means of a theoretical contingency framework. The goal of the second manuscript is theory 
refinement, by illustrating MCS dynamics and the influence on operational performance. 
More specifically, this manuscript shows how a misfitted MCS, aggravating performance, 
is changed towards a design fitting the contingencies and risks, and therefore contributing 
to performance. The third manuscript aims at refining theory by illustrating the impact of 
supplier cultural resemblance on the MCS of MSRs. In particular, the manuscript reveals 
how supplier cultural resemblance affects the speed of MCS change over time. According 
to Keating (1995), these theory refinement goals need a clear theoretical starting point, 
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supplemented with an openness to discover unexpected findings. To balance these theory 
attachment and detachment requirements, we developed a theoretical framework for each of 
the manuscripts as described in the previous section. These frameworks guided our data 
collection, but at the same time allowed sufficient openness. Based on the data, we assessed 
the explanatory power of the theoretical frameworks. 
The following examples of case studies strengthen the argument that cases allow 
investigating in detail relational patterns and a wide range of variables influencing the 
structure and performance of MSRs (Sartorius & Kirsten, 2005): Cooper & Slagmulder 
(2004), Dekker (2004), Hakansson & Lind (2004), Kajüter & Kulmala (2005), Kamminga 
& van der Meer-Kooistra (2007), Langfield-Smith & Smith (2003), Sartorius & Kirsten 
(2005), Seal et al. (2004) and van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman (2000). These studies 
argue that the investigation of different MCS designs and the influence on performance by 
means of quantitative research is more difficult, because it is not exactly known what to ask 
or to look for. The meaning of MSRs and subsequent behaviour of companies and their 
employees is very complex, so that an in-depth study is more effective in discovering how 
different parties really interpret certain MSRs and whether the MCS is designed 
accordingly. This argument further justifies our choice for an in-depth case study and forms 
the reason why the current literature calls for more research of this type (e.g. Langfield-
Smith & Smith, 2003; Dekker, 2004; Hakansson & Lind, 2004). Especially the longitudinal 
case design of the second and third manuscript is emphasized as a suited future research 
design on MCS dynamics and the impact on performance, as this design makes it more 
effective to study cause and effect (e.g. Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Dekker, 2004, 2007; 
Ittner et al., 1999; Rinehart et al., 2004; Scannell et al., 2000; van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000). Indeed, only longitudinal data can reflect changes in MCS design and 
performance, which are needed to refine the dynamics of the fit-performance association 
(Luo, 2002). 
In most inter-organizational studies, the unit of analysis is one dyadic relation 
between two independent parties (van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2006). Since there 
exist different dyadic MSRs within one manufacturer and our dissertation concerns 
contingency research on supplier MCS design, our unit of analysis consists of specific 
MSRs. Dyer & Singh (1998) explicitly propose the relational view, focusing on the 
manufacturer-supplier dyad, as opposed to the industry structure view and resource based 
view, when analyzing cooperative strategy and sources of inter-organizational competitive 
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advantage. The fact that this approach is suited for studying the “inter-organizational rent-
generating process” (Dyer & Singh, 1998, p. 661) further justifies our choice for the MSR 
unit of analysis. In order to answer the proposed research questions, we analyzed all 
relations after the manufacturer had decided to outsource the manufacturing activities. In 
other words, we addressed neither the make-or-buy decision nor related commercial 
negotiations, but collected data from the start of production onwards.  
4.2.  Case company selection 
As case company selection forms an important dimension of case study research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), the selection of the case company and several suppliers was influenced 
by two selection concerns: theoretical suitability and open and flexible access to senior 
management (Christopher & Jüttner, 2000). Based on these concerns, we chose Volvo Cars 
Gent (VCG), the Belgian automotive production facility of the Swedish Volvo Cars 
Corporation (VCC), as manufacturing case company. In this section, we motivate our 
choice for the automotive industry, VCG and a selection of suppliers. We end the section 
with a brief description of VCG.  
4.2.1.  Automotive industry  
We chose the automotive industry for our study on MCS design for MSRs, because this 
industry is considered a trendsetter in supplier relationships (cf Womack & Jones, 1990; 
Lamming, 1993) and already previously studied (e.g. Anderson et al., 2000; Berry, 1994; 
Carr & Ng, 1995; Dyer, 1996(a), 1996(b), 1997; Dyer & Chu, 2000; Dyer & Nobeoka, 
2000; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Gulati, 1995; Gulati & Singh, 1998; Ittner et al., 1999; Kajüter & 
Kulmala, 2005; Lamming, 1993; Rinehart et al., 2004; Scannell et al., 2000; Seal et al., 
1999). Automotive manufacturing is even referred to as “a natural laboratory for testing 
transactions cost theory” (Anderson et al., 2000, p. 728). An automobile is an extremely 
complex product manufactured with thousands of components, working together as a 
system (Dyer & Chu, 2003). As a result, also this industry increasingly outsourced non-core 
activities (Scannell et al., 2000). Indeed, externally purchased materials account for 60% to 
70% of total automotive manufacturing costs (Taylor, 1994; Vasilash, 1997). Volvo for 
example acknowledges that up to 70% of the total car production cost results from buying 
modules made by suppliers outside Volvo (Von Corswant, 2003). Consequently, 
automotive manufacturers started to rely on suppliers to deliver competitive advantages in 
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the form of lower costs (Carr & Ng, 1995). To that end, a variety of supply chain 
management practices has been implemented, such as lean supply and continuous 
improvement. These practices induce the need for an appropriate MCS with two-directional 
communication and trust to organize and manage the relationships (Carr & Ng, 1995; 
Cooper & Slagmulder, 1999; Gietzmann, 1996; Lamming, 1993; Scannell et al., 2000). 
However, according to Scannell et al. (2000), these key practices in automotive lack 
sufficient academic study, which further justifies our choice for this industry. 
Besides suiting our research on MCS design of MSRs, the automotive industry 
also fulfilled specific research requirements of the different manuscripts. As the first 
manuscript investigated MCS design and the importance of informal control, we needed an 
industry that reflected the theoretical tension concerning this importance. The automotive 
industry was an appropriate choice, as that industry shows clear evidence of high and low 
levels of informal control. More specifically, Toyota is known for partnering with suppliers 
and installing softer forms of control (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000), while other automakers 
govern the search for continuous improvement by heavily formalized supplier relations 
(Alford et al., 2000). For manuscripts 2 and 3, studying MCS dynamics, we required MSRs 
that heavily changed, but were not terminated due to unsatisfactory supplier performance. 
The manufacturing phase of an automotive supply chain fulfilled both needs. For example, 
the manufacturing and delivery processes of suppliers drastically change, when a 
manufacturer starts producing a new car model. Moreover, manufacturer facilities are not 
inclined to switch suppliers, even when they are underperforming for some time because of 
a lack of capacity and sufficient supply quality at potential replacing suppliers. 
4.2.2.  Volvo Cars Gent 
Out of several automotive manufacturers, we chose Volvo Cars Gent (VCG) for three 
reasons.  
First, exploratory interviews learned that VCG was considered a “best practice”. In 
2005, VCG was financially healthy, operationally profitable and highly appraised in the 
international automotive sector. Additionally, VCG’s supply was evaluated one of the best 
in automotive benchmark studies. For example, with respect to suppliers’ capability for 
build-to-order, VCG’s supplier park was evaluated best in a comparative case study, also 
including supplier parks of e.g. Ford, General Motors and Audi (Howard, 2006). 
Furthermore, VCC and VCG were positively evaluated by suppliers regarding their 
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approach towards them. Also umbrella organizations, like the federation of the technology 
industry, which are able to compare their members’ different supplier relationships, were in 
favour of VCG’s MSRs. Hence, by choosing a “best in class” manufacturer, we aimed at 
gathering more convincing evidence, especially with respect to performance fluctuations, 
which are less likely driven by manufacturer characteristics.  
Second, VCG suited the research design of manuscripts 2 and 3 by experiencing 
changing MSRs due to the introduction of two extra car models. Before 2004, VCG 
operated in two shifts, manufacturing around 150.000 cars per year of two models (Volvo 
S60 and V70). In 2004, VCG started production of two extra models (Volvo S40 and V50) 
on another platform, which substantially changed all just-in-sequence MSRs. That way, 
VCG offered the opportunity to study MCS dynamics and the effect on operational 
performance after a drastic contingency change in 2004. 
Third, exploratory interviews with VCG management showed remarkable 
openness, interest in the research topic and willingness to cooperate due to the OEM’s 
openness and desire to learn. VCG confirmed this willingness by allowing us to gather first 
hand data on recent MSRs. Especially with respect to the second and third manuscript, 
documenting a severe performance decrease of one of VCG’s MSRs, VCG showed high 
commitment to our research project. In particular, VCG fully cooperated in gathering data 
concerning the events that contributed to the performance decrease. Furthermore, the 
automaker refused company disguising in the manuscripts of this dissertation.  
Nevertheless, this openness and commitment only followed our continuous 
emphasis on research ethics and confidentiality. It must be clear that it took a long time 
before we got settled into VCG and arrived at a stage where extremely confidential matters 
were openly discussed. To that end, we not only spent numerous hours interviewing several 
VCG managers, but also took the time for a full guided tour of VCG’s production facility. 
That way, we deepened our understanding of automotive production and built personal 
relationships with a number of highly motivated key informants. Their help was 
indispensable to gather the necessary data and to introduce us to the suppliers that were 
selected for a more in-depth study. As a result, our first study led to a research setting, 
which offered the best circumstances for additional research. Hence, as VCG suited the 
case research design of manuscripts 2 and 3, we opted to continue our research with the 
same automotive OEM, instead of choosing another one. 
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4.2.3.  VCG suppliers 
The selection of the case suppliers was also based on theoretical suitability and willingness 
to cooperate. Taking into account differences found at VCG and discussions with VCG 
management about supplier suitability and participation willingness, four high value-added 
just-in-sequence suppliers, two low value-added just-in-sequence suppliers (of which one is 
logistic provider) and two batch suppliers were chosen for the first manuscript. Except for 
the batch suppliers, all suppliers were located near VCG’s facility. Furthermore, all MSRs 
displayed good operational performance at the time of our study. For manuscript 2, 
however, we selected one of VCG’s high value-added just-in-sequence MSRs, studied in 
manuscript 1, that experienced considerably changing contingencies and fluctuating 
performance over time. For the third manuscript, this MSR was supplemented with a 
second high value-added just-in-sequence MSR, which resembled the first one on all 
situational characteristics, including the contingency changes, but differed with respect to 
cultural resemblance with VCG.    
4.2.4.  VCG case company description 
Volvo Cars Gent is the largest assembly unit of Volvo Cars Corporation, a Swedish 
automotive OEM, producing cars since 1927. In 1999, VCC became part of the Premier 
Automotive Group, including Jaguar, Aston Martin and Land Rover, owned by Ford Motor 
Company. In 2005, VCG celebrated its 40th birthday and already exceeded building 3 
million Volvos. At that time, the Belgian company employed 5.025 people, had a yearly 
turnover of about €4,2 billion and produced 258.479 cars per year.  This production was 
spread over four Volvo models, namely the S40, V50, S60 and V70, of which the first two 
were built on the so called P1 (small) platform and the latter two on the older P2 (large) 
platform. All four models were built on only one assembly line, which is rather unique in 
automotive and requires ultimate flexibility of all assembly processes. 
VCG’s production starts in the welding factory (GA), where pressed steel plates 
from Volvo’s press factories are welded together into a car body. The welding factory is the 
most robotised VCG department and operates 610 state-of-the-art robots. In the paint shop 
(GB), welded bodyworks are provided with various paint and protective coatings. 
Obviously, also the paint shop is largely automated, with over 95 percent of the paint being 
applied by robots or spraying machines. During final assembly (GC), the painted bodywork 
becomes a car with fitted interior elements, such as seats, and mechanical components, like 
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engine, gearbox and suspensions. Finished cars are subsequently transported to all parts of 
the world, in particular to the United States, to which about 23% of the production capacity 
is exported. 
Similar to other OEMs, production philosophy at VCG evolved from push to pull. 
In the past, production was scheduled on the basis of company capacity limitations. This 
resulted not only in unsold cars and unusable stock, but also in customers that did not get 
the car they desired. Especially this last shortcoming led to a “pull” system or “customer 
ordered production” (COP), a production planning entirely based on customer orders and 
their wishes. These customers were offered a larger choice in possible car configurations 
and guaranteed that their car would be delivered within a previously defined short time 
span. For Europe, the targeted lead-time for a car delivered to dealer lies between two to 
four weeks. Yet, this new approach created both a variant explosion of possible cars, for 
which stocking all components was physically and financially impossible, and the 
possibility for customers to make late order changes until four hours before the car goes on 
line at VCG. Hence, VCG needed flexible manufacturing and ordering, swift 
communication with suppliers and outsourcing of manufacturing activities to reliable 
suppliers.  
The first outsourcing project in 1984 involved car seat production, for which a 
textile manufacturer possessed substantially more core competences. Already in 1995, six 
additional important modules were produced externally, namely bumpers, dashboards, 
engines, fuel tanks, wheels and floor mats. By 2003, this number had risen to 20 suppliers, 
delivering 77% of total material value. Obviously, outsourcing advantages differed per type 
of activity, like postponing variant explosion for wheels or limiting warehouse space for 
bumpers and fuel tanks. Additionally, all suppliers were located in the neighbourhood of 
VCG in order to reduce transport costs and facilitate fast quality problem solving. 
Moreover, most suppliers now jointly work in what is called a SILS (supply in line 
sequence) centre, operated by a logistic provider and located five kilometres from VCG’s 
facility. This supplier park offers several advantages, such as limited overhead costs, 
competence sharing, joint transport to VCG and easy reshuffling. The most important 
advantage of local supply, however, is the possibility for suppliers to produce and deliver 
components both “just-in-time” (JIT), i.e. when the car for which the components are 
intended has come onto the final assembly line in factory GC, and “in-sequence”, i.e. in the 
same order as the cars on the production line. Indeed, following COP, every car on the 
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assembly line is different. Consequently, each component of a particular supplier order is 
potentially different as well. In order to reduce stocks and preserve maximum flexibility at 
VCG, these components need to be delivered both just-in-time and in the same order as the 
cars on the assembly line. Therefore, VCG considers local supply of ultimate strategic 
importance to make just-in-time and in-sequence, or “just-in-sequence” (JIS), supply 
feasible. VCG’s MCS on these JIS suppliers forms the main focus of this doctoral 
dissertation. 
4.3.  Data collection 
The main data gathering technique consisted of 34 semi-structured interviews. These 
interviews were held in eight rounds between October 2005 and December 2007. Following 
van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman (2000), we first interviewed executive managers of 
the umbrella organizations AGORIA (the Belgian federation of the technology industry), 
FEBIAC (the Belgian federation of the car and two-wheeler industries) and CLEPA (the 
European umbrella membership organization for the global automotive supply industry). 
That way, we increased our understanding of the automotive industrial environment and 
became well informed on recent problems and developments in the field of outsourcing 
manufacturing activities in this industry. Second, we interviewed all VCG managers 
involved with suppliers, including responsibles for quality, logistics, logistic engineering, 
material planning, IT, HR and purchase. That way, we got a general impression of VCG, its 
suppliers and its MCS. Third, we interviewed supplier managers, in particular plant 
managers of JIS suppliers and VCG responsibles of batch suppliers. Fourth, we re-
interviewed specific VCG managers most involved with suppliers spoken to previously. For 
the second and third manuscript, we reiterated the third and fourth round, meaning 
interviewing managers at the selected suppliers concerning our research questions and then 
re-interviewing VCG managers on the same issues. Table 0.1 provides an interview data 
summary, describing the organization and position of the interviewees, the number of 
interviews, the duration of the interviews and the interview dates. 
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VCG  Engineering Director & Material Planning & Logistics Manager  1 (joint)  122  8/02/2006 
  Supply Chain Control & Coordination Manager  3  55; 62; 58  10/02/2006; 29/05/2006; 13/10/2006 
  Logistic Engineering Manager  1  68  10/02/2006 
  Supplier Support & Purchasing Manager  4  92; 95; 98; 137  15/02/2006; 18/04/2006; 29/05/2006; 21/11/2007 
  Material Planning Manager  1  73  15/02/2006 
  Supplier Quality Assurance Manager  3  44; 96; 67  15/02/2006; 29/05/2006; 13/10/2006 
        Human  Resource Manager   1  50 15/02/2006
          Finance Manager 1  47 15/02/2006
          IT Manager 1  67 13/03/2006
SAG1          CEO SA1 1  68 17/12/2007
          Plant Manager 1  67 17/12/2007
SAG2  Plant Manager  3  106; 74; 116  13/03/2006; 18/04/2006; 26/11/2007 
          Human  Resource Manager 1  51 29/03/2006
  Quality Manager  2  125; 121  29/03/2006; 18/07/2007 
HVA JIS (3)  Plant Manager  1  164  30/03/2006 
HVA JIS (4)  Plant Manager  1  102  3/05/2006 
HVA JIS (5)  Plant Manager  1  116  10/10/2006 
LVA JIS (1)  Plant Manager  1  68  24/05/2006 
LVA JIS (2)  Plant Manager  1  121  6/10/2006 
Batch (1)  Commercial Service & Quality Manager  1  61  27/09/2006 
Batch (2)  Customer Service Manager & VCG Account Manager  1 (joint)      73 27/10/2006
FEBIAC  Advisor Automotive Suppliers Section  1  approx 60  10/10/2005 
CLEPA  CEO Strategic and International Relations & Aftermarket  1  76  15/11/2005 
AGORIA      Director Automotive 1      90 9/05/2006
 
Table 0.1: Interview data summary General introduction 
All interviews aimed at building a trusting relation and developing a dialogue with 
the interviewees, which permitted them to discuss their own concerns. The interviews were 
tape recorded electronically (except for one) and structured by an interview protocol with 
open-ended questions, based on the theoretical framework and tailored to fit the 
interviewee’s organization and the research question under study. This approach allowed 
covering framework constructs (i.e. theory attachment), while at the same time preserving 
openness for new findings (i.e. theory detachment). Interviews lasted between three 
quarters of an hour and three hours, with an average duration of approximately one hour 
and twenty minutes. Afterwards, all taped interviews were transcribed and sent back to the 
interviewees for feedback and final approval. This feedback was subsequently transcribed 
as well. Interview transcripts were written in prose, for two reasons. In order to start an 
open discussion on MSRs and their performance, which is a very sensitive topic, we 
explained the use of the tape recorder as a mnemonic device for ourselves. Hence, literally 
transcribing the interviewee’s words could have offended the interviewee and jeopardised 
further cooperation. Second, by writing in prose, we were able to immediately write out 
certain parts of the interview that were not entirely clear on the tape. As the interviewee 
approved the final transcript, we received absolute certainty on the written document and 
all interpretations made during transcribing. We believed this approach was more efficient 
than literally writing questions and answers containing all errors and indistinctness, made 
during the interview.  
For the first manuscript, we supplemented the interview data with archival 
research of internal and public data, such as company presentations, meeting minutes, 
supplier performance follow-up data and annual reports. We are convinced that content 
analysis of these data sources provided important additional insights in VCG’s MSRs. The 
most important contribution of this data gathering methodology was the possibility to 
triangulate (Scapens, 1990) different findings from the methods. The resulting triangulation 
enabled to crosscheck findings and made conclusions more reliable and convincing (Yin, 
2003). During the triangulation process, we certainly valued the role of our key informants 
at both VCG and the suppliers. 
4.4.  Data analysis 
The data analysis followed a structured iterative approach. Already during interview 
transcribing, a first analysis was performed by highlighting parts of the transcripts and 
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writing down comments and related personal ideas.  
Then, both transcripts and personal notes formed the basis for a second analysis 
which was completely done by hand and resulted in an extensive document, containing 
coded transcript extracts related to the theoretical constructs found in the data. The most 
important techniques to enhance our theoretical sensitivity during the coding process were 
asking questions (who?, when?, where?, what?, why?, how? and how much?) and making 
comparisons (Strauss & Corbin, 1999). In this process, also the tape recorder was utilised in 
order to capture facts and findings coming up during the analysis. As with interviews, these 
tapes were subsequently transcribed and further studied. Together with the rich collection 
of original data, the resulting document was used for writing up the case studies. As the 
case studies of the second and third manuscript were longitudinal, the transcript extracts of 
these studies were ordered chronologically.  
To structure and interpret the longitudinal case studies of the second and third 
manuscripts in relation to their contingency frameworks, we used the specific research 
methods of temporal bracketing and variance (Langley, 1999; Rowe et al., 2008). Temporal 
bracketing means dividing the time length of a longitudinal case study into time periods, so 
that there are continuities of events within a time period and discontinuities of events 
between time periods. That way, temporal bracketing is suited for making comparisons of 
organizational change between time periods. The variance (or synthetic) method implies 
transforming original data from a story with events to a collection of variables that 
synthesize critical components of the events. These variables are the variables from our 
theoretical frameworks, which allow analyzing how change in the influencing variables 
affects change in the dependent variable. Similarly to Rowe et al. (2008), we use both 
methods to make two types of comparisons, namely within period and between period 
comparisons. These comparisons provide the means to study static and dynamic 
propositions respectively. 
All case study descriptions and following discussions were approved for 
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This paper studies management control system design of supplier relationships in 
manufacturing, a supply chain phase currently under-explored. Compared to supplier 
relations during procurement and R&D, which research found to be governed by a 
combination of formal and informal controls, supplier relations in manufacturing are more 
formal, so that they could be governed by more formal and less informal controls. In order 
to refine management control theory, we propose a theoretical framework specifically 
adapted for the manufacturing phase. This framework is investigated by means of an in-
depth case study of the supplier management control system of a Volvo Cars production 
facility. We identify three types of suppliers that visualize the associations in the 
framework and illustrate the framework’s explicative power in automotive manufacturing. 
Furthermore, the case contradicts that supplier relations in the manufacturing phase are 
governed by little informal control, because the automaker highly values the role of trust 
building and social pressure. Most notably, a structured supplier team functions as a clan 
and establishes informal control among participating suppliers, which strengthens the 
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1.  Introduction 
In the current economic environment, characterised by globalisation and enhanced levels of 
competition, companies require an effective supply chain with inter-organizational 
relationships (IORs) to strive for sustainable competitive advantage. Not surprisingly, 
studies show that IORs have a high potential impact on the organization’s performance (e.g. 
Anderson & Dekker, 2005). Literature, however, also argues that many IORs do not 
provide the expected benefits and are often terminated because of managing difficulties 
(Ireland, Hitt & Vaidynanath, 2002). Academics often propose that lack of coordination and 
opportunistic behaviour of partners are the two main reasons for the relatively high 
relationship failure rate (e.g. Dekker, 2004). Hence, management control systems (MCSs) 
might play a critical role in preventing such failure, by establishing governance 
mechanisms to control the relationship (Ireland et al., 2002).  
The fundamental goal of MCSs is to influence decision making in attaining 
strategic objectives (Nixon & Burns, 2005). In an inter-organizational setting, this implies 
creating bilateral incentives to pursue mutual goals. Already in the mid-nineties, scholars 
started calling for more attention for this topic (e.g. Hopwood, 1996; Otley, 1994), and have 
not stopped since (e.g. van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2006). Consequently, inter-
organizational MCSs have been studied from several angles, including outsourcing (e.g. 
Anderson, Glenn & Sedatole, 2000), inter-organizational cost management (e.g. Cooper & 
Slagmulder, 2004), partnerships (e.g. Seal, Berry, Cullen, Dunlop & Ahmed, 1999), 
strategic alliances (e.g. Dekker 2004), networks (e.g. Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005) and joint 
ventures (e.g. Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). Yet, the main emphasis was put 
on relational collaboration during the first phases of the supply chain, namely procurement, 
which involves the make-or-buy decision, partner selection and contract design, and R&D. 
Although this historical focus is certainly justified, management control in a later phase of 
the supply chain, namely manufacturing, remains relatively under-explored (Cooper & 
Slagmulder, 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Scannell, Vickery & Dröge, 2000). 
However, purchased products and services for manufacturing account for more than 60% of 
the average company’s total costs (Degraeve & Roodhooft, 2001) and are subject to 
continuous improvement with suppliers, also requiring adequate management control. 
Therefore, this study illustrates how manufacturers design the MCS of supplier relations in 
the manufacturing phase of the supply chain, which we refer to as “manufacturer-supplier 
28 Manuscript 1 
relationships” (MSRs). In other words, we abstract from procurement and R&D 
influences.
1
Nevertheless, management control research on previous supply chain phases, 
offers a first theoretical insight into how a MCS for MSRs could look like. In particular, 
prior empirical research on IORs such as R&D collaboration (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), 
strategic alliances (Dekker 2004) and joint ventures (Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 
2007) found MCSs that combine both formal controls, like outcome controls, and more 
informal controls, such as trust building. Also the execution of outsourced services, like 
industrial maintenance (van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000), IT (Langfield-Smith 
& Smith, 2003) and accounting (Nicholson, Jones & Espenlaub, 2006) is governed by a 
combined MCS. So, if we assume these findings to hold for other IOR types and neglect 
potential characteristic differences, MSRs could be expected to be governed by a 
combination of formal and informal control as well. 
Yet, by taking into account differences between MSRs and other types of IORs, 
the MCS design could be different. In that respect, the literature argues that manufacturing 
is more formal than procurement and R&D. Indications for that argument and its 
consequences for management control can be found in the management control framework 
of Das & Teng (2001). Based on the variables in their framework
2, task programmability 
and outcome measurability, it should be clear that for manufacturing both variable levels 
are high; or at least higher than in the case of procurement and R&D. Consequently, the 
framework indicates that formal controls are suited mechanisms to govern MSRs. This 
argument is strengthened by the type of knowledge usage in MSRs, for which there exists a 
clear distinction between knowledge exploration and knowledge exploitation. On the one 
hand, it is argued that the first supply chain phases, like procurement and R&D, aim at 
                                                 
1 In terms of research methodology, this abstraction is put into operation by studying MSRs between a 
manufacturer facility and supplier facility only dealing with manufacturing, while procurement and R&D are 
handled by their respective mother companies (cf part three of this paper “research methodology”).   
2 Although this framework was originally developed by Ouchi (1979) for use in MCS design within organizations, 
Das & Teng (2001) further adapted it for use in IORs. Task programmability refers to the degree to which 
managers understand the transformation process in which appropriate behaviour is to take place. Outcome 
measurability refers to the ability to measure outcome precisely and objectively. When outcome measurability is 
high/low and task programmability is low/high, formal outcome/behaviour control should be set up to govern the 
relation. When both dimensions are low, informal control is preferable, but when both measures are high, both 
outcome and behaviour control are suited control mechanisms (Das & Teng, 2001). 
29 Manuscript 1 
knowledge exploration, while the later phases, such as manufacturing, primarily aim at 
knowledge exploitation. On the other hand, research shows that the exploration of 
knowledge is best governed by informal controls, while knowledge exploitation is most 
adequately controlled by formal controls (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005). Thus, based 
on the characteristics of high task programmability, high outcome measurability and 
knowledge exploitation goals, MSRs could be expected to be governed by primarily formal 
controls with little informal controls. In other words, the literature offers different 
management control designs for MSRs regarding the informal control level. Therefore, this 
study investigates how the MCS of MSRs is designed and how important informal controls 
are in that design, in particular in IORs between an original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM) and suppliers of outsourced manufacturing activities in the trend-setting automotive 
industry (cf Womack, Jones & Roos, 1990). 
An automobile is a complex product manufactured with thousands of components. 
Consequently, also this industry increasingly outsourced non-core activities and started 
relying on suppliers to create lower costs. To that end, a variety of supply chain 
management practices has been implemented, such as lean supply and continuous 
improvement. Yet, these practices induce the need for appropriate management control 
structures and bi-directional communication to organize and manage the relation (Carr & 
Ng, 1995; Cooper & Slagmulder, 1999; Scannell et al., 2000). In that respect, one particular 
automaker, namely Toyota, is known for partnering with suppliers, transferring its expertise 
to help suppliers and installing softer forms of control including trust. To govern the search 
for continuous improvement in manufacturing, Toyota established the “Toyota Group” by 
means of a supplier association, an operations management consulting division and 
voluntary small group learning teams (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). Other automakers, 
however, govern this search by heavily formalized supplier relations. Contrary to 
cooperation during procurement and R&D, manufacturing is argued to become much more 
demanding towards suppliers. Automakers increasingly transfer manufacturing risk and 
supply responsibility to first-tier suppliers, which results in suppliers delivering to very 
tight just-in-time and in-sequence schedules (Alford, Sackett & Nelder, 2000). As a result, 
OEMs install formal controls and supplier improvement techniques, which alert suppliers to 
the importance of ameliorating supply performance at lower costs. Hence, also automotive 
practice shows evidence of high and low levels of informal control. Therefore, this study 
specifically investigates how the MCS of automotive MSRs is designed. 
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Yet, besides illustrating MCS design, this paper contributes to explaining MCS 
design of automotive MSRs. To our knowledge, little management control research 
specifically investigated contingency theory’s explicative power in manufacturing. 
Naturally, several papers study influences on MCS design in manufacturing environments, 
like the impact of manufacturing flexibility (Abernethy & Lillis, 1995), customization and 
related interdependence (Bouwens & Abernethy, 2000), profit centre strategy (Lillis, 2002), 
production strategy and production technology (van Veen-Dirks, 2006). However, these 
studies investigate characteristics explaining MCS design in one organization. 
Consequently, the design of MCSs that govern different types of inter-organizational 
supplier relationships involved in the manufacturing of complex products (Gietzmann, 
1996) remains under-explored. Therefore, more attention towards explaining this type of 
MCS design is called for (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; 
van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2006). This paper answers that call by tailoring 
contingency theory to the setting of MSRs. To that end, we propose a refined theoretical 
contingency framework based on recent inter-organizational management control theory, 
but specifically adapted for the manufacturing phase. This framework proposes several 
contingencies determining the level of risks, which are governed by different levels of 
management control techniques.  
In order to illustrate the validity of the framework in practice and answer how and 
why automakers design their MCS, we perform an in-depth explanatory case study of the 
relations between a facility (VCG) of the international OEM Volvo Cars Corporation and a 
selection of its first-tier supplier facilities. The case study provides considerable evidence of 
three supplier types, namely batch, low value-added just-in-sequence and high value-added 
just-in-sequence suppliers, visualizing the associations in the framework between 
contingencies, risks and management controls. These controls include both formal and 
informal techniques, of which trust building and social pressure are highly valued. Most 
notably, VCG’s structured supplier team functions as a clan and establishes informal 
control among participating suppliers, which strengthens control on the OEM’s dyadic 
supplier relations. As our framework draws on case findings from other less formal IORs, 
our case findings offer more evidence of their external validity. That way, the findings 
contradict that informal controls play a minor role in automotive MSRs. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the second part, we 
develop the theoretical contingency framework. The third part describes the case research 
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methodology. The fourth part is the actual case study, which presents VCG, describes three 
supplier types by means of contingency levels and clarifies how VCG designed the MCS 
governing them. In the fifth part, we discuss our findings by comparing VCG’s 
management control with previous findings and elaborating on the significance of VCG’s 
supplier team. We conclude the paper with a summary of the main findings and some 
avenues for further research. 
2.  Theoretical framework 
In this part, we develop a theoretical contingency framework for MCS design of MSRs, 
which can be found in figure 1.1. 
 
Contingencies
Task uncertainty from process and product complexity
Sequential task interdependence




Performance risk of supply chain interruption
Relational risk of supplier opportunistic behaviour
Management control system
Formal control
Outcome control on timeliness, quality and defects
Behaviour control on planning, procedures, rules and regulations
Informal control
Building of contractual, competence, goodwill and generic trust
Clan control by social pressure  
Figure 1.1: Theoretical contingency framework for MCS design of MSRs 
 
Contingency theory originated with the aim of explaining the structure of 
organizations by particular circumstances. Later, management accounting researchers 
adopted and further developed the theory in order to explain the shape of MCSs in 
organizations (e.g. Chenhall, 2003; Luft & Shields, 2003). Therefore, contingency theory 
suits this study, regarding MCS design of MSRs and its explicative variables. The central 
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concept of the framework is the level of risk a certain MSR runs. Inter-organizational 
management control theory proposes two types of risk, which result from five different 
situational antecedents, characterizing the MSR. Although we clarify both risk types 
separately, we stress the integrative interpretation of all contingencies, jointly determining 
both levels of risk. Subsequently, this risk is governed by different management control 
instruments, either with a large or a small role for informal control.
3
2.1.  Performance risk 
The first risk type is performance risk, defined as the probability of not achieving the MSR 
objectives, despite satisfactory cooperation (Das & Teng, 2001). This type of risk is also 
referred to as “coordination requirements” (Dekker, 2004; Gulati & Singh, 1998). As the 
MSR objective concerns manufacturing as many products of the order book as possible, on 
time, with good quality and at the lowest possible cost, performance risk is the risk of a 
supply chain interruption, disturbing the realisation of this goal. Three contingencies related 
to technology increase this risk, namely complexity, task uncertainty and task 
interdependence (Chenhall, 2003). Yet as complexity and task uncertainty are highly 
related (Chenhall, 2003), the framework does not include complexity separately (cf Dekker, 
2004).  
Task uncertainty refers to variability in transformation tasks and the available 
knowledge of methods for performing those tasks (Chenhall, 2003). This situational 
characteristic determines the measurability difficulty of output and activities (Kamminga & 
van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000), which increases 
with increasing levels of complexity of both the delivered product and its operational 
processes (Woodward, 1965). The first complexity is related to the added value of the 
product and gradually increases depending on whether the supplier delivers a standard 
component or an important customized module (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004). The second 
                                                 
3 According to van Veen-Dirks (2006), all situational characteristics and MCS characteristics are determined 
jointly instead of sequentially. Also Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra (2007) propose that the influence of 
contingencies is not determined by each antecedent as such, but by their interaction. In addition, they suggest 
studying control as an integrative concept, in which all control dimensions are incorporated. Consequently, we do 
not propose one-on-one associations between one specific contingency, one specific type of risk and one specific 
type of control, suggested to suit that risk type. Instead, our model simultaneously studies the associations between 
situational contingencies, risks and management control techniques. 
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complexity regards the added value of the production process and reflects the complexity of 
the supplier’s manufacturing processes, needed to effectively produce and deliver the 
products as required. 
Task interdependence relates to the degree to which subactivities of the value 
creation process have been split up and made dependent on each other (Dekker, 2004). In 
MSRs, this interdependence is sequential (Thompson, 1967)
4, because the relation involves 
transferring the supplier’s output to the manufacturer’s input process. The level of 
sequential interdependence is impacted by the dependence level of the manufacturer’s 
operational performance on the supply quality (timeliness and product quality). Moreover, 
the interdependence level of a specific MSR is influenced by the production flexibility 
required from both parties and the manufacturer’s lack of precise knowledge to perform 
activities previously done in-house. 
2.2.  Relational risk  
The second type of risk is relational risk, implying the probability of not having 
satisfactory cooperation because of opportunistic behaviour of the supplier, exemplified in 
shirking, cheating, distorting information and appropriating resources (Das and Teng, 
2001). This type of risk is also referred to as “appropriation concerns” (Dekker, 2004; 
Gulati & Singh, 1998). Transaction cost economics (TCE) theory
5 proposes three 
contingencies that influence relational risk and subsequently determine appropriate control: 
asset specificity, environmental uncertainty and transaction frequency (Williamson, 1979). 
Yet, as the manufacturer possesses no specific assets related to a certain supplier, at least 
not in the manufacturing phase of the supply chain, there is no lock-in to supplier 
opportunistic behaviour.
6 Hence, unlike uncertainty and transaction frequency, asset 
                                                 
4 Thompson (1967) identifies three levels of task interdependence from low to high, which influence the level of 
inter-organizational coordination and communication: pooled, sequential and reciprocal interdependence. 
5 TCE argues that parties are only boundedly rational and behave opportunistically. Therefore, the total cost of 
outsourcing is the sum of both the supplied component costs and the transaction costs, including costs for 
negotiation, drawing up contracts, coordination, control and risk of opportunistic behaviour (van der Meer-
Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). 
6 Obviously, suppliers do have specific assets in place, rendering them vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour from 
the part of the manufacturer. However, this study and the developed theoretical framework only focus on supplier 
opportunistic behaviour. 
34 Manuscript 1 
specificity does not influence supplier opportunistic behaviour in MSRs and is not included 
in our theoretical framework. 
Consistent with being a central contingency research variable, environmental 
uncertainty also forms a powerful characteristic of MSRs (Chenhall, 2003). In particular, 
this contingency relates to general market uncertainties and uncertainty about unknown 
future contingencies (Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007; Langfield-Smith & 
Smith, 2003; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). Because manufacturer and 
supplier interact under these uncertainties, both parties face changes over time, which 
require detailed contracts (Dekker, 2004). However, incomplete contract theory argues that 
there exist limitations in drawing up complete contracts, because all future contingencies 
can not be foreseen, are too expensive to foresee or are too expensive or impossible to 
contract upon (Gietzmann, 1996). Consequently, the combination of uncertainty and 
incomplete contracts leads to potential opportunistic behaviour of the supplier. 
According to TCE, more frequent interactions lower the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1979). So, to preserve a positive relation between 
contingencies and relational risk, we could utilize infrequency as contingency variable (e.g. 
Anderson & Dekker, 2005). Yet, as we study MSRs with no connection to commercial 
negotiations determining the contract term, we include the antecedent relational stability 
aim. This contingency relates to the manufacturer’s aim of continued future interactions 
with the supplier and serves to build bilateral commitment (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004). 
We argue that MSRs, in which relational stability is considered necessary and thus aspired 
by the manufacturer, are subject to higher relational risk. For example, if supplier switching 
costs are high due to high interdependence, high commitment from the manufacturer could 
incite the supplier to accept lower quality or delivery performance. 
Besides including a transaction environment characteristic and a transaction 
characteristic, we also incorporate a transaction party characteristic (Langfield-Smith & 
Smith, 2003; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). In particular, we include 
supplier knowledge importance, which encompasses the degree of importance for the 
manufacturer to know the supplier and to be able to assess characteristics, such as 
trustworthiness and willingness to share proprietary knowledge. Usually, this kind of 
assessment is done by means of first-hand or second-hand experience. Hence, we argue that 
when the importance of supplier knowledge rises, the risk for insufficient or erroneous 
assessment and subsequent supplier opportunistic behaviour increases. 
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2.3.  Management control system 
Although MCSs have been conceptualised and categorised in various ways, the current 
management control literature has reached a consensus on two types of management 
controls, namely formal and informal control instruments (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 
2003). Obviously, studying the usage of informal controls compared to formal controls 
requires both control types to be included in the theoretical framework. 
Formal controls are explicitly set up to coordinate the MSR and include outcome 
controls and behaviour controls. Outcome controls involve the measurement and evaluation 
of the outcomes of operations against pre-defined outcomes or targets, by using several 
performance measurement techniques (Dekker, 2004; Merchant, 1998; Ouchi, 1979). The 
most important outcome metrics for MSRs are percentage of defects, quality of delivered 
goods and on time delivery of goods (Gunasekaran, Patel & McGaughey, 2004). Behaviour 
controls concern the specification and actual surveillance of behaviour by means of rules 
and standard procedures (Merchant, 1998; Ouchi, 1979). Additionally, behaviour controls 
include evaluating compliance with pre-specified planning, procedures, rules and 
regulations (Dekker, 2004). 
Informal controls (also called social controls) are not explicitly designed, but are 
grown out of shared norms and values, shaped by frequent interaction, meetings and 
management attitude (Merchant, 1998; Ouchi, 1979). Especially trust building
7 has 
emerged as an important informal control instrument in inter-organizational MCSs (e.g. 
Dekker, 2004). While formal controls reduce risks by altering the incentives for 
underperformance or opportunism, trust building mitigates these risks by minimizing the 
fear of underperformance or opportunism to occur (Das and Teng 2001). Therefore, we 
include three types of inter-organizational trust building, namely building contractual trust, 
competence trust and goodwill trust (Sako, 1992).
8 Contractual trust results from previous 
                                                 
7 Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer (1998, p. 395) define trust as “a psychological state comprising the intention 
to accept vulnerability, based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another”. According to 
them “trust is not a behaviour (e.g. cooperation), or a choice (e.g. taking a risk), but an underlying psychological 
condition that can cause or result from such actions” (Rousseau et al., 1998, p. 395; italics added). As such, trust in 
itself can not be a control instrument in the MCS of MSRs. Instead, the control techniques are the actions the 
manufacturer performs to create and build trust in the supplier.  
8 Contractual trust is based on the expectation that the supplier will keep promises and comply with agreements 
made, whether these are contractually stipulated or not. Competence trust concerns the expectation that the 
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contractual relations or grows during the MSR (Sako, 1992). Competence trust is increased 
by previous good performance, i.e. good quality and delivery results. Moreover, 
competence trust results from buying products from reputable suppliers or transferring 
competences to the supplier. Additionally, product and/or process certification and process 
standardisation enhance competence trust (Sako, 1992). To develop goodwill trust, Sako 
(1992) identifies shared values and norms as necessary, but insufficient, because transaction 
parties also need to show the willingness to be indebted to each other. Gulati (1995) 
stresses creating and growing an inter-organizational bond of friendship to trigger goodwill 
trust (Gulati, 1995). Other possible goodwill trust initiators are interactive goal setting, 
trustworthiness reputation and a long term relationship (Dekker, 2004). Next to these 
specific trust building mechanisms, the literature also proposes an important generic trust 
building technique, namely close interaction based on mutual interests and established by 
means of joint decision making and joint problem solving via a joint relationship board 
and/or joint task groups (Das & Teng, 2001; Dekker, 2004).
9  
Besides trust building, MSRs can be governed by another type of informal control, 
which Ouchi (1979) refers to as clan control. Based on shared norms, values and a common 
inter-organizational goal, supplier behaviour in the interest of the MSR will be reinforced, 
because suppliers are motivated to achieve the goal (Das & Teng, 2001). This incentive 
results from inter-organizational social pressure (Speklé, 2001) exerted by the 
manufacturer, which we believe is social control in its literal meaning. Because of high 
interdependence between manufacturer and supplier, below standard results of the supplier 
directly impact the manufacturer’s performance. Consequently, supplier management is 
unpleasantly confronted with manufacturer management and faces personal humiliation 
because of the error. Additionally, supplier management runs the risk of their reputation 
                                                                                                                            
supplier possesses the necessary technical and managerial competences to deliver the order as agreed. Goodwill 
trust regards the expectation that the supplier shares an open commitment, with the willingness to perform 
activities that are beneficial to the MSR, but possibly neither in the supplier’s interest nor required by the contract 
(Sako, 1992). 
9 Other potential generic trust building techniques in a MSR are communication via regular inter-organizational 
meetings (Chalos & O’Connor, 2004; Das & Teng, 2001), information sharing of problem areas (Chalos & 
O’Connor, 2004), supplier development activities (Carr & Ng, 1995), networking (Das & Teng, 2001), training 
(Chalos & O’Connor, 2004) and the extent to which the employees of both parties understand the factors ensuring 
the collaboration’s future success (Chalos & O’Connor, 2004). 
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and personal relationship with interacting manufacturer management getting injured. Also 
Dyer & Singh (1998) mention reputation and personal relations as social control 
mechanisms, besides norms and trust. By acting as negatively valued social sanctions 
(Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005), these social consequences create incentives for 
satisfactory supplier performance and render supplier underperformance and opportunism 
hard to sustain (Speklé, 2001). If we assume operational snags to be day-to-day business in 
MSRs, this social pressure creates an informal means to mitigate risk in MSRs. 
3.  Research methodology 
3.1.  Case study research  
The empirical part of this paper is based on an in-depth case study, which is an 
investigation of a real life phenomenon, relying on multiple sources of evidence and 
benefiting from prior development of theoretical propositions (Yin, 2003). An explanatory 
case study suits our research that concerns refining existing inter-organizational 
management control theory for the relatively under-explored manufacturing phase of the 
supply chain.
10 According to Keating (1995), such theory refinement needs a clear 
theoretical starting point, supplemented with openness to the discovery of unexpected 
findings. To balance these theory attachment and detachment requirements, we developed a 
theoretical framework to guide the data collection, but at the same time used data collection 
techniques allowing sufficient openness. Based on the data, we assessed the explanatory 
power of the theoretical framework. 
Furthermore, several inter-organizational management control case studies (e.g. 
Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Dekker, 2004; Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007; 
                                                 
10 More specifically, our research corresponds to investigating a complex phenomenon within its real life context, 
of which empirical evidence is rather limited, and answering how and why questions about this phenomenon, for 
which an explanatory case study design is most suited (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). Furthermore, our theory 
refinement goal represents the middle ground between theory discovery, i.e. describing novel phenomena, and 
theory refutation, i.e. disconfirming well specified theories by bringing in negative evidence (Keating, 1995). 
More specifically, our case research is of the theory illustration type, documenting “previously unappreciated 
aspects of management accounting practice” and identifying “aspects of the illustrated theory that require 
reformulation or more rigorous specification” (Keating, 1995, p. 71). Indeed, the goal of this study is to illustrate 
how manufacturers design supplier MCSs, how important informal controls are in that design and how the design 
can be explained by means of a specifically adapted theoretical framework. 
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Nicholson et al., 2006) strengthen the argument that cases allow investigating in detail the 
structure and influencing variables of IORs (Sartorius & Kirsten, 2005). These studies 
demonstrate that MCS design can be adequately investigated by means of qualitative 
research. The social meaning of inter-organizational MCSs, especially regarding the use 
and interpretation of informal controls, and the subsequent behaviour of companies and 
employees is very complex. Therefore, an in-depth study is needed to discover how 
different parties interpret certain IORs and whether the MCS is designed accordingly. This 
argument not only justifies the choice for a case study, but also forms the reason why more 
of this research is requested (e.g. Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Dekker, 2004; van der 
Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2006). 
Like most inter-organizational studies, the unit of analysis consists of dyadic 
relationships between manufacturer and supplier (van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 
2006). Dyer & Singh (1998) explicitly propose this “relational view”, focusing on the 
manufacturer-supplier dyad, as opposed to the “industry structure view” and “resource 
based view”, when analyzing cooperative strategy and sources of inter-organizational 
competitive advantage. In order to answer the proposed research questions concerning 
MSR MCS design, we analyzed all relations after the manufacturer had decided to 
outsource the manufacturing activities. In other words, we addressed neither the make-or-
buy decision nor related commercial negotiations, but collected data from the start of 
production onwards. Furthermore, we only gathered data on standard MCSs for MSRs with 
good operational performance. 
3.2.  Case company selection 
The selection of the case company and its suppliers was influenced by two selection 
concerns: theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989) and open and flexible access to senior 
management. Based on these concerns, we chose the Volvo Cars Gent (VCG) production 
facility of the Swedish Volvo Cars Corporation as manufacturing case company. On the 
one hand, VCG was chosen because exploratory interviews learned that the OEM is 
considered a “best practice”
11 by financial analysts, suppliers and umbrella organizations. 
                                                 
11 VCG is financially healthy, operationally profitable and highly appraised in the international automotive sector. 
Additionally, VCG’s supply is evaluated one of the best in automotive benchmark studies. Furthermore, VCC and 
in particular VCG are positively evaluated by suppliers regarding their approach towards them. Finally, also 
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For example, with respect to suppliers’ capability for build-to-order, VCG’s supplier park 
was evaluated best in a comparative case study, also including supplier parks of e.g. Ford, 
General Motors and Audi (Howard, 2006). On the other hand, VCG management showed 
remarkable openness, interest in the research topic and willingness to cooperate. Obviously, 
the selection of case suppliers was based on the same selection concerns. Taking into 
account differences found at VCG and discussions with VCG management about supplier 
appropriateness (i.e. theoretical sampling) and participation willingness, eight VCG 
supplier manufacturing facilities were chosen. This way, we were able to investigate 
VCG’s MCS of different MSRs, with data from both parties. 
3.3.  Data collection 
The main data gathering technique consisted of 26 semi-structured interviews with high 
level managers of both VCG and the selected suppliers. These interviews were held in three 
rounds between February 2006 and October 2006. Hence, the validity of the observations 
described in this paper relates to that period. First, all VCG managers involved with 
suppliers were interviewed, including responsibles for quality, logistics, logistic 
engineering, material planning, IT, HR and purchase. That way, we got a general 
impression of VCG, its suppliers and its MCS. Next, we interviewed supplier managers, in 
particular plant managers or VCG responsibles. Finally, we re-interviewed specific VCG 
managers most involved with suppliers spoken to in round two. Table 1.1 provides an 
interview data summary, describing the organization and position of the interviewees, the 
number of interviews, the duration of the interviews and the interview dates. 
                                                                                                                            
umbrella organizations, able to compare their members’ different supplier relationship approaches, are in favour of 
VCG’s MSRs. 
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    Organization Interviewee Number of
interviews 
    Duration  
(in min.) 
Date 
VCG  Engineering Director & Material Planning & Logistics Manager  1 (joint)  122  8/02/2006 
  Supply Chain Control & Coordination Manager  3  55; 62; 58  10/02/2006; 29/05/2006; 13/10/2006 
  Logistic Engineering Manager  1  68  10/02/2006 
  Supplier Support & Purchasing Manager  3  92; 95; 98  15/02/2006; 18/04/2006; 29/05/2006 
  Material Planning Manager  1  73  15/02/2006 
  Supplier Quality Assurance Manager  3  44; 96; 67  15/02/2006; 29/05/2006; 13/10/2006 
          Human  Resource Manager 1  50 15/02/2006
          Finance Manager 1  47 15/02/2006
          IT Manager 1  67 13/03/2006
HVA JIS (1)  Plant Manager  2  106; 74  13/03/2006; 18/04/2006 
          Human  Resource Manager 1  51 29/03/2006
          Quality Manager 1  125 29/03/2006
HVA JIS (2)  Plant Manager  1  164  30/03/2006 
HVA JIS (3)  Plant Manager  1  102  3/05/2006 
HVA JIS (4)  Plant Manager  1  116  10/10/2006 
LVA JIS (1)  Plant Manager  1  68  24/05/2006 
LVA JIS (2)  Plant Manager  1  121  6/10/2006 
Batch (1)  Commercial Service & Quality Manager  1  61  27/09/2006 
Batch (2)  Customer Service Manager & VCG Account Manager  1 (joint) 73  27/10/2006 
 
Table 1.1: Interview data summary Manuscript 1 
The interviews aimed at building a trusting relationship and developing a dialogue 
with the interviewees, which permitted them to discuss their own concerns. All interviews 
were tape recorded electronically and structured by an interview protocol with open-ended 
questions, based on the theoretical framework and tailored to fit the interviewee’s 
organization and responsibility (cf appendix for a general interview protocol of interview 
rounds two and three). This approach allowed covering all framework constructs (i.e. 
theory attachment), while at the same time preserving openness for new findings (i.e. 
theory detachment). Interviews lasted between three quarters of an hour and three hours, 
with an average duration of approximately one hour and a half. Afterwards, all taped 
interviews were transcribed and sent back to the interviewees for feedback and final 
approval. This feedback was subsequently transcribed as well. Interview transcripts were 
written in prose, as to avoid offending interviewees by literally transcribing their words on 
a sensitive topic. Furthermore, by writing in prose, we were able to immediately write out 
certain parts of the interview that were not entirely clear on the tape. As the interviewees 
approved the final transcript, we received absolute certainty on the written document and 
all interpretations made during transcribing.  
Finally, we supplemented the interview data with archival research of internal and 
public data, such as company presentations, meeting minutes, supplier performance data, 
supplier syllabi, annual reports and news articles. These archival data allowed triangulating 
different findings from different methods, rendering conclusions more reliable and 
convincing (Yin, 2003).  
3.4.  Data analysis 
The data analysis followed a structured iterative approach. Already during interview 
transcribing, a first analysis was performed by highlighting parts of the transcript and 
writing down comments and related personal ideas.  
Then, both transcripts and personal notes formed the basis for a second analysis, 
which was completely done by hand. The most important techniques to enhance theoretical 
sensitivity during the coding process were asking questions (who?, what?, when?, where?, 
why? and how?) and making comparisons (Strauss & Corbin, 1999). Also the tape recorder 
was utilised in order to capture facts and findings coming up during the analysis. As with 
interviews, these tapes were subsequently transcribed and further studied. Finally, this 
second analysis resulted in an elaborate document, containing coded transcript extracts 
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related to the theoretical constructs found in the data. Together with the rich collection of 
original data, this document was used for writing up the case study and discussing its 
findings. Both case study and discussion were approved for publication by VCG, without 
having to make changes. 
Due to lack of space, the following case study only describes our findings in terms 
of the framework, so without direct reference to the rich set of unique case data. Yet, to 
indicate the origin of this description, we grouped some exemplary interview quotes in 
three tables provided in the next part.  
4.  Case study: Volvo Cars Gent 
4.1.  Case company description 
Volvo Cars Gent (VCG) is the largest manufacturing unit of Volvo Cars Corporation 
(VCC), a Swedish automotive OEM owned by Ford Motor Company. In 2005, this 
company employed 5.025 people, had a turnover of about €4,2 billion and produced 
258.479 cars. The production was spread over four Volvo models, namely the S40, V50, 
S60 and V70. All models are built on only one assembly line, which requires ultimate 
flexibility of all assembly processes. Production starts in the welding factory, where pressed 
steel plates from Volvo’s press factories are welded together into a car body. In the paint 
shop, welded bodyworks are provided with various paint and protective coatings. During 
final assembly, the painted bodywork becomes a car with fitted interior elements, such as 
seats, and mechanical components, like suspensions. The relations with suppliers of these 
products for final assembly are this study’s subject. 
Similar to other OEMs, production philosophy at VCG evolved from push (i.e. 
build-to-stock), to pull (i.e. build-to-order). Yet, this new approach created both an 
explosion of possible cars, for which stocking all components was physically and 
financially impossible, and the possibility for customers to make very late order changes. 
Hence, VCG needed flexible manufacturing and ordering, and outsourcing of 
manufacturing activities to reliable suppliers. By 2003, 20 suppliers delivered 78% of total 
material volume and 77% of total material value. These suppliers set up shop in VCG’s 
neighbourhood in order to reduce transport costs and facilitate fast problem solving. 
Moreover, most suppliers jointly work in a supply-in-line-sequence centre, i.e. a supplier 
park, operated by a logistic provider and located five kilometres from VCG, which offers 
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advantages such as limited overhead costs, competence sharing and joint transport. The 
most important advantage of local supply, however, is the possibility for suppliers to 
produce and deliver components both “just-in-time” (JIT), i.e. when the car for which the 
components are intended has come on VCG’s production line, and “in-sequence”, i.e. in the 
same order as the cars on VCG’s production line.  
Because of local supply’s strategic importance in making just-in-sequence (JIS) 
supply feasible, VCG set up the Suppliers Team Volvo Cars ( S T V C )  t o  e x c h a n g e  
information with JIS suppliers. The purposes of the STVC are creating openness and 
sharing competencies by the exchange of real life experiences in order to improve 
manufacturing. To this end, all supplier plant managers attend a monthly STVC meeting in 
order to get to know each other, exchange VCG information (VCG planning, Volvo sales, 
automotive trends, etc.), jointly consider common problems and improvement programs, 
and set up and follow up on specific workgroup projects. Examples of common 
improvements are jointly buying electricity and increasing supplier park safety. Under the 
overall STVC, of which the chairman is a supplier plant manager, five inter-organizational 
workgroups exist, namely for quality, logistics, HR, IT and finance. Workgroup 
participants meet monthly at one of the supplier facilities to visit the company and discuss 
problems and improvements. Examples of discussion themes are correct sequencing, milk 
rounds, employee absenteeism, a monitoring and back-up procedure test of EDI 
communication and automatic invoicing. 
4.2.  Management control system of supplier relationships 
Our data contain substantial evidence of three supplier types in manufacturing that are 
characterized by different contingency levels, namely batch  suppliers,  low value-added 
(LVA) just-in-sequence (JIS) suppliers and high value-added (HVA) just-in-sequence (JIS) 
suppliers. In order to better understand how risk is influenced by the contingencies, we first 
clarify VCG’s performance and relational risk. Then, we discuss the contingencies one by 
one, before indicating how the resulting risk level is governed by both formal and informal 
management controls. A summary of the results can be found in figure 1.2. 
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Suppliers
Batch LVA JIS  HVA JIS
Contingencies
Process complexity batch low value-added just-in-sequence high value-added just-in-sequence
Product complexity standard components customized components customized modules
Performance dependence partially entirely entirely
Flexibility requirements low high high
Process knowledge asymmetry depends low high
Supplier dependence on fluctuating demand partially entirely entirely
Impact of unknown future contingencies low  high high
Relational stability aim medium high very high
Supplier knowledge importance little supplier knowledge good plant manager knowledge
good plant manager and 
middle manager knowledge
Risks
Performance risk of supply chain interruption low  medium high
Relational risk of supplier opportunistic behaviour low  medium high
Management control system
Outcome control
Quality KPIs PPM PPM; audit remarks PPM; audit remarks
Logistics KPIs
MPs; line stop minutes;
dropped cars; delivery precision 
MPs; line stop minutes;
dropped cars
MPs; line stop minutes;
dropped cars
Specific audit remark targets no no yes
Quality off-target response time no response, unless severe snag daily daily
Logistics off-target response time depending on stock level daily daily
Quality KPI follow-up  no response, unless severe snag monthly monthly
Logistics KPI follow-up  daily daily daily
Technical quality report penalty predefined; non-negotiable none none
Line stop penalty predefined; non-negotiable tailor made; negotiable tailor made; negotiable
Behaviour control
Syllabus none basic routines basic routines; specialized extensions
Supplier quality follow-up none, unless severe snag weekly, unless snag daily
Supplier logistics follow-up (workload score) 2, 5 or 10 2 or 5 10
Supplier company visits none, unless severe snag monthly weekly
Open information sharing none limited extensive
Trust building
Specific trust building
Contractual trust building high high high
Competence trust building medium high very high
Goodwill trust building medium high very high
Generic trust building via STVC
Global STVC / STVC workgroup attendance no member 52% / 43% 69% / 68%
STVC workgroup contribution no member low to medium high
Social pressure
Supplier interaction for problem solving seldom often daily
Global STVC / STVC workgroup attendance no member 52% / 43% 69% / 68%
 
Figure 1.2: MCS design of MSRs at VCG 
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4.2.1.  Risks 
In MSRs, risk relates to potential problems concerning manufacturing and supporting 
processes like logistics and IT. In that respect, VCG is most concerned with the 
performance risk of a MSR, which is the probability that such an operational snag occurs in 
the supplier’s production or logistics processes and disturbs supply chain continuity and 
VCG manufacturing. In other words, performance risk is the risk that a supplier is not 
capable of keeping the promise of delivering the right goods of the right quality at the right 
time. Based on the levels of task uncertainty and task interdependence, we find 
performance risk of batch suppliers to be lower than the risk of LVA JIS suppliers. The 
level of this latter risk, in turn, is lower than the HVA JIS suppliers’ risk.  
Relational risk in the MSR regards the probability of supplier opportunistic 
behaviour. VCG considers this risk type to be the risk that (even potential) operational 
snags are not openly communicated or minimized, so that problem solving time is lost and 
the problem escalates. Additionally, shirking one’s responsibility in case of a snag is a 
second appropriation concern for VCG managers. Although the first opportunism type 
damages VCG manufacturing most, also the second type results in worthless discussions, 
seriously hampering manufacturer-supplier interaction. By studying environmental 
uncertainty, relational stability aim and supplier knowledge importance, we find a similar 
ordering for relational risk, namely lowest for batch suppliers, highest for HVA JIS 
suppliers and somewhere in between for LVA JIS suppliers.  
4.2.2.  Contingencies 
VCG and supplier management refer to process and product complexity to differentiate 
between supplier types. Batch suppliers deliver products in large quantities on a regular 
basis from facilities all over the world. JIS suppliers are located in the neighbourhood of 
VCG and deliver just-in-time and in-sequence, which is much more complex. Although 
many batch suppliers deliver simple parts, like plastic pieces, some batch suppliers deliver 
more complex products, such as electronic devices. However, all batch suppliers deliver 
standard components, which are not called off for a specific car. LVA JIS suppliers, 
however, deliver customized components. Their manufacturing activities are low value-
added, because they primarily aim at variant creation, after which all parts are sequenced 
and delivered just-in-time. Supplying back shelves is a good LVA example, because 
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manufacturing stays limited to punching holes for speakers. Concerning delivery, HVA JIS 
suppliers are comparable to LVA JIS suppliers. Yet, these suppliers assemble modules such 
as car seats, so that their processes add considerably more value. To that end, HVA JIS 
suppliers operate large facilities with many employees engaged in complex processes. 
Furthermore, modules like dashboards are characterized by lower output measurability 
compared to batch and LVA JIS products, which results in extra difficulties in case of 
unsatisfactory quality. Because HVA JIS suppliers deliver the most complex modules by 
means of the most complex production and supply system, performance risk is highest. 
Because of just-in-sequence delivery, the interdependence between JIS suppliers 
and VCG is high; or at least considerably higher than between VCG and batch suppliers. 
All JIS suppliers work in harmony with VCG like the cogwheels of a watch, because if one 
supplier disturbs the continuous delivery flow, not only VCG but also other JIS suppliers 
suffer. Severe supply problems stop VCG’s assembly line, producing a car every 61 
seconds. As all JIS suppliers exclusively deliver VCG and only receive EDI orders during 
running production, their production will inevitably suffer (in the worst case stop) as well. 
Hence, VCG’s and JIS suppliers’ performance entirely depends on the performance of all 
JIS suppliers. Additionally, JIS suppliers must be highly flexible because of pull production 
and heavily fluctuating automotive demand (cf environmental uncertainty). Furthermore, 
HVA JIS suppliers operate complex processes, which are more core competences than the 
variant creation processes of LVA JIS suppliers. Consequently, VCG lacks sufficient 
knowledge to effectively and efficiently perform these HVA activities. 
The automotive industry probably experiences its highest competitive level ever. 
According to all parties involved, environmental uncertainty has become the new standard. 
Hence, VCG’s JIS suppliers’ market uncertainty is high, because their performance 
completely depends on Volvo’s market demand, which sometimes heavily fluctuates. In 
addition, there are two unknown future contingencies, substantially impacting the relation 
with JIS suppliers. On the one hand, VCG continuously bears the risk of being closed down 
by its mother company VCC/Ford in case of a performance decrease. On the other hand, the 
VCC/Ford purchase department can always decide not to resource the current supplier. 
Consequently, both VCG and suppliers continuously need to prove themselves towards 
their mothers, who benchmark them against their colleague facilities. This competition 
between colleagues increases environmental uncertainty to stimulate continuous 
improvement. As a result, VCG needs to safeguard its high performance level at all times 
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and needs suppliers not to behave opportunistically. Suppliers, however, face similar 
performance pressure from their own mother companies. Because of that, they are tempted 
to hide operational snags from VCG and try to solve problems themselves in order to 
prevent their negative performance from being noticed and registered. In other words, 
environmental uncertainty is a very important contingency influencing relational risk. 
Although also batch suppliers face these environmental uncertainties, their impact is much 
smaller, because the effect from VCG is mitigated by supplying other automotive OEMs 
and other industries. 
VCG generally cooperates with suppliers and helps them facing problems. VCG 
truly strives for long term relational stability, because the OEM is aware that the 
interdependence, which is higher with JIS suppliers, considerably impacts performance. To 
put it simply, if the supplier is in trouble, VCG is in trouble as well. So, as all JIS suppliers 
need to work in utmost harmony with VCG, the OEM prefers stable over changing MSRs, 
even when they are underperforming for a long time. VCG beliefs that assisting suppliers 
minimizes the possibility of (further) damage to VCG’s production. Consequently, JIS 
suppliers receive much bilateral cooperation to solve problems quickly. The location of 
most JIS suppliers in the supplier park provides opportunities for such problem solving and 
process ameliorations. Although VCG also assists batch suppliers in severe problems, the 
OEM values stability most for HVA JIS suppliers, as their interdependence is highest. 
Obviously, this attitude makes VCG more vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour from HVA 
JIS suppliers. As these suppliers know VCG strives for relational stability, their fear for 
retaliation, resulting from disclosed opportunism, is lower. 
Finally, our data show that VCG managers value good supplier knowledge most in 
case of HVA JIS suppliers. Yet, this does not mean that VCG assesses JIS supplier’s 
competence reputation on a firm level basis. That is the responsibility of the VCC/Ford 
purchase department during supplier selection. Instead, VCG evaluates suppliers on a 
person level basis and gathers information about supplier plant managers, concerning 
trustworthiness and willingness to share proprietary knowledge. These managers play a 
central role in the MSR, as they need to guarantee good performance by interacting with 
several parties involved, including VCG management, supplier mother company 
management and supplier employees. The importance of VCG’s plant manager knowledge 
is exemplified by the fact that VCG not only follows their appointment from close by, but 
also suggests appropriate candidates to supplier mother companies. For HVA JIS suppliers, 
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with a larger management staff than LVA JIS suppliers, the same importance is given to 
partner knowledge of middle management. For example, if a supplier quality manager 
appears unwilling to share proprietary information concerning quality (problems), VCG’s 
interacting quality manager will highlight this personal attitude by escalating the supplier to 
step two of the escalating activities procedure
12, even when no substantial quality problems 
have occurred. This reflects the considerable impact of this contingency on VCG’s 
relational risk with HVA JIS suppliers. It speaks for itself that VCG is not interested in the 
plant manager of batch suppliers. In most cases, especially when the supplier’s facility is 
located abroad, VCG managers do not even know who actually leads the plant.  
Exemplary interview quotes concerning VCG’s MSR contingencies and risks can 
be found in table 1.2.
13
 
                                                 
12 The escalating activities procedure is a VCG procedure used to escalate suppliers experiencing operational 
difficulties. The aim is to indicate both internally (at VCG and VCC) and externally (to the supplier) that VCG is 
aware of the problems and installs adequate measures to help solving them. Those measures depend on the snag 
seriousness and are linked to the step the supplier is escalated in. Standard, all JIS suppliers are in step one, while 
batch suppliers are in step zero. When encountering frequent problems with a supplier, VCG managers escalate the 
supplier to the next step. If the problem is not solved after a pre-defined period of time, the supplier is further 
escalated. The procedure ends when a supplier either reaches step five, which theoretically implies re-evaluation 
and potential re-sourcing of his products, or substantially improves so that he returns to step one (zero for batch).  
13 When interviewees refer to “Volvo”, they actually mean “Volvo Cars Gent” or (as we put it in the text) “VCG”. 
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Sometimes, both groups of suppliers [LVA and HVA JIS] are called in the same breath, but actually one should not do that. A supplier that only puts 




Subsequently, there is a further partition on the basis of the product. Those suppliers that really deliver a serious added value also have a process in which 




If Volvo is stopped for two hours or for an entire shift, no batch supplier suffers from that. All call-offs are send as usual. JIS suppliers, however, are 
stopped as well. (VCG) 
Flexibility 
requirements 
The STVC is set up with JIS suppliers around Volvo that are very sensitive to changes. A day of economic unemployment, one minute stoppage of the 
assembly line or one overtime hour at Volvo has consequences for the production at those suppliers. (VCG) 
Process knowledge 
asymmetry 
Volvo has transferred her [HVA JIS product] knowledge to our [HVA JIS supplier] employees step by step, until the point when our people had more 




There is a total excess capacity of cars, as a result of which manufacturers are much more flexible towards the market. When the market demands 
something else than planned, they will listen to it. As a result, the capacity planning compared to the real orders is suddenly completely wrong, so that 
other amounts of components are needed, which suppliers completely did not expect. (VCG) 
Impact of unknown 
future contingencies 
In principle, JIS suppliers are certain about their contract for the life time of the current product. They are never certain about the next model. […] Volvo 
must fight as well and be the best to get the new [car] model to Gent. […] It is possible that the current supplier loses the battle and is switched. 
Everything is possible. The supplier must continuously prove being worth JIS supplier of Volvo. […] Also Volvo must continuously work and prove to 
be the best. The same holds for the suppliers.  (VCG) 
Relational stability 
aim 
We do not want to change suppliers, because then we must completely start over the relationship with the supplier, which costs much time and thus 
money. […] In case of a problem, the supplier is first helped and not immediately subject for replacement. Only when the supplier is really of ill will or 
really unable or unauthorized to solve the problem, we go to the market. (VCG) 
Supplier knowledge 
importance 
We [HVA JIS supplier] have the advantage to be built up with people coming from the Volvo organization. Those employees know plenty of people at 
Volvo. […] On all levels, also team leaders on the shop floor, people communicate very informally. (HVA JIS supplier) 
Risks  
Performance risk  In a [HVA] JIS environment, with two thousand parts coming from Japan, Mexico, China and everywhere in Europe, one can expect problems. The 
typical problems are quality issues and machine breakages. (HVA JIS supplier) Manuscript 1 
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Relational risk  The suppliers brought all hands on deck in the hope of solving the problem in time, without the customer feeling a thing. The suppliers took a risk and if 
they succeeded, it was ok. If not, we stopped or received bad products. (VCG) 
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4.2.3.  Management control system 
4.2.3.1.  Outcome control 
All VCG suppliers are subject to considerable outcome controls, more specifically in the 
form of key performance indicators (KPIs). These KPIs make up VCG’s standard outcome 
control for suppliers not involved in VCG’s escalating activities procedure. Undoubtedly, 
the most important KPI in automotive, and thus at VCG, is parts-per-million (PPM), 
indicating how many parts delivered do not comply with the agreed upon 100% quality 
specifications out of one million parts delivered. Additionally, JIS suppliers’ quality 
performance is assessed by car audit remarks
14, for which the most complex HVA 
products, like car seats and dashboards, receive specific audit demerit targets. It speaks for 
itself that own targets result in a higher level of outcome monitoring and evaluating, which 
is confirmed by the quality manager, who indicates that problem response time is shortest 
for HVA JIS suppliers. Other important KPIs are related to logistics. The first one, number 
of missing parts (MPs), measures the number of parts that did not arrive at VCG in time 
and/or in the correct sequence. The second indicator, line stop minutes, registers the number 
of minutes that a supplier caused stoppage of the VCG production line. Third, dropped cars 
are cars dropped from VCG’s line planning, because the supplier is unable to deliver the 
requested part.
15 Finally, batch suppliers are subject to a delivery precision registration, 
measuring the amount and timeliness of deliveries.  
VCG emphasizes uniformity in measuring supplier performance based on the most 
important KPIs, which are PPM, MPs and lines stop minutes. However, our data still show 
a substantial difference between batch and JIS suppliers; not in the KPIs utilized, but in the 
management process behind the KPIs, which is more complex for JIS suppliers. First, the 
response time in case of deviation from target is much shorter for JIS suppliers. Second, the 
                                                 
14 Every day, five to eight finished cars are audited by VCG personnel, who report negative audit remarks of four 
types: B10, B30, A70 and S300. The number behind the type of remark is the number of demerit points associated 
to the identified deficiency, which reflects the seriousness of the found demerit.  In that respect, VCG targets an 
average of 35 demerits per car. 
15 Obviously, delivering missing parts by incorrect sequencing is only possible for JIS suppliers. Similarly, line 
stops and dropped cars can only be caused by suppliers delivering parts without which a car can not be further 
assembled. 
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PPM rate of JIS suppliers is followed-up monthly, while the PPM rate of batch suppliers is 
only taken into consideration in case of a severe operational snag. Furthermore, the penalty 
procedure is more straightforward for batch suppliers. Contrary to JIS suppliers, batch 
suppliers receive a pre-defined financial penalty for technical quality problems. Also line 
stop minutes are responded to more severely when caused by batch suppliers, who receive 
an invoice that covers VCG losses and costs. Such penalties for JIS supplier are always 
negotiable and the compensation demand decision is tailor-made. Apparently, VCG is 
aware of the higher complexity and flexibility of JIS suppliers and takes that into account 
for evaluation. 
4.2.3.2.  Behaviour control 
VCG’s most important behaviour control on JIS suppliers is certainly the syllabus. This 
document contains all agreements regarding the basic routines of day-to-day operational 
business, for example how the product should be transported and how EDI communication 
should be controlled. Especially in case of operational snags, the syllabus prescribes which 
actions should be taken, including who to notify and how to prevent the problem from 
escalating. For example, if the supplier is unable to load trucks as required, he should 
arrange a rush transport. Also when the EDI system breaks down, the supplier should 
follow the back-up routines prescribed in the syllabus. Additionally, the syllabus contains 
the requirement to hold the necessary certifications, including ISO-TS. Reflecting their 
larger process complexity, HVA JIS suppliers’ syllabi contain specialized extensions 
compared to the ones of LVA JIS suppliers. As batch supplier relations are not as risky as 
JIS relations, VCG does not draw up syllabi with batch suppliers.
16  
Also supplier follow-up substantially differs between supplier types. Clearly, HVA 
JIS suppliers are most intensively followed up, because VCG quality and logistic engineers 
monitor suppliers and solve operational problems on a daily basis. The fact that VCG’s 
logistics department is organized by a workload score, in which HVA JIS suppliers receive 
a standard ten points and LVA JIS suppliers only two or five, exemplifies the difference. 
                                                 
16 Moreover, because such local operational agreements can not be negotiated by the VCC/Ford purchase 
department, the syllabus is entirely set up by VCG and the suppliers. Hence, although both parties sign the 
document and engage themselves in complying with the agreed terms, the syllabus is not part of the target 
agreement with the supplier, which renders it legally unenforceable. 
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Furthermore, HVA JIS suppliers are visited weekly or two times per week, while LVA JIS 
suppliers are only visited monthly or once every couple of months. When nothing disturbs 
the delivery flow from these suppliers, VCG feels no need to control their behaviour. The 
same approach holds for HVA JIS suppliers, of which the ones without substantial 
problems in the recent past are visited considerably less, but never less than once a month. 
Undoubtedly, batch suppliers receive lowest follow-up by VCG. VCG only deals with 
batch suppliers and visits their facility in case of a severe operational snag that the supplier 
does not get solved. Nevertheless, these batch supplier visits remain rather exceptional. 
During supplier follow-up and supplier company visits, VCG expects JIS suppliers 
to openly share information in order to achieve efficient cooperative problem solving. 
These suppliers are asked to document operational processes, control systems and related 
problems, because JIS supply is impossible without information sharing. As VCG and JIS 
suppliers are highly mutually dependent, any type of restraint towards opening up own 
processes unnecessarily hinders the MSR. In order to explicitly stimulate such information 
sharing, VCG installed the STVC, currently led by the credo “Dare to Share!”. As VCG 
wants to set a good example, the OEM shares a considerable amount of information, 
depending on the level of interdependence. JIS suppliers are informed regularly on issues 
affecting VCG’s and thus the suppliers’ production; not only on the operational, but also on 
the strategic level. The actual level of information sharing is more extensive with HVA JIS 
suppliers, although mother company characteristics further differentiate suppliers. As batch 
suppliers are not affected by operational changes (e.g. line speed changes), they do not 
receive operational information. Also strategic information, like sales expectations and 
hence future production volumes, is not shared with batch suppliers, as their production 
schedule is far less dependent on that of VCG alone. 
Exemplary interview quotes regarding VCG’s formal management controls can be 
found in table 1.3. 
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Theoretical variables  Interview Quotes (Source) 
Outcome control   
Quality KPIs  The most important KPIs for quality are PPM and external audit remarks. Yet, the latter KPI is not monitored for batch suppliers. (VCG) 
Logistics KPIs  I use three formal KPIs: missing parts, line stop minutes and service level or delivery precision, of which the first two are the most important and 
followed up for both batch and JIS suppliers. The latter is only monitored for batch suppliers. […] The list of reports also contains dropped car reports. 
(VCG) 
Specific audit remark 
targets 
Concerning audit remarks, specific audit remark targets are only set for high impact high value-added suppliers, which are followed up in an Excel file. 
(VCG) 
Quality off-target response 
time 
Surely, I will respond faster for high value-added suppliers than low value-added suppliers, when a negative trend arises. I notice that because of the 
relation that we have with the supplier and the daily cooperation. (VCG) 
Logistics off-target 
response time 
For JIS suppliers, we play the ball shortly, because we do not have stock for those suppliers’ products. For batch suppliers, there usually is stock for one 
and a half to two weeks. Only when the stock level drops and the [batch] supplier is unable to deliver, we respond. (VCG) 
Quality KPI follow-up  Every month, a 4Q report arrives in my mailbox from all JIS suppliers. (VCG) 
Logistics KPI follow-up  We run daily queries for delivery precision, which are send to the suppliers via e-mail. Also line stoppages and the number of dropped cars are monitored 
daily. Finally, the number of missing parts is automatically sent as a report to the supply chain controllers every 24 hours. That approach is the same for 
all suppliers. (VCG) 
Technical quality report 
penalty 
Concerning technical reports, suppliers of sequential parts are not charged for a technical failure. In case of batch suppliers, four man hours are always 
charged. (VCG) 
Line stop penalty  Big line stoppages are always discussed with the supplier and billed depending on the situation. […] Whether invoices for line stoppages are actually 
send, is a tailor made decision. That’s why my department keeps those data. When it concerns a once-only incident at a certain supplier, Volvo has to be 
realistic. However, when the line stoppages are continuously and latently present in the data, it becomes another story. […] Batch suppliers are treated 
stricter than JIS suppliers with respect to penalties. The fact that Volvo can cause stoppage at JIS suppliers as well plays a part in the assessment of 
sending penalties. (VCG) 
Behaviour control   
Syllabus  The syllabus is the golden handbook, with a mutual fine-tuning of procedures and what to do in case of problems. […] The syllabus is not part of the 
target agreement, but has to be fine-tuned and is therefore considered to be a binding agreement. (VCG) 
Supplier quality follow-up  For batch suppliers, there is no supplier follow-up, unless there is a large problem, which does not get solved. […] We are continuously working on high 
value-added JIS suppliers, every day. Also with low value-added JIS suppliers, we are very busy; but less and only when something comes up. […] 




My department uses a point system in which every supplier receives two, five or ten points, depending on the work load for the controller. […] [HVA] 
JIS suppliers with a heavy process and high added value always get ten points, because we know that we experience difficulties with them once every 
while. (VCG) 
Supplier company visits  My controllers only visit suppliers when there are problems and that is more often the case with larger [HVA] JIS suppliers than with [LVA] suppliers 
that only sequence. I guess that about once a week somebody visits those [HVA JIS] suppliers, while pure sequential [LVA JIS] suppliers are never 
visited more than once a month. (VCG) 
Open information sharing  Apart from the electronic data, Volvo has asked the [HVA JIS] supplier permission to visit the shop floor regarding the difficulties. There, Volvo has 
looked at the working instructions of the operators. […] Next to that, also control instructions were inspected. […] Also the follow-up of how many good 
and bad parts every shift produced was investigated. (VCG) 
  Openness and whole-hearted talking to each other is not easy, but I still try to cultivate it within the STVC. I want suppliers to be open and to learn from 
each other, without them thinking of the competitiveness at higher levels in their companies. […] This attitude is reflected in the slogan of the STVC: 
“Dare to Share!”. […] In the forum for quality managers, I try to be as open as possible and share general information concerning Volvo as much as 
possible. […] By being open myself, I receive much openness and information back from the supplier. (VCG)  
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4.2.3.3.  Informal controls 
Trust building 
Contractual trust building 
Contractual trust constitutes the basic type of trust in VCG’s MSRs. VCG managers 
indicate they at least need to be able to trust their suppliers to execute agreements made. If 
VCG discusses process changes, improvements or problem solutions and a decision is 
made, the OEM always trusts the supplier to comply with the agreement, even when oral 
promises are not put on paper. Consequently, our data show that the level of this type of 
trust building does not differ between batch, LVA JIS and HVA JIS suppliers. VCG trusts 
all suppliers to act as agreed upon and continuously builds this trust on positive 
experiences.  
Moreover, VCG stresses that without this trust, collaboration with a particular 
supplier manager becomes impossible. Indeed, interviewees indicate that this kind of trust 
is rather inter-personal instead of inter-organizational, because it depends on personal 
relationships with one or more managers. For that reason, longstanding personal 
relationships strengthen contractual trust in VCG’s MSRs. 
Competence trust building 
Without betraying VCG’s contractual trust, the supplier might be unable to comply with 
promises because of a lack of competence. In that case, the supplier is willing to perform 
the best he can and indeed does everything in its power to succeed, but still fails. In most 
cases, however, VCG trusts suppliers to succeed in delivering the goods as required and 
acting on changes or improvements as promised. This competence trust is considerably 
present for batch suppliers based on previous quality and delivery performance levels. 
JIS suppliers, however, are trusted more because of VCG’s closer performance 
and capabilities monitoring, which renders good performance more transparent. Obviously, 
this emphasis on JIS performance is aided by JIS suppliers’ geographical proximity. As 
HVA JIS suppliers produce more complex products with more complex manufacturing 
processes, these suppliers have VCG’s highest capability confidence; of course only on the 
assumption that all processes function well. In addition, VCG’s competence trust is 
strengthened by the fact that JIS suppliers possess several process certifications, such as 
ISO-TS, which require considerable process standardization and are subject to monitoring 
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by external auditors. Furthermore, competence trust in some HVA JIS suppliers has 
benefited from the fact that VCG literally transferred their infrastructure and knowledge, in 
the form of assembly lines and employees, to the local supplier facility.  
Contrary to contractual trust, the object of competence trust is not that clear. On 
the one hand, VCG seems to value (or doubt) competences of the supplier organization, 
implying both human capital and assets. On the other hand, VCG confirms that also 
manager competence influences VCG’s competence trust. 
Goodwill trust building 
Besides contractual and competence trust, VCG and supplier managers strongly emphasize 
the importance of goodwill trust, or as they describe it: “trust that the supplier openly and 
honestly communicates problems, even potential ones, concerning quality, logistics, etc”. 
As VCG managers admit to making mistakes themselves, which sometimes also harm 
suppliers and for which VCG is not liable, VCG feels indebted to suppliers to understand 
problem occurrence. Yet, in exchange for this understanding, VCG desires open 
communication about operational snags. Moreover, VCG trusts suppliers to provide that 
information even before a certain incident actually causes a problem. VCG does not want 
the supplier to ignore, minimize or conceal potential problems, because the consequences 
could substantially impact both VCG and other JIS suppliers. Additionally, VCG expects 
supplier management to take responsibility for mistakes, so that no time is wasted on 
identifying which party actually caused it. That way, all energy can be devoted to joint 
problem solving, sometimes even with assistance from other suppliers. Nevertheless, VCG 
acknowledges that suppliers are tempted to behave opportunistically, because informing the 
customer that the organization can not fulfil promises is neither pleasant, nor common 
practice. Moreover, these problems are recorded by VCG’s formal controls and reported to 
VCC, the supplier’s mother company and sometimes to the STVC.  
However, VCG places considerable goodwill trust on supplier managers, which 
are again the prime object of this trust. VCG continuously shares and actively promotes its 
norms and values (quality, safety, environmental awareness, openness, fairness, 
empowerment and collaboration) during supplier interaction. Consequently, JIS suppliers 
are trusted to know that VCG values honest communication more than opportunistic 
ignorance, even when the problem is only potential with low occurrence chances. That way, 
operational problems do not necessarily deteriorate, but build goodwill trust when the 
supplier communicates openly. As performance risk is highest for HVA JIS suppliers, these 
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suppliers are characterized by many problem solving opportunities for this goodwill trust 
building. Furthermore, the more frequent interaction with HVA JIS suppliers builds an 
inter-organizational bond of friendship between VCG and HVA JIS supplier managers. 
Most relationships with these managers also appear to be longer, because some of them 
already worked in other functions at the same or other suppliers, or even at VCG. In that 
respect, we note that longstanding personal relations of ten to fifteen years are not 
exceptional and further increase goodwill trust. As personal relations with batch suppliers 
are limited because of less interaction, their goodwill trust is much lower. Nevertheless, 
VCG clearly indicates that they do trust this supplier type to share severe problems that 
(potentially) affect VCG production. 
Generic trust building via the supplier team 
Besides strengthening mechanisms for one specific type of trust between VCG and one 
specific supplier, our case study reveals a mechanism that specifically aims at building 
trust, namely the STVC. On both the overall STVC and the workgroup level, socializing (or 
networking) is put forward as an extremely important goal. For that purpose, every meeting 
starts with a joint lunch and ends with a joint drink, during which everybody can get to 
know each other personally and professionally. Yet, the actual goal of this socializing 
aspect is the creation of a strong bond with high trust. VCG and supplier managers confirm 
that by socializing the level of mutual trust has increased, so that in case of failure, parties 
quickly and openly work on a solution by helping each other, instead of placing blame and 
negotiating penalties to cover production losses.  
Furthermore, the STVC forms a joint relationship board, i.e. a structured forum of 
close interaction between participants, in which mutual interests are established, problems 
are solved jointly and decisions are made together. Indeed, all STVC members, including 
VCG, share one goal, namely building as many cars of the order book as possible, on time, 
with good quality and at the lowest possible cost. VCG continuously promotes this 
common goal and the norms and values driving the goal in order to convince all JIS 
suppliers that their contribution to the goal is crucial. The multi-directional communication 
during STVC meetings contributes to establishing this awareness. Next, the STVC aims at 
installing joint problem solving with all parties, assisting each other in minimizing 
operational snags. Also this approach, which requires information sharing of problems, 
further builds trust based on difficulties that are first shared and then successfully solved. 
Finally, the STVC workgroup participants jointly work on projects, aiming at problem 
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avoidance, lower operating costs and higher performance. Based on workgroup meetings, 
several implementation decisions are made jointly. During these workgroup sessions, VCG 
and supplier experts share proprietary knowledge, so that all suppliers can be developed. 
The fact that meeting locations are rotated across all suppliers signals this development 
goal. In case a workgroup deems appropriate, an outside expert is invited for training.  
Concerning the difference between suppliers, it is clear that VCG’s trust in batch 
suppliers can only be built by limited dyadic interaction, because batch suppliers do not 
participate in STVC meetings. HVA JIS suppliers more frequently attend STVC and STVC 
workgroup meetings and contribute considerably more than LVA JIS suppliers. VCG 
managers even confirm that a discussion is going on whether to either always invite all JIS 
managers or limit participation to those suppliers contributing most and benefiting most 
from participating. Obviously, this discussion confirms that HVA JIS suppliers not only 
possess more competencies to share, but also benefit more from workgroup projects, which 
most adequately builds trust.  
Social pressure 
Our data show that every supplier is aware of the common inter-organizational goal and is 
familiar with VCG’s norms and values, like openness, fairness, empowerment and 
collaboration. As a result, VCG and suppliers feel related, like in a team or a clan. 
Consequently, every supplier faces negative consequences in case of an operational snag, to 
which he acts opportunistically. Although VCG continues stressing mutual cooperation in 
both parties’ interest, the interacting supplier manager(s) is (are) faced with negative 
personal feelings, because VCG personally confronts him (them) with mistakes that harm 
the common goal and do not comply with the norms and values. This social pressure is 
exercised most on HVA JIS suppliers, as those suppliers are subject to daily operational 
snags requiring problem solving. LVA JIS suppliers receive less social pressure, while 
batch suppliers only seldom require VCG interaction for problem solving.  
In addition to this bi-directional social pressure, the STVC strengthens VCG’s 
social pressure by bringing all separate MSRs together into one big supplier clan. Clearly, 
the STVC’s main goal is not controlling VCG suppliers. In fact, the STVC is run by 
suppliers to the benefit of all suppliers and VCG, with maximum support of VCG. Yet, the 
STVC contributes to social pressure by the fact that important mistakes, depending on the 
type, are reported on the STVC quality, logistics or IT workgroup meetings, and the most 
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severe ones even at STVC plant manager meetings. Again, the idea is neither to punish the 
supplier by providing all details to other suppliers, of which some are competitors, nor to 
blame some supplier department or supplier manager. The first goal of this collective 
problem sharing, sometimes even by means of clear pictures, is to learn from mistakes, 
identify areas of potential amelioration for which workgroup projects could be set up and 
further stress VCG’s open communication. Second, the joint problem sharing builds trust, 
not only between VCG and the supplier that caused the problem, but between all suppliers, 
as discussed in the previous paragraph. Last but not least, managers noted that when a 
supplier snag is reported to all suppliers present at the STVC meeting, the responsible 
supplier faces negative response of both VCG and all other suppliers. Indeed, because 
operational snags harm both VCG’s and JIS suppliers’ production, every supplier needs to 
give account not only to VCG, but also to all other JIS suppliers. Hence, reporting supplier 
failures at the STVC offers VCG two means of increasing social control. First, VCG is able 
to formally structure its bi-directional social pressure. Second, the presence of other JIS 
suppliers signals the accountability towards all JIS suppliers and augments negative guild 
feelings in case of supplier failure.
17  
In other words, the STVC creates a clan, in which VCG and JIS suppliers not only 
look after each other, in terms of helping and trying to improve each other, but also look at 
each other, in terms of signalling that the clan does not tolerate mistakes potentially 
harming the clan without proper action. To that end, social sanctions will be applied by all 
clan members on defaulting suppliers. We argue that this type of control by the STVC is 
social control in its essence and serves a very important role in VCG’s MCS of MSRs. Yet, 
this importance differs depending on the type of supplier considered. As batch suppliers are 
no member of the STVC, these suppliers are only subject to dyadic social pressure. 
                                                 
17 A good example of social pressure relates to the monitoring and back-up procedure test of EDI communication, 
set up by the IT workgroup. First, VCG's IT department drew up an audit questionnaire, which some suppliers did 
not fill in. Yet, when the following workgroup meeting clearly stated which suppliers filled in the audit form, all 
non-respondent supplier managers immediately apologised and asked to provide the questionnaire once again. 
Clearly, no supplier manager likes to be confronted with his name tied to non-compliance, especially not in front 
of several people involved. The next step in the IT workgroup project involved testing the EDI monitoring and 
back-up procedure. To heighten the level of supplier priority giving to the test, the IT workgroup dropped 
anonymity in the report system during meetings. Again, supplier managers responded positively to the social 
pressure, following from their name being linked to a performance score, which was visible to all other workgroup 
participants. 
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Furthermore, HVA JIS supply is more complex, so that the potential negative impact on 
VCG and other suppliers is larger than the one of LVA JIS supply. Additionally, HVA JIS 
suppliers tend to attend STVC and STVC workgroup meetings more frequently, which 
further increases the opportunity of managers to be confronted with mistakes. 
Exemplary interview quotes relating to VCG’s informal management controls can 
be found in table 1.4. 
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Theoretical variables  Interview Quotes (Source) 






I want the plant manager to call for help and to simply tell me if he can not promise something. I do not want promises, which can not be kept, because 
Volvo can not do anything with those promises. Volvo prefers the supplier to openly and honestly inform Volvo that they experience a problem, which 
they can not solve for the time being. […] Promising that it [the problem] is solved tomorrow and not keeping that promise, is something a supplier can 
not do often. That can happen once and then I point out that it does not work that way. The second time, that leads to relational problems. I prefer the 
supplier to say: “I can not do it”. (VCG) 
  For me, trust means “a word is a word”. For me, little has to be put on paper. When somebody promises me something or I promise something to 
somebody, I assume that it happens. […] With Volvo, that works perfectly. Relations are built up and that is not possible with everybody. When someone 
new starts at Volvo, that person does not have that bond with the suppliers. That has to be built up with people. (batch supplier) 
Competence trust 
Building 
I want to send out trust to Volvo that we deal with the problems and solve them in reasonably short term. [...] Trust needs time to be built up anyhow. 
One does not have trust immediately. Besides, trust is not built by what you say, but by what you do. The results have to be there. (HVA JIS supplier) 
  The personal relationships with Volvo are rather good, because our plant is located very near by Volvo and lots of our co-workers came from Volvo. […] 
I believe that [the relationship] works pretty well with all suppliers, although it might work slightly better with our co-workers, because they are all ex 
Volvo people. (HVA JIS supplier) 
Goodwill trust 
Building 
I admit that I do not call Volvo and admit to having a problem for every hick-up in our [HVA JIS] process, because then I can call them every day. Every 
day, there are problems in a company. The trust has to be there that, when the problem is serious and we see “now, it will go wrong”, we provide the right 
information on time, so before the process actually goes wrong. (HVA JIS supplier)  
  Being honest towards each other and not covering up problems works best. […] By working in beforehand, certain things can be taken into consideration. 
This approach is constantly promoted by Volvo and me. […] That honesty towards each other is a consequence of respect for each other. That respect has 
to be earned and can not be claimed; not even by the customer. Respect is mutual trust that rises from many years of cooperation, experience with open 
and less open managers and talking about one thing and another. (VCG) 
  Trust is built across time by good cooperation and not dropping each other, both externally and internally, in case of problems. Then, one must always be 
open and honest. In case of problems, it depends on how you deal with those problems whether trust gets damaged or strengthened. (LVA JIS supplier) 
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Generic trust building via 
STVC 
 
Global STVC / 
STVC workgroup 
Attendance 
Socializing is a very important aspect of the STVC meetings. Because of that, every meeting starts with a joint lunch, to have loose chats about every 
possible subject. […] The most important reason to work on socializing is that suppliers need a strong bond and lots of trust towards each other. That is 
necessary in a JIS environment, because if one supplier stops, for example because of a stock out or machine breakage, not only that supplier suffers, but 
also Volvo and the other JIS suppliers. When the entire settlement of that issue has to be done via the management, parties will kill each other. The whole 
reasoning of “There was a stoppage of that long, for which that supplier is to blame, so he has to pay that high of a penalty” only leads to bigger 
problems. […] Socializing is important in creating trust that works across company boundaries. That way, one can cooperate with a neighbour in case of 
problems. On the other hand, the STVC also provides the opportunity to talk with people and exchange ideas, before a problem arises. (HVA JIS 
supplier) 
  I promote the STVC with an open communication, where suppliers sit together as a team and try to help each other. (VCG) 
  Volvo is the binding agent of the suppliers, because all suppliers have one common goal, which is supplying Volvo. (HVA JIS supplier) 
  The attendance rate is an indication of who attaches most importance to participating in the STVC. The time a manager makes for the meeting is an 
indication of the importance he attaches to the meeting, because time is something neither one of us has. (HVA JIS supplier)  
STVC workgroup 
Contribution 
Concerning the contribution relating to logistics and quality, the bigger [HVA JIS] suppliers offer a larger contribution to the STVC and the work groups. 
[…] Based on the situational circumstances, there is more or less input and contribution to the STVC meetings. Some suppliers even do not participate at 
all. (LVA JIS supplier) 
Social pressure   
Supplier interaction 
for problem solving 
I am proponent of the approach in which we work with the customer on a problem till 8pm, then have dinner and a drink together, sometimes till the early 
hours, and continue cooperation the next morning. That cooperation leads to a team spirit, in light of which the customer does not tell the supplier that he 
produces and therefore has to solve the problem, and the supplier does not tell the customer that he developed problems and therefore is responsible for 
dealing with them. On the contrary, the question is how both parties can solve the problem jointly. (HVA JIS supplier) 
Global STVC / 
STVC workgroup 
Attendance 
Moreover, there is the STVC, which exercises social control on the suppliers. That is, in the STVC the performance of every supplier is shown. And 
nobody likes to be offended as worst performer. That stimulates and motivates even more. Although the suppliers obviously differ and therefore can not 
be compared just like that, the worst performer gets seriously offended, especially when he stops Volvo and that way also the other [JIS] suppliers. At 
that moment, there are nineteen people across the table saying: “What the hell is wrong with that supplier?”, because they get in as much trouble as 
Volvo. (HVA JIS supplier) 
  Concerning IT, we have experienced intense moments, in which an IT problem at a supplier stopped Volvo and the JIS suppliers, including us [HVA JIS 
supplier]. Through the STVC, which serves common interests, that supplier was asked to let his systems be checked. (HVA JIS supplier) 
 
Table 1.4: Exemplary interview quotes concerning VCG’s informal management controls Manuscript 1 
5.  Discussion 
The previous analysis confirms the contingency framework’s explicative power for VCG’s 
MSRs. Based on the distinction between batch, LVA JIS and HVA JIS suppliers, signalling 
the situational differences between VCG suppliers, we were able to identify substantial 
differences in the MCS. These corresponding differences clearly visualize the associations 
in the framework. Because HVA JIS suppliers are characterized by high performance and 
relational risk, this supplier type is subject to high outcome and behaviour control. 
Compared to batch suppliers, this supplier group’s outcome is monitored more frequently, 
responded to more quickly and penalised less stringently. In addition, these suppliers’ 
behaviour is governed by means of an extensive syllabus and weekly company visits. 
Furthermore, all levels of trust building are highest for HVA JIS suppliers. Finally, the 
STVC creates generic trust building and social pressure possibilities, which are largest for 
HVA JIS suppliers. That way, the high levels of risk for this supplier type are governed by 
the highest levels of both formal and informal control techniques. LVA JIS suppliers are 
found to be positioned between batch and HVA JIS suppliers on all control systems, which 
reflects the association of medium governance with medium levels of risk.
18
Thus, despite having studied MSRs with good operational performance and 
considerable levels of formal control, we still find high levels of informal control. 
Apparently, the risk of the more formal MSR, is too high to be governed by primarily 
formal controls. VCG considerably stimulates trust building and cooperation, because the 
(potential) costs of unilaterally imposing demands with little trust are considered much 
higher. In other words, the combined MCS of VCG with substantial levels of both formal 
and informal control is argued to be designed specifically to improve performance. This 
does not mean, however, that operational snags do not occur. On the contrary, those 
problems are daily business, especially in case of HVA JIS suppliers. Yet, VCG believes 
                                                 
18 Nevertheless, we acknowledge that small differences remain within each supplier group. These differences 
might be captured by a continuum interpretation from low to high contingency level, low to high risk and therefore 
low to high management control structures. By positioning the types of MSRs on these continuums, it becomes 
clear that a relatively low/high position on the contingency variable continuum corresponds to a relatively 
low/high position on the MCS continuum. Such continuum interpretation is comparable to recent case based 
management control findings (e.g. Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007; Sartorius & Kirsten, 2005; van 
Veen-Dirks; 2006). 
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that dealing with those snags would be more complicated if the OEM would not follow up 
on suppliers by means of a combined MCS in a cooperative environment.  
Consequently, our case findings contradict that MSRs would be governed by little 
informal control mechanisms (Das & Teng, 2001; Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005). 
Moreover, our case strengthens the external validity of case findings on less formal IORs. 
Indeed, also studies on R&D collaboration (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), strategic 
alliances (Dekker, 2004) and joint ventures (Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007) 
indicate the importance of informal control usage in inter-organizational MCSs. 
Furthermore, these studies show considerable evidence of MCS’s contingency dependence. 
In essence, the same two inferences can be made for the MCSs of service outsourcing 
relations (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Nicholson et al., 2006; van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000). So, despite theoretical framework differences, our result of a combined 
MCS that is contingent on situational characteristics corresponds to previous case findings. 
Even more formal MSRs are governed by a considerable amount of informal control. 
In that respect, the most striking finding of this study is certainly the existence and 
the role of VCG’s supplier team in controlling MSRs. In particular, the STVC functions as 
a clan, which not only structures, and that way strengthens, VCG trust building and social 
pressure techniques, but also extends this control towards all JIS suppliers. That way, 
management control on dyadic JIS supplier relations is strengthened by the clan of all JIS 
suppliers. Yet, this control only follows from the STVC’s first goal, which is stimulating 
and facilitating collaboration among all participants, in order to continuously improve 
manufacturing processes (i.e. kaizen costing). In that respect, the STVC cooperation is 
comparable to inter-organizational teams working together on designing new or improved 
products during the R&D phase of the supply chain, often by means of target costing, 
which aims at cost reduction through collaboration (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004). To 
transpose this collaborative behaviour between mother companies during R&D to facilities 
during manufacturing, VCG set up the STVC with JIS supplier facilities. In essence, this 
supplier team structures the unstructured interaction. Compared to formal information 
exchange, like electronic EDI messages and formal supplier follow-up, informal 
information sharing largely depends on the personal relationship and willingness of 
interacting managers. By means of the STVC, this bi-directional social interaction becomes 
structured and at the same time multi-directional due to frequent participation of many JIS 
suppliers. In addition, the STVC offers the possibility to substantially increase informal 
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control on dyadic MSRs. First, the STVC magnifies bi-directional trust between 
manufacturer and supplier and multidirectional trust among all suppliers. In fact, our study 
reveals that the forum is a textbook case of building trust by means of several techniques, 
including networking, frequent information and knowledge sharing, joint decision making 
and joint problem solving. Second, the STVC clan strengthens VCG’s social pressure on 
suppliers, as supplier errors are discussed during STVC (workgroup) meetings. Obviously, 
the presence of all suppliers involved increases potential negative feelings with respect to 
operational snags. So via the STVC, VCG succeeds in structuring unstructured social 
interaction, and by doing so, transforming it into social control. 
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the social control technique of the STVC 
would not work without the willingness of all suppliers to open up their facilities during 
supplier visits and share both technical and managerial knowledge. Hence, the information 
exchange exceeds mere cost information, as discussed in studies of open-book accounting 
during commercial negotiations (Seal et al., 1999) and R&D (Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005), to 
include all kinds of information concerning manufacturing and delivery processes, as 
exemplified by the case study of Mouritsen, Hansen & Hansen (2001).
19 Furthermore, 
STVC interaction offers participants the opportunity to get to know each other personally 
regarding family situation and/or personal interests. In a setting in which cooperation based 
on mutual trust
20 is considered crucial and built through personal interaction, this last form 
of information exchange is indispensable to jointly operate in JIS and already avoided 
                                                 
19 One important remark concerning the STVC is the fact that trust building and collaboration among VCG 
suppliers is not as evident as between VCG and particular suppliers, because some supplier facilities are 
competitors on mother company level. For example, VCG has different suppliers for car seats and cabling. Yet, 
the cabling supplier delivers car seats to other OEMs and could definitely supply car seats to VCG as well. This 
situation negatively impacts facility managers’ willingness or permission to open up factories and share 
proprietary knowledge. Nevertheless, the STVC overcomes this barrier by arguing that although suppliers are 
competitors in the global market place, their competitiveness only plays during commercial negotiations, which 
are concluded well before the start of manufacturing. Indeed, during the manufacturing phase, all suppliers serve 
the same purpose regarding their product, namely supplying the right product, on time, with good quality and at 
the lowest possible cost. By considering this common goal and allowing suppliers to hold back certain production 
infrastructure or process knowledge which is patented, the STVC finds most suppliers prepared to trust  and 
collaborate with competitors.  
20 Concerning the question whether trust primarily exists between people or organizations (cf Tomkins, 2001), our 
case data contain considerable evidence of inter-personal trust. This compares to similar evidence of Dekker 
(2004) and Cooper & Slagmulder (2004). 
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numerous line stops. So, although the STVC advantages are not always directly measurable 
in monetary terms, all participating members are convinced that these benefits play an 
important role in VCG’s and JIS suppliers’ performance, because better delivery disturbs 
VCG’s manufacturing less.  
To end this discussion, we compare VCG’s STVC with the approach of Toyota (cf 
Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). In order to increase the knowledge base and lower the knowledge 
sharing cost, Toyota actively shapes a network identity with its suppliers by means of 
shared values and goals, and mechanisms such as a supplier association and small group 
learning teams, which resemble VCG’s STVC. Nevertheless, we believe VCG considerably 
differs from Toyota, in particular concerning the degree to which suppliers are compelled to 
collaborate and adopt the Toyota production system (TPS). Indeed, Toyota admits that if a 
supplier would be unwilling to open up operations to other firms in the network, the refusal 
would be a serious breach of faith, jeopardizing future collaboration with the supplier (Dyer 
& Nobeoka, 2000). Additionally, Toyota appears much more interested in transferring 
Toyota knowledge to suppliers than learning from suppliers, which results in the obligation 
for suppliers to work with their systems. Therefore, we argue that Toyota sets up 
appropriate mechanisms to create a network identity, but with little respect for supplier 
identity or particular supplier knowledge. VCG, however, considers it essential not to push 
collaboration, but to strive at unmediated cooperation between JIS suppliers. For example, 
VCG does not compel supplier participation at STVC meetings, but allows supplier (plant) 
managers to freely decide on their presence. Additionally, VCG does not demand suppliers 
to comply with their way of manufacturing, but stimulates them to transfer their expertise to 
VCG as well. VCG always helps suppliers as partners and by mutual agreement, if 
necessary on a daily basis. Only when problems keep dragging, VCG uses its commercial 
power advantage to speed up a solution. By means of the STVC and its collaboration, VCG 
expresses respect for supplier company culture, supplier responsibilities and supplier 
expertise, while installing one common clan culture that surpasses company boundaries. 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the inter-organizational management control literature by 
illustrating how manufacturers design the MCS of supplier relations in the manufacturing 
phase of the supply chain. Although MSRs offer important cost reduction possibilities, 
which require appropriate management controls (Carr & Ng, 1995; Cooper & Slagmulder, 
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1999), these control techniques lack sufficient academic knowledge (Cooper & Slagmulder, 
2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Scannell et al., 2000). Therefore, we investigate 
supplier MCS design in one of the most competitive manufacturing industries in the world, 
namely automotive. Especially this industry is considered to be trend-setting in the search 
for continuous improvement, which is exemplified by the rise of lean manufacturing and 
lean supply (cf Womack et al., 1990) and kaizen costing (e.g. Carr & Ng, 1995).  
Research on procurement and R&D found that other types of IORs, like R&D 
collaboration (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), strategic alliances (Dekker, 2004) and joint 
ventures (Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007) are governed by a combination of 
formal and informal control. Based on these findings’ external validity, MSRs could be 
expected to be governed by a combination of formal and informal control as well. 
However, as MSRs are more formal than those IORs, MSRs could be expected to be 
governed by primarily formal controls with little informal controls (Das & Teng, 2001; 
Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005). Hence, the literature offers different MCS designs for 
MSRs, either a combined MCS or one consisting of primarily formal controls, which 
motivates studying the MCS design of MSRs and the importance of informal controls in 
that design. Since automotive practice shows evidence of high and low levels of informal 
control as well, our first contribution is answering how the MCS of automotive MSRs is 
designed. Yet, besides illustrating that MCS design, this paper also contributes to 
explaining the MCS design, because evidence on contingency theory’s explicative power in 
MSRs is rather limited (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; van 
der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2006). To that end, we propose a refined theoretical 
contingency framework based on recent inter-organizational management control theory, 
but specifically adapted for the manufacturing phase. 
In order to illustrate the validity of this framework in practice, we performed an in-
depth case study of the supplier MCS of Volvo Cars Gent. Our semi-structured interviews 
and archival data contain substantial evidence of the proposed associations and indicate that 
informal controls are very important in manufacturing. The identification of three supplier 
types, namely batch, LVA JIS and HVA JIS suppliers, characterized by different levels of 
antecedents and risks, visualizes the association with the management controls tuned to 
govern the risks. For example, as HVA JIS suppliers score relatively high on all 
contingencies and subsequently on both performance and relational risk, VCG designed the 
MCS accordingly, with high levels of outcome and behaviour controls. Yet, besides these 
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formal controls, VCG pays considerable attention to informal control, more specifically to 
different kinds of trust building techniques and social pressure. In that respect, the most 
striking finding of this paper is the existence and the role of VCG’s structured supplier team 
in controlling MSRs. In fact, the STVC functions as a clan, which not only structures, and 
that way strengthens, VCG’s trust building and social pressure, but also extends this control 
towards all JIS suppliers. That way, management control on dyadic JIS supplier relations is 
strengthened by the clan of all JIS suppliers. This combined MCS is designed specifically 
to improve performance, which corresponds to earlier inter-organizational management 
control research (e.g. Anderson & Dekker, 2005). As our theoretical model drew on 
findings from other less formal IORs, our case not only offers more evidence of those 
findings’ external validity, but also confirms that MSRs are governed depending on 
situational characteristics. By studying an under-explored part of the supply chain, for 
which the inter-organizational management control literature proposes different supplier 
MCS designs, this paper contributes to this increasingly growing literature by reducing a 
perceived gap between literature and management practice, as called for by Nixon & Burns 
(2005).  
Naturally, our findings have some important implications. The case findings 
support the importance of a combined MCS, suited for the contingencies of the MSR under 
investigation, which corresponds to recent studies emphasizing the extended make-or-buy 
decision (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Gietzmann, 1996; van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000).
21 Although supplier relations, especially in automotive, seem to become 
more demanding once the manufacturing supply chain phase starts, VCG clearly holds on 
to cooperative interaction, comparable to the procurement and R&D phase. Instead of 
lowering collaboration and informal controls in favour of a more demanding approach with 
more formal controls, VCG balances formal and informal controls and highly values the 
role of trust building and social pressure. The central role of the STVC strengthens this 
finding. Consequently, managers should be aware of the benefits of well designed MCSs in 
MSRs, especially in a very competitive business environment like automotive. 
                                                 
21 The extended make-or-buy decision not only deals with the decision to make or buy, but also with partner choice 
and MCS design. Our findings indicate that VCG actively considers this extension by designing its MCS to 
support specific MSRs. 
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Nevertheless, these implications are hampered by an important limitation due to 
the case research. By only looking at one specific industry and exclusively studying one 
type of IORs of one automotive OEM, we aimed at maximizing comparison opportunities 
and minimizing extraneous variation within the case. Yet at the same time, we limited 
generalizability outside this context. For example, it remains unclear to what extent VCG’s 
company culture determines the use of informal controls compared to other (automotive) 
organizations. Similarly, the impact of prior supply chain phases and mother company 
influences on VCG’s MSRs remain unaddressed. However, these limitations offer a first 
avenue for further research. To investigate the external validity of our findings, research 
could be done on other MSRs, both in automotive and in other industries, like consumer 
electronics. Especially the occurrence and usage of STVC-like fora in MSRs are worth 
further investigation, because they seem to offer considerable benefits. To that end, other 
case studies or a comprehensive survey could be set up. 
A second research direction follows from the assumption in our theoretical 
sampling that VCG’s MCS benefits performance. Although this presupposition was 
confirmed by interviewees, we never really investigated it. Hence, a follow-up study could 
investigate to what extent the contingency fit between antecedents and management 
controls, as proposed by the framework, contributes to operational performance 
(Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007; van Veen-Dirks, 2006). In other words, what 
would be the negative consequence of a contingency misfit?
22 Yet, in order to effectively 
study this research question, a longitudinal research design is needed, preferably of 
changing supplier relations.  
Appendix: Interview protocol (main questions + exemplary probes for detail) 
Q1. Could you sketch the outsourcing relation between the supplier and VCG? 
•  When did the relationship start and why did VCG outsource the manufacturing of this product?  
•  What are the characteristics of the product and its production process? 
•  What is your function in the company and your role in the VCG-supplier relation?  
                                                 
22 Since that kind of MCS misfit over time would result in escalating control problems, damaging the MSR 
performance (Dekker, 2004), such misfitted MCSs would be changed towards a more suitable design (van Veen-
Dirks, 2006). So, assuming that MCS dynamics are equilibrating and return to a stable situation after being 
disturbed (van Veen-Dirks, 2006), the appropriate research question is to what extent a temporary contingency 
misfit temporarily negatively influences operational performance. 
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•  With which departments of the supplier/VCG do you most frequently interact? 
Q2. How does VCG control the relationship with the supplier? 
•  Which KPIs for quality, logistics, etc. are set up? Which of them are the most important? How frequently are 
they followed up on? Are there KPI targets? How does VCG penalize the supplier in case of operational 
problems or performance below target? Are those penalties negotiable? 
•  Which procedures, rules, regulations, etc. does VCG put in place to monitor and control supplier behaviour? 
How frequently is behaviour followed up on? Does VCG visit the supplier? 
•  Are there other control mechanisms present in the VCG-supplier relation?  
•  Are there, in that respect, differences with other suppliers? 
Q3. How does cooperation between the supplier and VCG work out?  
•  Is there a difference between cooperation in case of difficulties and cooperation as part of continuous 
improvement? 
•  To what extent is information shared in the VCG-supplier relation? Does information sharing occur via 
personal interaction and/or via the supplier team? 
Q4. What is the goal of the supplier team and what are its benefits, if any? 
•  How big is the supplier’s contribution to the supplier team and how big are the benefits from the supplier 
team for the supplier? 
•  Are there, in that respect, differences with other JIS suppliers? 
Q5. What does trust mean for you (in an inter-organizational context)? 
•  How would you evaluate that trust in the VCG-supplier relation? 
•  Is trust important? 
•  How is trust built? 
Q6. Could I look into some relevant documents (e.g. reports, meeting minutes, PP-





The impact of inter-organizational management control systems on 
performance: 





This study investigates whether appropriate management control design of supplier 
relations is associated with good performance. Although management control systems 
(MCSs) are found to be contingent on situational characteristics, it remains unclear whether 
this contingency fit contributes to performance. In order to illustrate the existence and 
refine the dynamics of the fit-performance association, we perform a longitudinal case 
study of an exemplary automotive manufacturer-supplier relation that was subject to 
considerable change and severe performance difficulties in the course of time. As proposed, 
case findings show that if the supplier is incapable of dealing with changed contingencies, a 
MCS contingency misfit is associated with poor operational performance. However, this 
misfit is only temporal, as the manufacturer adapts the MCS to fit the changed supplier 
relation and regain operational performance. In addition, the longitudinal data suggest that 
trust and basic formal control (i.e. formal control continuously exercised under all 
circumstances) are complements, while trust substitutes for extra formal control (i.e. formal 
control set up on top of basic formal control). Finally, our data indicate a timing difference 
in the substitutive relation. The building up of extra formal control proceeds gradually, 
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1.  Introduction 
This study investigates whether appropriate management control system (MCS) design (i.e. 
contingent on situational characteristics) of supplier relations is associated with good 
performance. This performance association remains under-explored, contrary to the 
contingency fit between MCS design and situational characteristics, which is thoroughly 
studied both within and between organizations (Chenhall, 2003; Dekker, 2004). 
Nevertheless, the association between appropriate MCS design and performance forms 
contingency theory’s main interest, as it explains the fit association (Donaldson, 2001). 
Despite this interest, previous contingency studies on inter-organizational management 
control only assume, explicitly (e.g. Dekker, 2004) or implicitly (e.g. Cooper & 
Slagmulder, 2004), that an appropriate MCS design contributes to performance. Following 
calls for more attention towards inter-organizational MCSs (van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2006), this study aims at illustrating the validity and refining the dynamics of 
this assumption in practice.  
For that purpose, we propose a theoretical contingency framework from the 
position of the buyer. On the one hand, this framework visualizes the association between 
contingency variables of supplier relationships influencing risks, and management control 
techniques governing these risks (cf Das & Teng, 2001; Dekker, 2004). On the other hand, 
the framework includes the association between degree of MCS fit on contingencies and 
risks, and performance. With respect to this association, we propose that if a supplier is 
incapable of dealing with changed contingencies, a misfitted MCS is associated with poor 
performance. Besides illustrating this static proposition, this paper also refines the fit-
performance association by investigating the following dynamic proposition. If a supplier is 
incapable of dealing with changed contingencies, a misfitted MCS only  temporarily 
aggravates performance, until the MCS is changed towards a design fitting the changed 
contingencies and risks and therefore contributing to performance (Kamminga & van der 
Meer-Kooistra, 2007; van Veen-Dirks, 2006). Corresponding to calls for this kind of 
research in the intra-organizational production environment (van Veen-Dirks, 2006) and 
inter-organizational joint ventures (Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007), we argue 
that it is worthwhile to investigate these propositions for supplier relations in a less studied 
phase of the supply chain, namely manufacturing (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Langfield-
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Smith & Smith, 2003).
23
More specifically, this paper presents an in-depth longitudinal case study of such a 
“manufacturer-supplier relationship” (MSR) between a Volvo Cars facility (VCG) and one 
of its high value-added just-in-sequence module suppliers (SAG). This research method is 
proposed to be strong in investigating the impact of MCS fit on performance, because it 
allows studying an extensive MCS of individual supplier controls (Ittner, Larcker, Nagar & 
Rajan, 1999; Dekker, 2004). The trend-setting automotive industry (cf Womack, Jones & 
Roos, 1990) suits this case research, because that sector is characterized by high levels of 
component outsourcing and extreme competitive pressure. As a result, manufacturers 
initiate continuous improvement projects with suppliers, which require appropriate MCSs 
to organize and manage the relation (Alford, Sackett & Nelder, 2000; Carr & Ng, 1995; 
Scannell, Vickery & Dröge, 2000). As the fit-performance association is only visible in 
relations changing over time, we specifically investigate a MSR that was subject to 
considerable change. To structure and interpret the longitudinal data in relation to our 
theoretical framework, we use the temporal bracketing and variance research methods 
(Rowe, Birnberg & Shields, 2008). Findings of this analysis confirm our theoretical 
propositions. After starting module production and delivery for two new extra Volvo 
models, SAG struggled to perform. As VCG’s MCS no longer fitted SAG’s increased 
contingencies and risks, the MCS aggravated operational difficulties. Therefore, it was 
changed towards a more appropriate design, fitting the level of risks and contributing to 
regaining performance. Furthermore, our case shows the importance of informal 
management control on SAG management and the active role of VCG in establishing this 
control by choosing SAG managers.  
  Furthermore, our longitudinal case study offers the opportunity to refine the either 
complementary or substitutive relation between trust and formal control, called for by e.g. 
Anderson & Dekker (2005) and van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman (2006). To that end, 
we distinguish two categories of formal control based on our findings. First, we define 
basic formal control as formal control continuously exercised under all circumstances. 
                                                 
23 In other words, this study abstracts from the earlier supply chain phases of procurement (involving the make-or-
buy decision, partner selection, contract design, etc) and R&D, primarily focused on by prior research. In terms of 
research methodology, this abstraction is put into operation by studying a relation between a manufacturer facility 
and supplier facility that only deal with manufacturing, while procurement and R&D are handled by their 
respective mother companies.   
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Second, we use extra formal control for formal control set up on top of basic formal 
control. Based on this distinction, our longitudinal data suggest that trust and formal control 
are complements and substitutes at the same time, depending on the level of formal control. 
In particular, trust and basic formal control are complements, while trust substitutes for 
extra formal control. Moreover, the study indicates a timing difference in the substitutive 
relation. The building up of extra formal control proceeds gradually, while the lowering 
happens almost immediately.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the second part, we provide 
an in-depth literature study, explaining and motivating the research question and case 
research design. The third part proposes a theoretical contingency framework and 
accompanying propositions, which guide our case analysis. In the fourth part, we briefly 
discuss the details of the case methodology. The fifth part forms the actual case study and 
presents the selected MSR. We describe this relation’s characteristics and performance 
through time and indicate how the governing MCS changed during periods of fluctuating 
performance. In the sixth part, we discuss our findings, also concerning the relation 
between trust and formal control. Finally, we conclude this paper by summarizing the main 
findings and highlighting some avenues for further research. 
2.  Literature study 
The aim of contingency theory is explaining the structure of organizations by particular 
circumstances (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). For management control research on inter-
organizational relationships (IORs), this means explaining how the MCS on another firm, 
which creates bilateral incentives to pursue mutual goals, is designed within its 
environmental and organizational context (Chenhall, 2003; Luft & Shields, 2003; Nixon & 
Burns, 2005). Consequently, numerous studies examined the contingencies of MCS design 
from several angles. These angles include outsourcing (e.g. Langfield-Smith & Smith, 
2003; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000), inter-organizational cost management 
(e.g. Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), partnerships (e.g. Seal, Berry, Cullen, Dunlop & 
Ahmed, 1999), strategic alliances (e.g. Dekker, 2004), networks (e.g. Kajüter & Kulmala, 
2005) and joint ventures (e.g. Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). However, it 
remains unclear whether the contingency fit between the MCS and situational 
characteristics, found in those studies, influences performance. For example, the service 
outsourcing cases of van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman (2000) and Langfield-Smith & 
76 Manuscript 2 
Smith (2003) do not provide indications of MCS’s impact on performance. Contrary, 
Kajüter & Kulmala (2005) explicitly incorporate performance as outcome variable in a 
contingency framework, explaining the use of open-book accounting in networks. 
Nevertheless, they do not provide evidence on the performance impact of open-book 
accounting either, as this impact appears too difficult to precisely assess (Kajüter & 
Kulmala, 2005). Comparably, Dekker (2004) acknowledges that in his strategic alliance 
between a supplier of railway safety system components and the Dutch Railways, “no 
assessment could be made of the performance consequences of the alliance and in particular 
of its governance structure” (Dekker, 2004, p. 47). 
Nevertheless, performance forms the central variable in the contingency theory of 
organizations, which aims at explaining organizational success or failure (Donaldson, 
2001).
24 In essence, the paradigm of contingency theory contains three core elements 
(Donaldson, 2001, p. 7), which, applied to MSR management control, are the following. 
First, certain contingencies such as task uncertainty and environmental uncertainty are 
associated with MCS design. Second, these contingencies determine MCS design, because 
changing contingencies cause the manufacturer to change the MCS design. Third and most 
importantly, a fit of the MCS design and the influencing contingency variables results in 
higher operational performance, whereas a misfit decreases performance (Donaldson, 
2001)
25. Undoubtedly, this third association, stipulating that a MCS fitted on situational 
                                                 
24 This paper uses Donaldson’s (2001) categorization of contingency theory elements. As a result, our study 
assumes a contingency approach to fit instead of a congruence approach, which are two very different approaches 
to fit with respect to the link between fit and performance (Gerdin & Greve, 2004). More specifically, the 
congruence approach assumes that a MCS fit on contingencies is the result of a natural selection process. 
Consequently, only the best performing firms survive and are therefore observable at any point in time. As there 
are no low performers, the congruence approach has no interest in the link with performance. The contingency 
approach, however, assumes that both high and low performers exist, because more or less successful MCS fits 
occur for extended periods of time. Hence, the goal of the contingency approach is to study performance 
fluctuations that depend on the fit between the MCS and its situational contingencies (Gerdin & Greve, 2004; Luft 
& Shields, 2003). 
25 Actually, the third element of contingency theory lies at the heart of the contingency theory paradigm, because it 
explains the other elements in the following way. When a MSR is confronted with a contingency change, it moves 
into a situation where the existing MCS, which fitted the previous situation, does not fit the new contingency level. 
Based on the third element, performance decreases. When this performance drop is sufficiently large, the 
manufacturer changes the supplier MCS to fit the new situational characteristics in order to avoid further loss. In 
other words, the MCS moves towards fit because of the performance loss of a misfitted MCS. Hence, a change in 
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characteristics benefits performance, forms the underlying assumption of studies 
investigating contingency associations of inter-organizational MCSs (Dekker, 2004; 
Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). Yet, empirical evidence on the validity of this 
assumption is limited.
26  
In the inter-organizational management control literature, only Ittner et al. (1999) 
and Anderson & Dekker (2005) quantitatively study the third contingency theory element.
27 
In particular, Ittner et al. (1999) investigate whether non-price supplier selection criteria 
and supplier monitoring affect the association between supplier strategies (arms-length or 
partnership) and performance. Their survey data reveal that organizations with supplier 
partnerships, but without appropriate supplier selection and monitoring, display 
significantly lower performance than similar organizations utilizing more appropriate 
selection and monitoring practices. Anderson & Dekker (2005) focus their attention 
towards contract design (contract extensiveness and contract structure) and the potential 
negative consequences of a misfit between transaction characteristics and contract design. 
Their data comes from a large survey database of sourcing contracts for IT technology 
products and accompanying services. Comparable to Ittner et al. (1999), Anderson & 
Dekker (2005) find that contractually specified management control techniques that are 
                                                                                                                            
contingencies leads to a change in the MCS, which represents the second contingency element. This way, the 
MSR’s contingencies and MCS move towards fit, which results in the association between contingencies and 
MSC, or contingency theory’s first element (Donaldson, 2001). 
26 Obviously, the impact of contingency fit on performance has been studied in other management accounting 
research fields. One example of such a research stream is the performance effect of the fit between strategy and 
management accounting systems (e.g. Gerdin & Greve, 2004; Ittner, Larcker & Randall, 2003). Other examples of 
contingency research and the impact of fit on performance relate to management accounting techniques, such as 
Activity Based Costing (e.g. Cagwin & Bouwman, 2002; Ittner, Lanen & Larcker, 2002) and the Balanced 
Scorecard (e.g. Hoque & James, 2000; Maiga & Jacobs, 2003).     
27 Also Leiblein, Reuer & Dalsace (2002) and Sampson (2004) study the fit-performance association, albeit from a 
more high level strategic orientation. First, Leiblein et al. (2002) study the performance impact of supplier 
governance fitted on relational characteristics in the semiconductor industry. More specifically, they model 
governance as the choice between internal production and production outsourcing to suppliers. Second, Sampson 
(2004) studies the cost of a governance misfit on transactional characteristics in R&D alliances. In particular, she 
investigates the governance alternatives of an equity joint venture and a pooling contract. Both papers use 
transaction cost economics theory and study governance structures corresponding to Williamson’s (1991) 
hierarchy and market. However, neither paper looks into the actual MCS of the hierarchy or market, or 
acknowledges the existence of a hybrid form of governance.  
78 Manuscript 2 
better fitted on transactional characteristics decrease the probability of ex post performance 
problems.  
Without questioning the contribution of previous survey research, both studies 
face two limitations. First, they appear hampered by the methodological obligation to limit 
the scope of the MCS to a number of (theoretically motivated) control techniques. Indeed, 
Ittner et al. (1999) focus on partner selection and monitoring, the latter being captured by 
supplier certification and face-to-face contact only. Furthermore, Anderson & Dekker 
(2005) exclusively look at formal management control in the form of the supply contract. 
Hence, as more comprehensive frameworks with both formal and informal management 
control techniques exist (e.g. Dekker, 2004), more research looking into the performance 
impact of both control types is justified (Anderson & Dekker, 2005). Second, survey data 
only reflect average inter-organizational practices, so that an examination of individual 
supplier controls is proposed to be more powerful to illustrate the impact on the relation’s 
effectiveness (Ittner et al., 1999). As case studies offer the possibility to cope with both 
limitations, this type of research is put forward as a suitable type of future research on the 
impact of inter-organizational MCSs on performance (Ittner et al., 1999; Dekker, 2004).  
Therefore, there already exist some case studies looking into this contingency 
relation. Klein Woolthuis, Hillebrand & Nooteboom (2005) study the relation between 
trust, contractual control and inter-organizational performance by means of four 
longitudinal case studies concerning collaborative innovation. Based on a cross-sectional 
comparison, the authors conclude that relationships characterized by trust are more 
successful, while the effect of contract completeness on performance is mixed (Klein 
Woolthuis et al., 2005). While Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) investigate partner 
dependence, Yan & Gray (1994) study the effect of partner bargaining power on US-
Chinese joint venture MCS design. Four case studies in different industries are described, 
based on which the impact on joint venture performance is assessed. Yet, performance 
levels differ both within and between joint ventures, leading the authors to conclude that the 
direct impact is not as straightforward as predicted (Yan & Gray, 1994). Finally, also 
Cooper & Slagmulder (2004) provide some insight in both the MCS and the performance of 
inter-organizational cost management (IOCM) practices, while theoretically explaining 
IOCM usage based on contingency variables. 
On top of evidence being mixed, none of the previous case studies actually 
investigates the third element of contingency theory, which states that performance is not 
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influenced by its MCS, but by the fit  between  MCS  and  situational characteristics 
(Donaldson, 2001). To our knowledge, the only case studies looking into this association, 
comparable to Ittner et al. (1999) and Anderson & Dekker (2005), are Heikkilä (2002) and 
van Veen-Dirks (2006). Heikkilä (2002) studies MCSs in the specific context of customer 
relations and investigates to what extent organizations design demand chain structures 
fitting specific customer situations and whether this fit benefits performance. The cross-
sectional qualitative analysis of six customers involved in a Nokia efficiency improvement 
project provides a clear indication that a fit between customer situation and demand chain 
structure is associated with higher supply chain efficiency (Heikkilä, 2002). van Veen-
Dirks (2006) investigates the fit between an organization’s production environment 
characteristics and internal MCS design, its impact on operational performance and the 
MCS change to increase the level of fit (van Veen-Dirks, 2006). Yet, van Veen-Dirks’ 
(2006) research remains within the boundaries of one organization and is based on 
complementarity theory. Heikkilä (2002) does study IORs, but only looks at customer 
relations. Hence, it must be clear that case evidence on the (most important) third 
contingency element between a contingency fitted MCS and performance is scarce. This 
study aims to fill this research gap. 
3.  Theoretical framework and research propositions 
To illustrate the validity and refine the dynamics of the third contingency element in 
practice, we propose a theoretical contingency framework for MSRs from the position of 
the manufacturer, which can be found in figure 2.1. 
 
 












Figure 2.1: Theoretical contingency framework for MCS design and the impact on 
operational performance of MSRs 
 
The constructs on the left hand side visualize the associations between 
contingency variables influencing risks and management control techniques governing 
these risks.
28 The degree to which the level of management control fits the level of risks is 
conceptualized by means of the degree of fit construct, which visualizes the association 
with operational performance. 
MSRs are subject to performance risk and relational risk. Performance risk is the 
probability of the supplier interrupting the supply chain and damaging the common goal. 
This goal is manufacturing as many products of the order book as possible, on time, with 
good quality and at the lowest possible cost. Relational risk implies the probability of the 
supplier acting opportunistically by not openly communicating or minimizing operational 
snags (Das & Teng, 2001). These risks are increased by four contingencies. First, task 
uncertainty relates to the complexity and added value of both the delivered product and its 
operational processes (Woodward, 1965). Second, task interdependence refers to the degree 
to which sequential subactivities of the value chain have been split up and made dependent 
                                                 
28 In the model, all contingencies interactively determine both risk types (cf Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 
2007; van Veen-Dirks, 2006). As a result, the model simultaneously depicts the associations between 
contingencies, risks and management controls. 
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on each other (Dekker, 2004). Third, environmental uncertainty regards general market 
uncertainties and uncertainty about unknown future contingencies (Langfield-Smith & 
Smith, 2003). Fourth, relational stability aim concerns the manufacturer’s aim of continued 
future interactions with the supplier to build bilateral commitment (Cooper & Slagmulder, 
2004). 
MCSs contain two types of control, namely formal and informal control 
techniques (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). Formal controls are explicitly set up to 
coordinate the MSR and include outcome controls and behaviour controls. Outcome 
controls involve the measurement and evaluation of operational outcomes against pre-
defined targets. Behaviour controls concern specifying, monitoring and evaluating 
compliance with pre-specified planning, procedures, rules and regulations (Dekker, 2004; 
Merchant, 1998; Ouchi, 1979). Informal controls are not explicitly designed, but are grown 
out of shared norms and values (Merchant, 1998; Ouchi, 1979). Especially trust building 
has emerged as an important informal control instrument in inter-organizational MCSs (e.g. 
Dekker, 2004). Sako (1992) distinguishes three types of inter-organizational trust building, 
namely building contractual, competence and goodwill trust.
29 Besides trust building, 
MSRs are governed by clan control (Ouchi, 1979). Based on shared norms, values and a 
common goal, suppliers are motivated to achieve that goal (Das & Teng, 2001) because of 
inter-organizational social pressure (Speklé, 2001) exerted by the manufacturer. In 
particular, poor operational performance leads to social sanctions for supplier managers 
(Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005), namely unpleasant confrontations with manufacturer 
management and personal humiliation, which render supplier underperformance and 
opportunism hard to sustain (Speklé, 2001). 
To incorporate the fit-performance association, we add operational performance 
on the right hand side of the framework. Since product quality is emphasized more than 
timeliness and cost as supplier evaluation criterion (Waters-Fuller, 1996), we use this 
performance indicator to evaluate operational performance. In particular, we measure 
                                                 
29 Contractual trust is based on the expectation that the supplier will keep promises and comply with agreements 
made, whether these are contractually stipulated or not. Competence trust concerns the expectation that the 
supplier possesses the necessary technical and managerial competences to deliver the order as agreed. Goodwill 
trust regards the expectation that the supplier shares an open commitment, with the willingness to perform 
activities that are beneficial to the MSR, but possibly neither in the supplier’s interest nor required by the contract 
(Sako, 1992). 
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product quality by its most important evaluation metric in MSRs, namely percentage of 
defects (Gunasekaran, Patel & McGaughey, 2004). In automotive industry, this KPI is 
expressed in “parts per million” (PPM), i.e. the number of products claimed to be defective 
by the manufacturer out of one million products delivered by the supplier (Lowe, Deibridge 
& Oliver, 1997).  
Following contingency theory’s third element, the arrow from degree of fit to 
performance depicts our static proposition: a MCS fitted on MSR contingencies and risks is 
associated with good operational performance. Conversely, provided that the supplier is 
incapable of dealing with changed contingencies, a misfitted MCS is associated with poor 
performance (Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007; van Veen-Dirks, 2006). 
However, since that kind of misfit over time results in escalating control problems, further 
damaging operational performance (Dekker, 2004), such misfitted MCS is changed towards 
a more appropriate design (van Veen-Dirks, 2006). These dynamics form this study’s main 
interest and further justify our choice for an in-depth longitudinal case study. In essence, we 
assume that MCSs are equilibrating and return to a stable situation after being disturbed 
(van Veen-Dirks, 2006)
30. If contingencies, on which the MSR’s MCS is fitted, change, the 
risk levels change, so that the MSR moves into misfit and its performance decreases. 
Therefore, the manufacturer changes the MCS to fit the new level of risks in order to avoid 
further performance loss. Because any manufacturer tends to adopt a MCS that fits 
situational risks, a change in risks leads to a change in the MCS. In contingency 
terminology, this change is called “Structural Adaptation to Regain Fit” or “SARFIT” 
(Donaldson, 2001). Consequently, we also study the following dynamic proposition. 
Provided that the supplier is incapable of dealing with changed contingencies, a misfitted 
MCS only temporarily aggravates performance, until the MCS is changed towards a design 
                                                 
30 Consistent with economics theory, contingency theory largely depends on the assumption of equilibrium, 
stipulating that organizations utilize the MCS best suited for the MSR, i.e. the MCS fitting the MSR’s risks. Yet 
contrary to economics, contingency theory (with a contingency approach to fit) assumes that also misfits occur for 
extended periods of time (Luft & Shields, 2003). Obviously, the outcome of such a misfit could be the end of the 
IOR. Yet in that case, the change towards a MCS fitting the new level of risks does not occur. Consequently, this 
kind of “equilibrium” without MCS dynamics is not interesting for our research. Therefore, we abstract from the 
possibility that the manufacturer changes suppliers. In terms of research methodology, this abstraction is put into 
operation by studying a MSR in an industry, in which manufacturers are not inclined to switching suppliers during 
the manufacturing phase. 
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fitting the changed contingencies and risks and therefore contributing to performance. 
4.  Research methodology 
4.1.  Case study research 
An explanatory case study (Yin, 2003) suits studying these research propositions, as they 
involve refining existing inter-organizational management control theory from a dynamic 
perspective. More specifically, our case research seeks “to establish the plausibility of a 
specific theoretical perspective by demonstrating its capacity to illuminate some previously 
unappreciated aspect of management accounting practice” (Keating, 1995, p. 69). Indeed, 
the goal of this study is to refine inter-organizational management control theory by 
illustrating that a misfitted MCS, aggravating performance, is changed towards a design 
fitting the contingencies and risks and therefore contributing to performance. 
Several inter-organizational management control case studies (e.g. Cooper & 
Slagmulder, 2004; Dekker, 2004; Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007; Nicholson, 
Jones & Espenlaub, 2006) demonstrate that MCS design can be adequately investigated by 
means of case research. The social meaning of a MCS and subsequent behaviour of 
companies and employees is very complex. Therefore, an in-depth study is needed to 
discover how different parties respond to a situational change, how they change the MCS 
and whether that change has any effect on performance. This argument not only justifies the 
choice for a case study, but also forms the reason why more of this research is requested 
(e.g. Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Dekker, 2004; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 
2006). 
As theory refinement needs a clear theoretical starting point combined with 
openness to discover unexpected findings (Keating, 1995), we proposed a theoretical 
contingency framework to guide the data collection, but simultaneously used data 
collection techniques allowing sufficient openness. The collected data was longitudinal, 
because only such data can reflect changes in MCS design and performance, which are 
needed to illustrate the validity and refine the dynamics of the third contingency element 
(Luo, 2002). Only by means of a longitudinal study, we are able to answer the call for more 
research on MCS dynamics and its impact on performance (Anderson & Dekker, 2005; 
Dekker, 2004; 2007; Ittner et al., 1999; Scannell et al., 2000; van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000). 
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Like most inter-organizational studies, the unit of analysis is one dyadic relation 
between manufacturer and supplier (van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2006). Dyer & 
Singh (1998) explicitly propose this “relational view”, focusing on the manufacturer-
supplier dyad, as opposed to the “industry structure view” and “resource based view”, when 
analyzing cooperative strategy and sources of inter-organizational competitive advantage. 
Furthermore, we analyzed the relation after the manufacturer had decided to outsource the 
manufacturing activity. In other words, we addressed neither the make-or-buy decision nor 
related commercial negotiations, but collected data from the start of production onwards. 
4.2.  Case company selection 
The selection of the case companies was influenced by two selection concerns: theoretical 
suitability and open and flexible access to senior management.  
First, we chose the Volvo Cars Gent (VCG) production facility of the Swedish 
Volvo Cars Corporation (VCC) as manufacturing case company. On the one hand, we 
chose automotive, because this industry is considered a trendsetter in supplier relationships 
(cf Womack et al., 1990). Due to the high level of component outsourcing, extreme 
competitive pressure and resulting continuous improvement projects with suppliers, this 
sector needs appropriate MCSs to organize and manage supplier relations (Alford et al., 
2000; Carr & Ng, 1995; Scannell et al., 2000). Furthermore, our research regarding MCS 
dynamics requires a MSR that heavily changes and is not terminated due to potential 
unsatisfactory supplier performance. The manufacturing phase of an automotive supply 
chain fulfils this need. For example, the manufacturing and delivery processes of suppliers 
drastically change when a manufacturer starts producing a new car model. Moreover, 
manufacturer facilities are not inclined to switch suppliers because of a lack of capacity and 
sufficient supply quality at potential replacing suppliers. On the other hand, we chose VCG, 
because exploratory interviews learned that this manufacturer is considered a “best 
practice” by financial analysts, suppliers and umbrella organizations. For example, with 
respect to suppliers’ capability for build-to-order, VCG’s supplier park was evaluated best 
in a comparative case study, also including supplier parks of e.g. Ford, General Motors and 
Audi (Howard, 2006). In addition, VCG was subject to extremely changing supplier 
relations due to the introduction of two extra car models. Besides theoretical suitability, 
exploratory interviews with VCG management showed remarkable openness, interest in the 
research topic and willingness to cooperate.  
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Second, we chose SAG, the production facility of one of VCG’s first-tier module 
suppliers, as supplying case company.
31 This high value-added just-in-sequence
32 supplier 
of VCG met our theoretical suitability requirement of facing severe operational difficulties 
over time without relationship termination. In fact, the supplier evolved from an exemplary 
supplier to a problematic supplier and back. Furthermore, SAG was very willing to 
participate in our study. 
4.3.  Data collection 
The data gathering consisted of 17 semi-structured interviews with high level managers of 
both VCG and SAG.
 Interviews were held in three rounds between February 2006 and July 
2007. First, all VCG managers involved with suppliers were interviewed, including 
responsibles for quality, logistics, logistic engineering, material planning, IT, HR and 
purchase. That way, we got a general impression of VCG, its suppliers and its MCS. 
Second, we interviewed SAG management, in particular the plant manager and two middle 
level managers. We asked them to describe the history of the VCG-SAG relation. As a 
result, we got SAG’s impression of the VCG-SAG relation, its history and its MCS, in the 
form of retrospective data, starting January 2000. Third, we re-interviewed three high level 
VCG managers specifically involved with SAG for several years. After asking them the 
same question, they added their view to the retrospective data of our study. Table 2.1 
provides an interview data summary, describing the organization and position of the 
interviewees, the number of interviews, the duration of the interviews and the interview 
dates. 
                                                 
31 For reasons of confidentiality, we call this production facility “Supplier Automotive Gent” or “SAG”. The 
mother company headquarters are referred to as “Supplier Automotive”. Concerning the delivered product, it 
suffices to know that SAG delivers a high value-added module. Examples of such modules supplied to VCG are 
seats, cockpits, engines, fuel tanks, bumpers, exhaust systems, door modules and wheels. For the same reason, the 
case description only refers to “X” and “Y” instead of people’s full last names. Finally, we guarantee 
confidentiality by inserting an asterisk in interviewee quotes containing supplier characteristics. 
32 In order to reduce stocks and preserve maximum flexibility at VCG, components are delivered both just-in-time 
(JIT) and in-sequence. Just-in-time delivery means delivery when the car, for which the components are intended, 
has come onto VCG’s final assembly line. In-sequence delivery implies delivery in the same order as the cars on 
VCG’s production line. Suppliers delivering just-in-time and in-sequence are also called just-in-sequence (JIS) 
suppliers. 
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    Organization Interviewee Number of     Duration  
interviews  (in min.) 
Date 
VCG  Engineering Director & Material Planning & Logistics Manager  1 (joint)  122  8/02/2006 
  Supply Chain Control & Coordination Manager  2  55; 62  10/02/2006; 29/05/2006 
  Logistic Engineering Manager  1  68  10/02/2006 
  Supplier Support & Purchasing Manager  2  92; 95  15/02/2006; 18/04/2006 
  Material Planning Manager  1  73  15/02/2006 
  Supplier Quality Assurance Manager  2  44; 96  15/02/2006; 29/05/2006 
        Human  Resource Manager 1  50  15/02/2006
        Finance Manager 1  47  15/02/2006
         IT Manager 1 67  13/03/2006
SAG  Plant Manager  2  106; 74  13/03/2006; 18/04/2006 
        Human  Resource Manager 1  51  29/03/2006
  Quality Manager  2  125; 121  29/03/2006; 18/07/2007 
 
Table 2.1: Interview data summary Manuscript 2 
The interviews aimed at building a trusting relation and developing a dialogue 
with the interviewees, which permitted them to discuss their own concerns. All interviews 
were tape recorded electronically and structured by an interview protocol with open-ended 
questions, based on the theoretical framework. This approach allowed covering all 
framework constructs (i.e. theory attachment), while at the same time preserving openness 
for new findings (i.e. theory detachment). Interviews lasted between three quarters of an 
hour and two hours, with an average duration of approximately one hour and twenty 
minutes. Afterwards, all taped interviews were transcribed and sent back to the 
interviewees for feedback and final approval. The feedback was transcribed as well. 
Interview transcripts were written in prose, as to avoid offending interviewees by literally 
transcribing their words on a very sensitive topic. Furthermore, by writing in prose, we 
were able to immediately write out certain parts of the interview that were not entirely clear 
on the tape. As the interviewees approved the final transcript, we received absolute 
certainty on the written documents and all interpretations made during transcribing.  
4.4.  Data analysis 
The data analysis followed a structured iterative approach. Already during interview 
transcribing, a first analysis was performed by highlighting parts of the transcript and 
writing down comments and related personal ideas.  
Then, both transcripts and personal notes formed the basis for a second analysis, 
which was completely done by hand. This analysis started with writing the case study, for 
which all transcript extracts were ordered chronologically. The most important techniques 
to enhance theoretical sensitivity during the coding process were asking questions (who?, 
what?, when?, where?, why? and how?) and making comparisons (Strauss & Corbin, 1999). 
Also the tape recorder was used, to capture facts and findings coming up during the 
analysis. As with interviews, these tapes were transcribed and further studied. The coding 
process resulted in a document, containing an elaborate sample of ordered longitudinal 
data, which was used for writing up the case study.  
Finally, we used the temporal bracketing and variance research methods to 
structure and interpret the case data in relation to the contingency framework (Langley, 
1999; Rowe et al., 2008). Temporal bracketing means dividing the time length of a 
longitudinal case study into time periods, so that there are continuities of events within a 
time period and discontinuities of events between time periods. That way, temporal 
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bracketing is suited for making comparisons of organizational change between time 
periods. The variance (or synthetic) method implies transforming original data from a story 
with events to a collection of variables that synthesize critical components of the events. 
These variables are the variables from our theoretical framework, which allow a 
longitudinal analysis on how change in the influencing variable, i.e. MCS fit on risks, 
affects change in the dependent variable, i.e. operational performance. Similarly to Rowe et 
al. (2008), we use both methods to make two types of comparisons, namely within period 
and between period comparisons. These comparisons provide the means to study our static 
proposition (i.e. a MCS misfit is associated with poor performance) and dynamic 
proposition (i.e. a change towards a more appropriate MCS contributes to a performance 
increase) respectively.  
The case study description and following discussion were approved for publication 
by VCG and SAG, without having to make changes. 
5.  Case study description: the fall and revival of an exemplary MSR 
The MSR between VCG and SAG started in 2000, when VCG outsourced the production of 
the module under investigation to Supplier Automotive, a global automotive supplier, for 
two new models on Volvo’s P2 platform (Volvo S60 and V70). Therefore, Supplier 
Automotive set up a supplier facility (SAG) in VCG’s supplier park to deliver modules 
just-in-time and in-sequence. Delivery volume fluctuated around 150.000 modules per year, 
which were produced by some 30 employees in two shifts. Following Supplier 
Automotive’s low profile approach, many responsibilities such as finance and HR were 
centralised. This explains why the SAG plant manager was sent on secondment from 
another Supplier Automotive facility and was only present during office hours to 
concentrate on budgeting and reporting. Actual production and communication with VCG 
was lead by the production manager, with assistance of a quality manager and a logistics 
manager.  
 
After production started without exceptional difficulties, SAG was awarded prizes related 
to outstanding quality and delivery to VCG both in 2001 and 2002. 
During the start up of production for P2 and following years, SAG was a real exemplary supplier. If 
one would have asked me for our best supplier at that time, for example with reference to a new 
supplier, the answer would invariably be SAG. (VCG manager) 
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Consequently, SAG’s relationship with VCG was governed by KPIs (primarily PPM) 
follow-up, a clear syllabus (i.e. a document containing all agreements regarding the basic 
routines of day-to-day operational business), and a substantial level of trust in SAG’s 
capabilities built on performance. Because nothing disturbed SAG delivery, VCG left the 
supplier alone. Also concerning Volvo’s supplier team (STVC)
33, the SAG plant manager’s 
interest and involvement were small, mainly because of his situation of secondment. 
In the period 2000-2003, collaboration with VCG was exceptionally good. There were no problems. It 
was an ideal situation. That manifested itself almost in non-communication. VCG did not contact SAG, 
because everything functioned well. (SAG manager) 
 
This situation lasted until 2003. By that time, VCG had been awarded the production of two 
extra models on a new P1 platform (Volvo S40 and V50), which substantially changed 
production processes at SAG. First, production volume almost doubled to around 250.000 
units per year by means of a second assembly line and doubled warehouse size. Second, 
producing four models created a variant explosion and a considerable increase in JIS supply 
flexibility. Third, the new module required more activities, so that SAG production 
activities tripled and became substantially more complex. Fourth, the volume increase 
required SAG to expand its headcount to some 100 people and introduce a third night shift. 
This new 24 hour system not only inhibited working over-time during the night in case of 
operational snags during the day, but also hampered control on employees, as the night shift 
was shielded from daytime management.  
 
Although production of the new models started in January 2004, preparations began one 
year and a half upfront. Already during this project phase, some decisions were made that 
later contributed to the escalation of operational difficulties. In essence, SAG 
underestimated the changes and paid too little attention to change management, especially 
regarding the increased production volume and number of variants.  
                                                 
33 The purposes of the “Suppliers Team Volvo Cars” (STVC) are creating openness between all JIS suppliers and 
sharing competencies by the exchange of real life experiences in order to improve performance of all parties 
involved. To this end, all JIS plant managers participate in a monthly meeting in order to get to know each other, 
exchange information, jointly consider common problems and improvement programs, and set up and follow up 
on specific workgroup projects. Under the overall STVC, of which the chairman is a supplier plant manager, five 
inter-organizational workgroups exist (quality, logistics, IT, HR and finance). Workgroups meet monthly at one of 
the supplier plants to visit the plant and jointly discuss problems and improvement programs. 
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At that time, SAG management thought: “We are doing alright. The upcoming changes will not be a 
problem. There are some new variants for P1, but that will work out.” Yet, P1 formed a variant 
explosion, which SAG management thought of handling the same way as before. In the end, this 
appeared problematic. (VCG manager) 
Instead of introducing the upcoming production changes into the organization, SAG 
considered producing the new products self-evident. That was visible in the information 
exchange towards VCG. Indeed, during the project phase, VCG installed cross-functional 
workgroups
34, to make sure SAG was capable of handling the new module supply. Yet, 
SAG’s information concerning the new approach was very superficial. 
SAG hung up a lot of fog and told VCG that certain issues would get solved, while on the work floor 
nothing happened. VCG approved a theoretical model, rather than real changes. (SAG manager) 
Obviously, this behaviour was only possible, because VCG expected all process changes to 
be taken care of based on previous outstanding SAG performance. 
VCG controlled too little, maybe because of previous good experiences, and that way they got slightly 
deceived. (SAG manager) 
Furthermore, the responsibility of the workgroups mainly dealt with the VCG-SAG 
interface. As all related models were negotiated and approved, VCG did not have a bad 
feeling regarding the upcoming changes. Yet, despite this fine-tuning, SAG management 
neglected both to communicate the volume increase and all related modifications in the 
SAG organization and to prepare employees for new operational tasks. In addition, SAG 
received too little support from its mother company. 
The introduction of P1 slipped out of their control. They forgot to talk to their own people and 
communicate the changes. (VCG manager) 
Supplier Automotive expected SAG to be self-sustaining, but did not provide resources for it, […] so 
that people were not adequately trained. Meanwhile, the management fooled itself. The entire system 
was doomed to fail. (SAG manager) 
 
As a result, SAG exhibited gradually lowering operational performance from the start of 
production. Nevertheless, the supplier succeeded in covering up these problems. 
SAG put those problems away under the form of overcapacity, increased stocks and scrap. At the start 
of production, a supplier is able to keep up such a strategy,
 because VCG sometimes only needs ten 
good quality [*] modules. With a capacity of 500 pieces, SAG always gets those out. However, the 
                                                 
34 Four workgroups (information exchange and data management; packaging and logistics; supplier process- and 
product quality; human resources) investigate production and delivery related changes at the supplier by means of 
trial production runs and audits. 
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question is whether the supplier learns enough out of its experiences. It is normal to have problems, but 
the goal is to learn from them. SAG seriously lacked those problem solving capabilities. (SAG 
manager)  
As SAG’s learning capacity was too low, the supplier displayed increasing operational 
difficulties, which already became catastrophic in June 2004. The PPM rate was multiple 
times higher than the target and the number of line stop minutes exceeded several hundreds.  
At the start-up of P1, SAG started sputtering. That manifested itself in many rejections, an increasing 
PPM rate and especially stopping our production line several times; not by one minute, but by a large 
number of minutes. (VCG manager) 
 
VCG acknowledged these operational difficulties by escalating SAG to step four in the 
quality escalating activities procedure
35 in order to increase control and formalise 
performance complaints.  
At the start of production, SAG was already in step two because of the introduction of the new models 
and the related risk, which required sharpened attention. After the start of production, SAG 
immediately moved from step two to four, without being accredited the normal three months to improve 
and without passing step three.
36 (VCG manager) 
Consequently, VCG installed several extra controls, starting with supplier review meetings. 
These regular meetings at SAG were lead by an expert team of VCC engineers and dealt 
with difficulties by asking questions, analyzing problems and studying action plans. 
Second, VCG contracted an external organization to perform third party inspection at the 
end of the SAG production line, for which SAG paid the costs. Third, VCG demanded SAG 
to perform extra quality controls both internally at SAG and externally at VCG, via a SAG 
staff member checking delivery quality at the VCG line, when SAG transportation racks 
were opened. Finally, VCG required SAG to take a digital picture of every module 
delivered. Besides these controls, VCG demanded SAG to work overtime during the 
                                                 
35 The aim of the escalating activities procedure is to indicate both internally (at VCG and VCC) and externally (to 
the supplier) that VCG is aware of the operational difficulties and installs adequate measures to help solving them. 
Those measures depend on the snag seriousness and are linked to the step the supplier is escalated in. Normally, 
all JIS suppliers are in step one. When encountering frequent problems with a supplier, VCG managers escalate 
the supplier to the next step. If the problem is not solved after a pre-defined period of time, the supplier is further 
escalated. The procedure ends when a supplier either reaches step five, which theoretically implies re-evaluation 
and potential re-sourcing of his products, or substantially improves, so that he returns to step one. 
36 According to official VCG documents, SAG did spent one quarter in step three. Yet, that is because the 
procedure only allows stepwise escalation. In reality, however, SAG was immediately put in step four and 
received all related extra controls. 
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weekend, to build up safety stock after problems during the 24 hour system work week. 
Furthermore, VCG wanted SAG’s operational difficulties to get solved. To that end, VCG 
sent staff members to SAG.  
I also wanted to make the link to the causes of problems, as those were unknown. (VCG manager)  
When VCG staff figured out that too little was learned at SAG, they showed more focus and came to 
SAG to ask questions. (SAG manager) 
More specifically, a supplier quality engineer and a logistics controller
37 were assigned to 
follow up on SAG, under supervision of VCG’s local purchase responsible, Mr X, who had 
numerous years of experience with suppliers. His guidance was needed, because SAG was 
only recently assigned to the quality engineer.  
The problem was that the engineer was only put on SAG recently, when everything at the supplier was 
under control. Consequently, he only did monitoring. […] He could not respond in the same way as a 
quality engineer with more experience. That is why Mr X took the lead. Yet, that still was not the same 
as with a more experienced engineer on SAG. (VCG manager) 
Because VCG did not expect difficulties with SAG due to previous good performance, 
VCG was surprised when severe performance problems arose, as was SAG. As a result, 
valuable time was lost in comparison with suppliers that were more strongly followed up 
from the beginning.  
SAG management did not see the problem coming either and moved from very good performance into 
big trouble. People respond differently in that case. The good situation made us decide not to put too 
much energy in SAG, presuming that SAG management had everything under control. Somehow, this is 
a contribution of VCG to the escalation of the operational problems. (VCG manager) 
The VCG team visited the supplier daily, on some occasions two times a day and even at 
night or during the weekend. These supplier visits served two purposes, namely controlling 
and motivating SAG personnel.  
On the one hand, we wanted to control whether SAG employees were busy and whether they were 
doing a good job. On the other hand, we wanted to motivate the employees and hearten them by 
signalling: “Guys, you are not alone. Your customer has seen it.” (VCG manager) 
The control purpose followed VCG’s damaged trust in SAG capabilities. 
The lack of trust in their promises led to extra control. These controls were necessary to go to the 
supplier, when he did not carry out his promises. At that moment, I could show SAG management the 
                                                 
37 Besides an escalating activities procedure for quality, VCG uses a similar procedure for logistics. As product 
quality formed SAG’s main issue due to continuing operational difficulties, poor logistics performance mostly 
followed as a secondary consequence. Therefore, SAG was “only” escalated to step three of the logistics 
escalating activities procedure. This implied that a logistics manager joined VCG’s team at SAG to provide input 
on SAG’s performance, analyse problems and follow up on action plans. 
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results and say that the process was in fact not under control based on the results. After all, figures 
form physical evidence. (VCG manager)  
During the problems, VCG’s control on SAG increased and VCG’s trust in SAG decreased. (SAG 
manager) 
To regain trust, VCG continuously questioned SAG’s operational processes. 
I continuously asked: “Why does the process stop and VCG does not receive [*] modules?” Then, I 
saw innumerable problems and continuously asked why certain operations were done this way, as 
production clearly sputtered. (VCG manager) 
However, VCG representatives were not received openly, so that very little progress was 
made. 
SAG tried to keep these people away from problems by putting them around the table instead of 
showing them the work floor. This strategy was utilised until problems reached a climax and VCG 
management reacted by saying: “We have enough of it.”(SAG manager)  
The plant manager was the core of the problem, because he was not capable of neither running the 
business, neither setting things straight. Instead, he covered up snags for Mr X. When Mr X was at SAG 
and asked how things went, the answer always was: “good, good”, while in reality there were multiple 
issues. (SAG manager)  
My conclusion was that the formal exemplary supplier had been reduced to zero and did not have any 
structure, any management, nothing at all, left. The plant manager, however, always said he had things 
under control and would solve the problems. Yet, the next day was the same story. VCG had stopped 
because of SAG. (VCG manager) 
 
Consequently, by August 2004, the production manager had quit, after having 
unsuccessfully demanded extra resources from Supplier Automotive several times. The 
quality manager had left as well, as had his successor. Finally, the logistics manager had 
quit, which made headquarters decide to centralize the logistics function. Consequently, 
only the plant manager remained, but this manager appeared to lack appropriate 
communication and management skills. Due to limited employee monitoring, he suffered 
from internal control problems with SAG employees, which were hampered even more by a 
doubled production hall and the introduction of the night shift.   
In 2004, serious problems arose and the same management was not capable of solving them in the 
short term, because they had created a social cemetery. They did not talk to people any longer. (VCG 
manager)  
At SAG, there even was sabotage in order to disturb the production process. One time, someone 
deliberately cut the computer cables of the [*] robot. (SAG manager) 
Furthermore, the plant manager experienced difficulties in his relationship with VCG. 
The plant manager had a different style, in particular regarding communication. He had a very stiff 
approach and a totally different charisma compared to Mr Y. And the person of the plant manager 
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plays a very important role in the relation that VCG has with a JIS supplier. (VCG manager)  
At a certain moment, I saw the plant manager running through his factory and scratching his hair. He 
seemed to have lost it. So, I said: “Our production line has stopped.”, to which he only responded with 
“I know …”, without being able to give a reason or a solution. That is when I said: “Apparently, you 
are here alone and you can not do it alone. This can not go on any longer. And you have to stop telling 
me that the problem gets solved, because I do not believe you any more.” (VCG manager) 
For VCG, the tolerance limit for SAG’s operational problems was reached. Based on high 
pressure from Mr X, the plant manager was removed by Supplier Automotive.  
To the [*] managers, I emphasized: “SAG has to stop shutting down VCG, because SAG jeopardizes 
the future of VCG and the other suppliers in the supplier park, which also stop and suffer financial and 
reputation loss. So, how is Supplier Automotive going to support SAG?” […] The following day, 
Supplier Automotive had removed the plant manager. (VCG manager) 
As a response and attempt to regain VCG’s trust, Supplier Automotive sent several new 
managers to SAG, including an interim plant manager from another Supplier Automotive 
facility. VCG staff kept visiting SAG twice a day and met management to jointly discuss 
priorities, walk through the factory, analyse problem causes and decide on which snag to 
tackle first. This situation went on for several months, but without substantial performance 
improvement. The PPM rate decreased from its highest rate in September 2004, but 
remained too high. Rather quickly, the interim manager appeared not capable of 
restructuring SAG either.  
The manager was very good in technical aspects, but exceptionally bad in managing social aspects. So 
instead of dealing with the workforce, which was far too large for the production volume, the plant 
manager considered all problems technically based on his experience in the other Supplier Automotive 
facility. Yet, that facility manufactures simple and standardised [*] modules, so that the standard 
concept suited for that production unit did not suit SAG. (SAG manager) 
It was suggested that the plant manager only addressed symptoms, installed technical 
solutions like a pick-to-light system to solve picking errors and hired more employees to 
operate the more complex production systems. Yet, none of the technical solutions worked 
properly and none of the new operators knew how to operate the new system adequately. 
During supplier visits, already going on with the previous SAG management, VCG staff 
inspected employee working instructions and product control instructions, which all 
appeared deteriorated.  
There were no instructions, so that the operator carried out his assignment and then just stood there 
watching and waiting for his next assignment. Also control instructions were disintegrated. […] There 
were moments that I called SAG and told them: “Our production line has stopped. Do you know 
that?”, to which SAG responded: “Stopped? No, I did not know, but I will have a look.” (VCG 
manager) 
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As a result, VCG’s trust in SAG’s capabilities disappeared completely, which was 
formalised by stripping SAG of its Q1 Award
38 in November 2004. As SAG had already 
failed to renew other quality certificates
39 as well, the interim plant manager left, so that 
SAG again needed a new one.  
During the problematic period, we lost all trust in SAG management. (VCG manager)  
By the end of 2004, VCG only distrusted SAG. (SAG manager) 
 
However this time, the plant manager of another VCG JIS supplier, Mr Y, put himself up. 
When Mr X learned about his candidature, he considered this manager to be the manager 
SAG and VCG needed. Consequently, he personally telephoned Supplier Automotive. 
At that time, I was already six years plant manager at [*], a company that had performed very well all 
those years and of which the challenge was somewhat gone. (SAG manager)  
I asked them: “I know there is a candidate for the position of plant manager at SAG. What are you 
waiting for? It is not my decision, but yours, but I think this man is the right person for the job and I 
can recommend him. Furthermore, there is no more time, because the difficulties have been going on 
for months. You have to decide now and according to me, this is the right person.” (VCG manager) 
Undoubtedly, this telephone call accelerated the appointment of Mr Y as new SAG plant 
manager. In January 2005, he started talking with SAG staff at a time when wages were not 
paid in time for several months and employees considered going into a strike. In March 
2005, he actually started as plant manager.  
The new plant manager, Mr Y, is totally different and manages in a different way, namely by talking to 
people and listening to their problems. He also came to listen to VCG in order to find out what went 
wrong. (VCG manager)    
First, Mr Y dealt with the employee excess by laying off fifteen employees and two team 
leaders. Second, he built on his organization by immediately hiring a new quality and HR 
manager and a few months later also attracting a production manager and logistics 
supervisor. That way, rolling stock was halved and the production hall was not packed with 
merchandise and scrap any longer. Furthermore, Mr Y’s management qualities played an 
important role in the recovery of SAG performance. 
                                                 
38 The Q1 Award is a very demanding quality standard of VCC, indicating that a certain supplier satisfies quality 
requirements and is worth delivering VCC. The award is received based on an evaluation of PPM performance, an 
audit of business operating system parameters (e.g. profitability), recommendation letters of customers and the 
possession of standard automotive quality certificates. 
39 Two examples of standard quality certificates in automotive are ISO-TS and ISO-14000. These certificates need 
renewal every three years, but in 2004 SAG failed to apply for renewal. 
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If SAG would not have had someone like Mr Y, the turnaround would not have succeeded. (VCG 
manager)  
Because of the coming of Mr Y, many things changed substantially at SAG. (SAG manager) 
Mr Y listened to SAG employees’ problems, instead of only listening to VCG’s problems. 
Furthermore, he eliminated over-engineering out of the production process. Based on the 
Plan-Do-Check-Act approach, he analysed problems and tackled causes instead of fixing 
symptoms; all in cooperation with VCG.  
Because of his personality and his approach, a change set in, a restructuring. (VCG manager)  
Thanks to the influence and the crisis management of Mr Y, we have succeeded in dealing with the 
causes of the problems. (VCG manager)  
I dealt with meetings differently and went searching for causes instead of symptoms, so that no 
frustrations arose. […] I worked with VCG managers that had the necessary maturity, like Mr X. (SAG 
manager) 
As manufacturing activities became simpler and easier to maintain, reliability increased. 
Operation processes were optimized by discussing snag occurrence and preventive 
measures with operators. Moreover, training of new employees got a lot of attention, 
stimulated by VCG, as SAG activities require very specialized skills.  
 
Undoubtedly, the relationship with VCG played an important role as well. First, Mr Y 
really enjoyed VCG’s trust from the beginning, which helped to open doors within Supplier 
Automotive and get the resources needed to change things. 
I received the trust of Mr X to carry out things at SAG. Through him, I also got the support of VCC in 
Sweden. Furthermore, I already had other contacts both at VCG and VCC, and in general got 
everyone’s trust based on the good references built up during my career. Therefore, Supplier 
Automotive had to take me into account. (SAG manager)  
SAG started with more than a clean sheet, because they had a new plant manager, who we already 
knew and in who we already had lots of trust. Therefore, it was easier for us to open up for even more 
trust than in the case of an unknown new plant manager. (VCG manager)  
That pressure [on timing] also went up to the mother company in [*], which was asked to send 
specialists, for example to give training regarding [*]. I have the feeling that the pressure of the 
customer opens certain doors in the own supplier organization. (VCG manager)  
Second, VCG’s involvement was always constructive. The automaker brought along many 
ideas, which SAG did not need to follow, but at least formed a source of inspiration. SAG 
never got punished by VCG. 
I was at SAG two times a day, sometimes for the whole day, to set up action plans together, give ideas 
and suggest “let us try this or that”. (VCG manager)  
VCG took much trouble and was very constructive. Every day, they said what had to be done to 
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improve by the next day. The approach was not “what can be done better and do it”, but rather “what 
can be done better and let us work on that together”. […] VCG actively thought along, cooperated 
well, sat around the table and visited the work floor. (SAG manager) 
This mild reaction on the crisis at SAG was attributable to VCG’s quality expectation 
pattern. 
VCG allows many errors before the supplier has reached the desired quality level, but becomes 
exponentially stricter when that level is attained. Once the quality level surpasses VCG expectations, 
tolerance steeply lowers. So, the expectation pattern consists of two parts. The first one deals with a 
good supplier that once in a while does something wrong. The second one deals with a bad supplier 
that once in a while does something good. Expectations for both supplier types are very different. (SAG 
manager) 
Third, Mr Y got assistance from VCG, as well as the time to implement changes. The fact 
that VCG, in the person of Mr X, chose the new plant manager contributed to this 
collaborative approach, based on which both parties now freely visit each other. Such 
cooperation occurred less in 2004, because at that time SAG management did not know the 
people at VCG and the possibilities they offered to quickly come to a solution. In that 
respect, VCG also highlighted SAG how issues were dealt with by other JIS suppliers.  
VCG brought in concrete knowledge, for example concerning [*] fixtures, by means of VCG employees 
coming over. Concerning quality, we got room to breathe. Also concerning IT, help was offered by 
workgroups. (SAG manager)  
In case of problems, VCG collaborates with us. […] I have a badge that allows access to VCG 24-7. I 
can go everywhere I want, without having to ask for permission first. This also works the other way 
around. Mr X can come in at SAG, whenever he likes. […] That is the big advantage of Mr Y. He 
knows everybody, does some phone calls and that way easily enters the VCG organization. (SAG 
manager)  
VCG proposed SAG to have a look at those [other JIS] suppliers and steal ideas with their eyes. That 
works and is primarily the merit of the supplier team, of which the most important goal is learning 
from each other. (VCG manager) 
The former plant manager was not actively involved in the supplier team. Mr Y, however, 
was and engaged in being supplier team chairman. Furthermore, he also stimulated his 
middle level management to actively participate and contribute to the supplier team 
workgroups.  
 
Already in April 2005, four months after Mr Y’s appointment, SAG’s operational 
performance had substantially improved, which even surprised VCG. Based on this fast 
performance recovery, VCG got confirmation of its high level of trust in Mr Y and regained 
trust in SAG. Because of that, VCG control was loosened. Yet, the change in the level of 
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control and trust did not go gradually. 
I did not expect Mr Y to set things straight that quickly, because the situation was extraordinary bad. 
(VCG manager)  
By settings things straight and improving the PPM rate, we regained the customer’s trust. (SAG 
manager)  
I am of the opinion that once things are back under control, extra controls need to be reduced, for they 
are put in place to get out of the problematic situation. (VCG manager)  
SAG and I succeeded in rendering VCG controls more informal again by consistently binding ourselves 
only to those promises we were certainly able to fulfil. People at VCG know that when I say “I will do 
this”, I will really do it, and when it appears impossible to do, I will tell them. That way, formal control 
is less needed. […] It is not the case that VCG gradually exerts a bit less control and gradually has a 
bit more trust. The change rather goes via a turning point. The customer sets the supplier free, when he 
says what he is going to do, what will be the effects and when there will be any results. If the customer 
sees that the supplier worked correctly and attained the postulated results, the supplier may take a next 
step. The customer feels the progress and correct functioning of the supplier and then it can go quickly. 
Look at VCG’s expectation pattern. Controls are built up slowly, but can be cut back very quickly. That 
is what happened at SAG. (SAG manager) 
Indeed, after having spent nine months, more than officially allowed, in step four, VCG de-
escalated SAG to step one in April 2005. Consequently, the supplier was not followed up 
on a daily basis any longer. That was an important change, because VCG experienced that a 
strictly formal relationship was difficult to work in. 
VCG was specifying everything, concerning the how and the when, so that they were frustrated and 
more busy with capturing everything formally than searching for the right solutions. Taking on 
commitments very formally is difficult, because it requires much time and because it is very difficult to 
really make things non-negotiable. Therefore, I try to avoid that. (SAG manager) 
As cooperation based on trust also has to work the other way around, VCG positively 
responded to Mr Y’s trust in the automaker by keeping the relationship open and 
collaborative. 
We also look at our own mistakes. […] Also the supplier has to dare to bring up problems, so that 
improvements can come from both sides. We are open for that and definitely do not only lay demands 
on the supplier, but also think about what we can do ourselves. (VCG manager)  
Trust implies that when an error is discovered, both parties can talk about it in all openness. If VCG 
would assume that the supplier messes up, they would deny their own errors and that way inhibit trust 
building. (SAG manager) 
Consequently, SAG openly communicates own operational difficulties to VCG. 
I think it is typical of suppliers to keep the customer away from a problem and first try to solve it 
themselves. Yet, the only condition for this is that the supplier actually solves the problem. However, 
SAG now clearly works pro-actively. Problems are reported sooner, even if we are not sure whether 
VCG will suffer. (SAG manager)  
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If there is a machine breakage, we will immediately call VCG and report what is going on, which 
actions are being undertaken and when we are switching to safety stock. (SAG manager) 
In other words, by sharing information and offering assistance in a trusting relationship, 
VCG succeeded in motivating SAG to respond similarly. Their choice for Mr Y perfectly 
fitted this approach. That is because trust needs to be built and Mr Y already worked with 
VCG for six years. 
The person of the plant manager plays a big role in our relation with the supplier. This is played off 
through the supplier team, in which value is attached to the bond between VCG and plant managers 
and among plant managers. VCG has a part in that as well. It is giving and taking. We give suppliers a 
lot of information. That way, we want to stimulate suppliers to do the same, but one supplier responds 
more easily than another, largely because of the person of the plant manager. Mr Y’s style is that way: 
communicating easily and calling informatively in beforehand. (VCG manager)  
Mr Y recognizes problems and reports those to me and his own management. […] Being honest and not 
covering up problems works best. By working in beforehand, certain things can be taken into 
consideration. This approach is constantly promoted by VCG and me. […] That honest behaviour is 
the result of mutual trust, following from collaborating for years and talking about one thing and 
another. That way, you get to know how the other party works, how he thinks, so that you can 
anticipate on him. That approach works very well with Mr Y because of the long relation. He knows 
how I think and I also know that of him. He also knows that I am on the phone, the minute that 
something is wrong, and I also know that of him. That is an open relation that works fine. (VCG 
manager) 
Nevertheless, the relationship clearly does not work on trust alone. 
After the restructuring, extra controls, like third party inspection and an employee at the production 
line, were cut back. Yet, follow-up on PPM by the quality manager and line stops by the logistics 
manager was maintained as most important indicators to assess the supplier. (VCG manager)  
In the relationship with VCG, trust is the most important thing, yet linked to figures. […] We also see to 
having proof that can be used besides trust. After all, we can not work on trust alone. That is why we 
consistently take pictures of products leaving the facility. (SAG manager)  
The approach of VCG is finding a balance between a formal customer-supplier relation and an 
informal relation based on trust. This is a combination that works better than the mere formal 
approach. (VCG manager) 
 
In April 2006, SAG showed stable operational processes and high operational performance. 
The supplier even succeeded in producing two months without operational snags. SAG had 
installed a clear structure internally and externally, with which VCG was familiar, so that 
the manufacturer felt at home at the supplier. This evolution resulted in the recovery of all 
quality certificates lost, including the Q1 Award.   
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6.  Discussion 
6.1.  VCG-SAG case analysis 
The aim of this study is to illustrate and refine the association between MCS fit and 
operational performance of a MSR, as visualised in the theoretical framework (cf figure 
2.1). To that end, we bracketed the previously described case data into six time periods 
based on changes in the influencing variables, i.e. the level of contingencies, risks and the 
MCS. The substantial increase in the level of contingencies and risks demarcates periods 1 
and 2, while different changes in the MCS demarcate periods 2 to 6. To facilitate within 
and between period comparisons of the different variables, the following analysis is 
organized by headings corresponding to the time periods. Consistent with the variance 
method, we interpret the case events in terms of the variables in the theoretical framework 
in order to compare the variables. Figure 2.2 shows a timeline that summarizes the results 
for each variable per time period from 2003 to 2006. Notice that performance is expressed 
in subjective and objective terms. The first performance measure results from assessing our 
qualitative data and indicates the periodical change (i.e. increasing or decreasing) of 
performance. This performance measure is added to summarize the case context and that 
way assist in interpreting the (objective) performance over time. The second performance 
measure refers to the average parts per million (PPM) over the period under consideration. 
The level of this quality measure is visualized by means of the graph at the bottom of the 
figure. The high-low categorization in the tabular part of the figure results from comparing 
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Figure 2.2: VCG-SAG MCS fit and operational performance over timeManuscript 2 
Period 1 (January 2000 – December 2003) 
From the start of production in 2000, SAG was an exemplary supplier with performance 
well above target. VCG’s MCS appeared to fit the supplier’s risks with basic KPI 
(primarily PPM) follow-up, a clear syllabus and a substantial level of competence trust, 
mainly based on previous good performance. VCG’s goodwill trust, however, was low. On 
the one hand, SAG’s start-up and production did not create large problems, for which open 
and honest communication combined with collaborative problem solving was needed. On 
the other hand, SAG’s plant manager was completely unknown to VCG, as he was only 
sent on secondment from another Supplier Automotive facility and did not engage in STVC 
meetings. Because of limited interaction, VCG neither got the opportunity to share norms 
and values, nor establish personal relationships with SAG management, so that also social 
pressure possibilities were limited. Because nothing disturbed SAG delivery, VCG left the 
supplier alone.  
Period 2 (January 2004 – June 2004) 
In 2004, SAG started module delivery for two extra models, which considerably changed 
its relation with VCG. SAG production volume almost doubled, while production activities 
tripled. A considerable headcount increase and the introduction of night work further 
augmented process complexity. Besides task uncertainty, task interdependence heightened 
due to an explosion of model variants. As VCG built all four models on one assembly line, 
flexibility requirements became substantially more stringent. Furthermore, fluctuating 
demands for four Volvo models added to the need for more flexibility and the level of 
environmental uncertainty. This demand dependence followed the extended production 
capacity for two models of which commercial success was uncertain. This uncertainty put 
additional pressure on operational performance, especially regarding the first cars of which 
quality needed to be satisfactory in support of future market demand. Consequently, SAG’s 
performance became even more important, so that the supplier was heavily inclined to keep 
operational difficulties in-house and solve snags itself. VCG’s vulnerability towards this 
kind of opportunistic behaviour augmented. As SAG started to play a more important role 
in VCG’s supply chain, the automaker’s striving for long term relational stability increased. 
Consequently, SAG’s fear for retaliation, resulting from disclosed opportunism, reduced. In 
other words, the two extra models substantially changed situational characteristics and 
increased performance and relational risk of the VCG-SAG relationship. Following the 
theoretical model, VCG must raise the level of management control to preserve a MCS 
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fitting the increased level of risks and positively impacting performance.  
However, neither formal nor informal controls were considerably heightened. 
With respect to formal controls, VCG did set up cross-functional workgroups during the 
project phase, but these only focused on the supplier interface and did not control all 
supplier processes. In addition, VCG got deceived by SAG’s information provision and 
approved an operational plan instead of reality. Consequently, SAG was in a position to 
handle operational changes too lax and to neglect adequately communicating them in the 
organization. Moreover, VCG considered SAG to be manageable by a less experienced 
quality engineer. These formal control decisions followed VCG’s competence trust in SAG, 
primarily based on previous good performance. However, VCG did not receive any signals 
that SAG would really be able to effectively handle heightened supply requirements. For 
example, VCG neither got the impression that Supplier Automotive had worked hard to 
prepare SAG, nor received information about an extra production or quality engineer to 
ensure production quality. Thus, the automaker had no grounds to build additional 
competence trust in justification of lower project workgroup thoroughness and the 
appointment of a young quality engineer. VCG’s goodwill trust and social pressure 
possibilities on SAG were not heightened either and remained low. Hence, while risks 
considerably augmented, VCG’s MCS did not follow this change
40 and evolved from 
contingency fit into misfit. Provided that SAG was incapable of dealing with the changes, 
we expect this situation to aggravate SAG’s operational performance, which is exactly what 
happened. After the start of production, SAG struggled, appeared unable to fulfil 
agreements made during the project phase and seriously damaged VCG’s competence trust.  
Period 3 (July 2004 – August 2004) 
VCG responded by escalating the supplier in the escalating activities procedure and 
installing extra outcome controls, like third party inspection and taking a picture of every 
module. Furthermore, behaviour control sharpened by daily supplier company visits of a 
VCC/VCG team led by a VCG expert (Mr X). This team aimed at collaboratively solving 
snags during supplier review meetings. Nevertheless, VCG’s collaboration was hampered 
by SAG’s opportunistic behaviour. Instead of responding openly and honestly to VCG 
                                                 
40 Nevertheless, VCG did put SAG in step two of the escalating activities procedure. Yet, this escalation is 
standard procedure in case of a new car model launch. After the start of production, it depends on the supplier’s 
performance to determine the next step. 
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concerns and accepting the assistance offered, SAG management initially kept VCG staff 
away from the issues. By continuously telling problems were taken care of, while in reality 
multiple issues remained, the plant manager further damaged goodwill trust. Moreover, 
SAG’s poor performance made it clear that the supplier already deceived VCG during the 
project phase by distorting information. This deception carried on, until VCG escalated the 
supplier to step four and installed outcome and behaviour controls to monitor every detail 
of SAG’s output and operational process. Those controls proved VCG’s remaining 
competence trust undeserved, as SAG was unable to improve. Instead, all middle level 
managers quit, leaving the plant manager to handle the situation alone. Finally, this 
manager also lost VCG’s contractual trust by continuing to promise solutions, while in 
reality VCG kept suffering.  
Period 4 (September 2004 – December 2004) 
At that time, Mr X no longer tolerated SAG’s low profile and demanded active involvement 
from Supplier Automotive. As a result, SAG got a new interim plant manager from another 
facility and operational assistance. That way, VCG tried to reinstall a sufficient level of 
trust in SAG, because as long as the level of informal control did not fit the heightened 
risks, the framework predicted operational difficulties to remain. As the first plant manager 
was replaced by a new interim plant manager, who received mother company assistance 
and initial VCG trust, performance was expected to pick up. Besides heightened informal 
control, the extra outcome controls and daily supplier visits were retained to contribute to 
the renewed MCS fit. Nevertheless, the new plant manager was unknown to VCG, so that 
his starting level of trust, based on previous interaction and reputation, was minimal. In 
addition, he only became interim manager, rendering social pressure based on negative 
personal feelings unsuited as control instrument. Moreover, the fact that he only became 
interim plant manager reflected that he did not like being detached to SAG. In other words, 
VCG only restated little trust in SAG, based on which both parties would have to work 
together. Hence, the informal control level did not sufficiently fit the increased level of 
risks, so that continuing operational difficulties could be foreseen. Indeed, despite improved 
VCG access to SAG’s shop floor, SAG’s performance never was poorer. Especially the 
interim plant manager turned out to prefer addressing symptoms with technical solutions 
instead of investigating causes together with VCG. This even worsened certain operational 
issues. Consequently, also this plant manager quickly lost VCG’s trust and left, leaving the 
VCG-SAG relation astray once again.  
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Period 5 (January 2005 – March 2005) 
However this time, Mr X acted differently by choosing and promoting a plant manager 
himself, in particular Mr Y, who VCG knew very well. Because of his outstanding 
relationship with VCG, he started with high levels of trust and VCG back-up in putting 
pressure on Supplier Automotive. In addition, his managing attitude fitted VCG’s goal of 
tackling problem causes instead of symptoms in an open and collaborative way. In terms of 
management controls, VCG increased the level of trust and social pressure by installing a 
plant manager in which the starting levels of these controls would be sufficiently high to fit 
the MSR’s risks. First, VCG reinstalled contractual trust, because the manufacturer was 
confident Mr Y would not make promises that he could not keep. Second, VCG knew he 
would openly communicate problems, prohibiting him from keeping promises made, 
because he had never acted opportunistically before. Third, VCG was familiar with Mr Y’s 
management style and desire to look for problem causes, which contributed to their 
competence trust. Although he had to prove this type of trust during the first period of his 
appointment, joint problem solving was a genuine issue with previous plant managers, 
contributing to the inability to create a turnaround. Fourth, Mr Y was more aware of SAG’s 
impact on VCG production and more familiar with VCG norms and values than previous 
plant managers. Many years of experience, a personal relationship with VCG managers 
(e.g. Mr X) and a good reputation made Mr Y sensitive towards social pressure. Moreover, 
the STVC now played a role of importance as well. Previously, the STVC did not 
informally control SAG’s plant managers. The first one was only sent on secondment and 
did not engage in STVC meetings, while the second one was too occupied trying to 
restructure SAG and not interested due to his temporary statute. Mr Y, however, already 
consistently participated in overall STVC meetings and chaired the IT workgroup. Later, 
this engagement even increased, when he accepted the role of STVC chairman. That way, 
the STVC contributed to VCG’s trust in Mr Y, and vice versa, and increased social pressure 
of both VCG and other JIS suppliers, to whom the STVC made Mr Y feel largely 
responsible. These heightened informal controls fitted the high risks for the first time and 
formed the reason to deliberately choose Mr Y. Hence, the framework predicted 
performance to improve, which it rapidly did. Within months of Mr Y’s appointment and 
much quicker than anyone could have imagined, SAG realised a considerable turnaround. 
Period 6 (April 2005 – …) 
Consequently, VCG rapidly cut back formal controls. In fact, SAG was already de-
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escalated to step one of the escalating activities procedure one month after Mr Y actually 
started. In other words, VCG lowered all extra formal controls from the moment SAG 
showed substantial improvements, building sufficient competence trust. Hence, formal 
controls were put back to basic supplier controls resembling the period 2000-2003; yet 
slightly extended, as VCG continued registering line stop minutes (i.e. number of minutes 
that a supplier causes stoppage of the VCG assembly line) and dropped cars (i.e. number of 
cars dropped from VCG’s line planning, because a supplier is unable to deliver the 
requested part), reiterated the penalty system and kept supplier outcome and behaviour 
follow-up more frequent due to the new production environment. The level of informal 
control, however, was many times higher, with high levels of trust building and social 
pressure. As VCG used this combined MCS to govern risks in the new production situation, 
SAG regained its outstanding performance already one year later. This good result was 
reflected in the awarding of lost certificates like the Q1 Award.  
6.2.  Dynamics of the fit-performance association 
The within period comparisons of the degree of fit and level of performance in previous 
case analysis provide considerable evidence of the static association between degree of fit 
and operational performance. In 2004, SAG struggled after starting module production and 
delivery for two new extra Volvo models. As VCG’s MCS no longer fitted SAG’s 
heightened risks, the MCS aggravated performance, so that operational difficulties 
seriously escalated. As a result, VCG changed the MCS design towards a design fitting the 
level of risks. Supported by the new contingency fit, operational performance rapidly 
picked up. Therefore, we conclude that this case effectively illustrates our static proposition 
concerning the fit-performance assumption, underlying previous inter-organizational MCS 
studies like Dekker (2004). That way, we support earlier findings of Ittner et al. (1999) and 
Anderson & Dekker (2005), stipulating that a MCS fit on situational characteristics benefits 
performance.  
Nevertheless, the between period comparisons of our longitudinal data refine their 
findings with respect to the dynamics of the fit-performance association. Operational 
difficulties followed a MCS misfit resulting from changed contingencies, while operational 
improvements  only set in when the MCS fitted the new situation. Furthermore, the 
evolution from MCS misfit to MCS fit did not occur immediately. It took VCG several 
attempts to achieve the appropriate level of management control. Clearly, only investigating 
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the MCS, its influencing contingencies and performance in periods one and six would not 
deliver these results. The longitudinal data on several periods provide evidence on the 
actual dynamics behind the fit-performance association, which offer the following 
interesting insights.   
First, the case shows the importance of informal management control in governing 
MSRs. Although MSRs are more formal than procurement and R&D relations previously 
studied (e.g. Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Dekker, 2004; Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005), we 
find that VCG’s SAG MCS consists of a combination of formal and informal controls, of 
which the informal trust building and social pressure play an important role. Without these 
informal controls fitting the MSR’s risks, SAG’s operational performance did not improve. 
If informal controls were unnecessary, VCG’s increased level of formal controls should 
have been able to deal with the operational snags, as they were increased to fit the 
heightened risks and worked properly. More specifically, the extra formal controls 
effectively detected poor SAG performance with respect to product quality and operational 
processes. Yet, these controls appeared unable to overcome the operational difficulties, 
given the absence of sufficient trust building and social pressure possibilities. This informal 
control appeared to be needed to create a turnaround. By choosing Mr Y as new plant 
manager, the VCG-SAG relation instantly regained high trust and lots of social pressure. 
Both parties agree that without this reinstatement of high informal control, performance 
would not have picked up; or at least not that quickly.
41  
Second, the case shows the impact of interacting managers and their personal 
relation on performance, and the way in which VCG used this awareness to its benefit. 
When the contingencies changed, the VCG-SAG relation was managed by a young 
inexperienced VCG engineer and an unsuitable SAG plant manager. The VCG engineer 
barely knew SAG managers and had little experience with handling operational problems. 
The plant manager did not respond to VCG’s open collaborative approach to search for 
                                                 
41 Another reason for the amelioration of the SAG supply might have been the learning curve. After struggling to 
manufacture and deliver a new type of module for more than one year, SAG might finally have learned enough 
about its new production environment, at the time Mr Y took over. Our data indicate that such learning effects 
definitely played a role in coping with start-up issues and improving performance at all VCG suppliers. 
Nevertheless, both VCG and SAG managers confirm that SAG suffered bigger problems for a longer period of 
time than similar high value-added just-in-sequence suppliers. Moreover, all interviewees agree that without the 
appointment of Mr Y, these difficulties would have disturbed SAG supply much longer. 
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problem causes and showed little involvement. To revive operational performance, both 
men were replaced; the first one by Mr X and the second one by Mr Y. Only from that 
point in time, interacting managers shared a well established personal relation, so that 
informal controls were sufficiently high to effectively cope with the increased risks. In 
addition, the case shows specific ways in which the manufacturer informally controls these 
relations. First, VCG utilizes trust building mechanisms, like assisting suppliers with 
difficulties to build competence trust and continuously sharing VCG norms and values to 
build goodwill trust. Second, the STVC aims at building trust by means of one common 
goal for all JIS suppliers, joint decision taking and joint problem solving. In addition, 
severe operational snags are reported on the STVC, so that social pressure is extended to all 
JIS suppliers possibly affected by the snag. Yet, to be susceptible to social pressure, the 
plant manager must be sufficiently involved with VCG and the STVC. At SAG, this had 
never been the case, so that VCG managers took the opportunity to choose a plant manager 
themselves. That way, VCG management displayed a remarkable third way of building 
personal relations, namely actively and deliberately influencing supplier decision making to 
install a plant manger of their choice. With Mr Y, VCG chose a manager with many years 
of experience and STVC involvement, who provided a good starting relation with instantly 
high trust that only grew during his restructuring. This leap of trust shows that trust not 
always has to be built up gradually. In addition, Mr Y was susceptible to social pressure 
because of his personal relation with VCG managers, good reputation and active 
involvement in the STVC. That way, our sequence analysis of the events contradicts that all 
credit for the successful revival of SAG was attributable to Mr Y. Instead, we conclude that 
VCG created an adequate environment for the turnaround by specifically choosing Mr Y 
and instantly installing an informal control level that fitted the new situation. That way, this 
important change in the MCS substantially contributed to SAG’s performance resurrection. 
Third, the case reveals that VCG’s reliance on informal controls, in particular trust 
building, also has a down side. Because of the competence trust, VCG was surprised when 
severe performance problems arose. Consequently, the manufacturer lost time by 
responding slowly in building up extra formal controls and collaboratively working on 
counter measures. Yet, this gradual formal control increase is standard procedure, 
structured via the escalating activities procedure. In that respect, VCG actually responded 
relatively fast by immediately escalating the supplier to step four. Also Mr X was quickly 
assigned to SAG. Still, VCG lost valuable time because of the informal controls. In 
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particular, VCG managers were not sufficiently aware of the fact that they needed to 
heighten informal control to fit the high risks by reinstalling sufficient trust and installing 
social pressure. Despite VCG emphasising the reliance on personal relations and informal 
control, they ignored this part of their MCS during SAG’s problem escalation. 
Consequently, they needed two unsuccessful attempts, before they effectively increased 
informal control on SAG via its plant manager. Therefore, this case demonstrates that 
reliance on informal control requires the manufacturer to be well aware of its use, 
especially in times of important changes. Otherwise, the importance of increasing informal 
control will be underestimated, either when contingencies drastically heighten risks or 
when the supplier damages trust by making errors or acting opportunistically. Furthermore, 
this awareness needs to be present at all levels of VCG and SAG management interacting 
with each other. Only that way, informal control, especially trust, will not result in time 
losses when difficulties arise. 
6.3.  Dynamic relation between trust and formal control  
Our longitudinal case data offer the possibility to make another important contribution, 
regarding the dynamic relation between trust and formal control, on which further research 
has been called for (Anderson & Dekker, 2005; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 
2006). In particular, the question is whether trust and formal control are complements or 
substitutes. The complementary relation renders trust and formal controls additively related, 
which means that any increase of trust or formal control raises the level of management 
control (Dekker, 2004). This way, more formal controls ameliorate trust, both by lowering 
the level of risk (Poppo & Zenger, 2002) and by creating an objective framework for 
assessing each party’s performance and behaviour (Das & Teng, 1998). Contrary, the 
substitutive relationship implies that trust and formal control are inversely related, so that 
more trust is associated with less formal control and vice versa (Dekker, 2004). In this 
view, more trust reduces risk, which subsequently decreases the need for formal control 
(Chiles & McMackin, 1996). Moreover, formal control signals a lack of trust and 
subsequently deteriorates trust (Das & Teng, 1998). As it is argued that the ambiguity 
concerning both views relates to relation dynamics (Van den Abbeele, 2006), we believe 
longitudinal data are most suited to shed more light on this relation. As VCG’s SAG MCS 
contains both formal control and trust building techniques, of which trust is the outcome, 
this MSR offers the possibility to effectively study their relation. 
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The case findings indicate that the relation is complementary and substitutive at 
the same time, depending on the level of formal control. In particular, trust and basic formal 
control act as complements. Basic formal control refers to VCG’s continuous outcome and 
behaviour control, like monitoring PPM rate and visiting suppliers on a regular basis, 
irrespective of the level of trust in the supplier or the supplier’s operational performance. It 
is the type of formal control that is exercised under all circumstances. Evidence on the 
complementary relation of basic formal control and trust follows from VCG’s MCS, which 
contains both control types to govern SAG in periods of good performance. Both VCG and 
SAG indicate that controlling the MSR is impossible with either only formal control or 
trust. Moreover, the basic formal control contributes to building competence and goodwill 
trust by making good operational performance more transparent and allowing operational 
snags to be handled collaboratively in all openness. Yet at the same time, trust substitutes 
for extra formal controls, which are set up on top of basic formal control. Evidence of this 
relation, however, only results from analyzing the performance decrease. Indeed, only 
studying MCS dynamics in the period 2004-2005 visualizes that when VCG’s trust in SAG 
deteriorated, extra formal controls were put in place on top of basic formal control. 
Oppositely, regained trust made VCG loosen formal control by cutting back extra control 
and falling back on basic control only.  
Yet, the timing of lowering extra formal control substantially differed from the 
building up. In particular, VCG built up extra formal control gradually and stepwise via the 
escalating activities procedure. When SAG’s performance did not improve after a few 
months, the supplier was escalated to a next step and subjected to more formal control. 
Opposite to this stepwise increase, the lowering of extra formal controls took place 
immediately, as SAG was reset to step one once trust sufficiently heightened. When trust 
reached the threshold level again, due to promises kept, improving performance and 
supplier openness, all extra formal controls were quickly lowered; at least much quicker 
than their stepwise increase. The reason for this substitutive relation is clear. Trust is much 
cheaper than extra formal control in transaction cost terms (Dekker, 2004); at least in this 
case, in which it is instantly created via Mr Y. Based on trust, VCG and SAG can work 
together without relying on extra formalisation both in daily operational interaction and in 
problem situations. Especially in case of solving single operational snags, trust helps by 
leaving out formal investigations regarding problem responsibility. Instead, VCG and SAG 
are confident each party openly communicates, does everything in its power to solve the 
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problem and actually succeeds; a conviction encompassing all three types of trust. 
Thus, contrary to previous studies, we find formal controls and trust to be 
complements (e.g. Poppo & Zenger, 2002) and substitutes (e.g. Chiles & McMackin, 1996) 
at the same time. This finding seems to correspond to Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005), who 
argue that trust and formal control, in particular contracts, can be both complements and 
substitutes, “depending on the intentions with which contracts are drawn up and used” 
(Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005, p. 834). In particular, these authors find contracts either 
extensively emphasizing safeguarding clauses to protect partners or clearly specifying goals 
to coordinate the IOR. Yet, while Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) find different relations 
between trust and formal control in different IORs, we find trust and formal control to be 
both complements and substitutes within the same IOR, similar to Dekker (2004) and Van 
den Abbeele (2006). Indeed, Dekker (2004) suggests that formal control is complementary 
and beneficial to trust, until a certain threshold of formal control is reached. When the 
formal control level is sufficiently high to govern the IOR, trust substitutes formal control 
(Dekker, 2004). Also Van den Abbeele’s (2006) survey data regarding IT sourcing shows a 
complementary relation in the early stages of the IOR and a substitutive one in the later 
stages.  
Nevertheless, by finding both relations at the same time, we refine the findings of 
Dekker (2004) and Van den Abbeele (2006). It must be clear that our case concerns one of 
the later stages of the MSR, namely the manufacturing phase. In this phase, however, trust 
and formal control are not only substitutes, but also complements. In particular, the 
substitutive relation regards extra formal controls, which are only installed above a 
threshold of basic formal controls, when trust deteriorates below its threshold. These basic 
formal controls complement trust at all times and forms a necessary flank to support an 
efficient build-up and functioning of trust, while at the same time the presence of trust 
reduces the need for extra formal control (cf van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2004). 
The latter conclusion follows from the absence of extra formal controls when trust is high, 
and the lowering of extra formal control when trust is built up. Obviously, providing such 
findings was only possible by means of the longitudinal data, which offered a great 
opportunity to shed more light on MCS dynamics. That way, our findings support that the 
complementary-substitutive ambiguity in earlier studies might be the result of neglecting 
these dynamics (Van den Abbeele, 2006). 
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7.  Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the inter-organizational management control literature by studying 
the association between appropriate MCS design (i.e. a MCS fitting the MSR’s level of 
contingencies and risks) and performance. Although MCSs are found to be contingent in 
several types of IORs, this research field has not sufficiently addressed the association with 
performance, which is most important in contingency theory assuming a contingency 
approach to fit instead of a congruence approach. Although some studies provide 
theoretical models incorporating the fit-performance association (e.g. Kajüter & Kulmala, 
2005), most research only assumes this association to hold (Kamminga & van der Meer-
Kooistra, 2007). To our knowledge, only Ittner et al. (1999) and Anderson & Dekker 
(2005) study the impact of a contingency fitted MCS on performance. Yet, these papers 
indicate two limitations following their survey research, namely the limited scope of the 
MCS and the study of average practice only. As a result, a case study is proposed to be a 
more powerful tool to investigate the impact of MCS fit on performance (Ittner et al., 1999; 
Dekker, 2004).  
To illustrate the validity and refine the dynamics of this association in practice, we 
studied a supplier relation in the manufacturing phase of the supply chain, which is 
relatively under-explored in the inter-organizational management control literature (Cooper 
& Slagmulder, 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Scannell et al., 2000). In particular, 
we looked at the relation between a Volvo Cars facility (VCG) and a high value-added just-
in-sequence module supplier facility (SAG) in the automotive industry, which is 
characterized by competitive pressure and continuous improvement (Carr & Ng, 1995). To 
that end, we refined existing management control theory for MSRs by proposing a 
theoretical contingency framework from the position of the manufacturer, which includes 
the dynamic association between degree of MCS fit on contingencies and risks, and 
operational performance. The real contribution of our case study follows from its 
longitudinal design, because this design allowed effectively exploring the impact of fit on 
performance in the course of time by the sequence of events and to refine current 
understanding of the fit-performance association. For that reason, we focus our attention on 
a changing MSR with fluctuating performance. The theoretical proposition is that if a 
supplier is incapable of dealing with changed contingencies, a misfitted MCS temporarily 
aggravates performance, until the MCS is changed towards a design fitting the changed 
contingencies and risks and therefore contributing to performance (Kamminga & van der 
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Meer-Kooistra, 2007; van Veen-Dirks, 2006). 
Our longitudinal data, which are structured and interpreted by means of the 
temporal bracketing and variance methods (Rowe et al., 2008), provide substantial evidence 
supporting this proposition. In 2004, SAG struggled to perform after starting module 
production and delivery for two new extra Volvo models. As VCG’s MCS no longer fitted 
SAG’s heightened risks and operational difficulties seriously escalated, VCG changed the 
MCS towards a design fitting the level of risks, which contributed to the revival of 
operational performance. That way, our case confirms and refines previous findings of 
Ittner et al. (1999) and Anderson & Dekker (2005). Furthermore, our case demonstrates the 
importance of informal control on supplier management, as formal controls appeared 
unable to overcome operational difficulties and a turnaround only set in when informal 
controls were sufficiently installed. In that respect, the case also shows the active role of 
VCG in establishing trust building and social pressure by choosing a suitable SAG plant 
manager. VCG became aware of the impact of interacting managers and their personal 
relation on performance and used this awareness to its benefit. Especially the creation of a 
leap of trust, which shows that trust not always has to be built up gradually, marks VCG’s 
approach in that respect. Nevertheless, the case reveals that high reliance on informal 
controls, in particular trust building, also has a down side. When trust decreases, time can 
be lost by responding slowly in building up extra formal controls and collaboratively 
working on reinstalling sufficient trust. Hence, relying on informal controls requires the 
manufacturer to be well aware of its use. Otherwise, the importance of increasing informal 
control will be underestimated in case of heightened risks or damaged trust.  
An additional contribution of this paper concerns the dynamic relation between 
formal control and trust. Our longitudinal data suggest that formal control and trust are 
complements and substitutes at the same time, depending on the level of formal control. In 
particular, trust and basic formal control are complements, while trust and extra formal 
control are substitutes. In the VCG-SAG case, this relation becomes visible by means of the 
MCS and the escalating activities procedure adding extra controls to the MCS. Compared 
to prior research, this result contradicts earlier findings of Chiles & McMackin (1996) 
(substitutes), Poppo & Zenger (2002) (complements) and Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) 
(either complements or substitutes, but not in one IOR). In addition, our result refines the 
findings of Dekker (2004) and Van den Abbeele (2006) by showing that trust and formal 
control are both complements and substitutes in one IOR at the same time of the relation 
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life cycle. Furthermore, our data indicate a timing difference in the substitutive relation. 
The building up of extra formal control proceeds gradually, while the lowering happens 
almost immediately. That way, our findings support that the complementary-substitutive 
ambiguity in the literature might be the result of earlier studies neglecting MCS dynamics 
(Van den Abbeele, 2006). 
A final contribution of this paper lies in its specific focus on a changing MSR with 
fluctuating performance, contrary to the current literature, which seems to under-value in-
depth research into poor performance by primarily studying success instead of failure. 
Obviously, we can learn a lot from studying good performance, but we believe we can learn 
even more from looking into operational difficulties. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the 
issue seriously hampering this kind of research, namely finding access to study operational 
difficulties and obtaining permission to publish the results (Kamminga & van der Meer-
Kooistra, 2007). Naturally, there exist some ways to overcome these difficulties, such as 
researching rather old cases, exclusively relying on second hand data and disguising 
company names, so that confidentiality becomes less of an issue (cf Klein Woolthuis et al., 
2005). Yet, that kind of data reduces a study’s internal validity. Therefore, first hand data of 
a more recent IOR, not requiring full company disguising, are still preferable. Due to 
VCG’s openness and desire to learn, and our emphasis on research ethics and 
confidentiality, we were able to gather that kind of data for this paper. 
Although the case study method was specifically chosen for its methodological 
qualities for studying the dynamics of an extensive MCS, we acknowledge that studying 
only one MSR hampers generalizing our findings. For example, we have no idea to what 
extent manufactures without a supplier team, which provides the opportunity to build 
personal relations with supplier managers, are able to choose supplier managers to their 
advantage. Similarly, we do not exactly know to what extent the learning curve impacted 
the turnaround of SAG performance or to what extent the prior supply chain phases of 
procurement and R&D impact the VCG-SAG relation during manufacturing. Yet, these 
limitations immediately offer a first avenue for future research, which could compare our 
findings to other MSRs between other companies, both in the automotive industry and 
others like consumer electronics. Especially the role of informal controls and personal 
relations between interacting managers are worth further study.  
A second avenue for further research might be to design a real-time longitudinal 
case study, instead of a retrospective case like in this paper. Although finding access to 
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study contingency changes, MCS dynamics and potential operational difficulties at the 
moment of occurrence will probably be a big challenge, the advantage is clear. Real-time 
data, especially from interviews, are more accurate. Although our study’s data came from 
both VCG and supplier managers, and were triangulated with performance data, we admit 
that managers’ opinions on events were probably biased two years after the events 
occurred. Moreover, the retrospective research design prohibited us from interviewing the 
initial SAG managers, so that their perceptions on the events were not available. A real-
time study could cope with these limitations. 
A third avenue for future research could investigate factors that contribute to the 
speed of MCS change, so that temporary misfits due to changing circumstances are less 
likely to occur (van Veen-Dirks, 2006). For example, our study demonstrated the 
contribution of SAG’s mother company on the escalation of operational difficulties. 
Because Supplier Automotive used a low profile approach, SAG received too little support 
both during the project phase and during the gradual escalation of performance. Only when 
VCG demanded active involvement, the mother company took action and offered 
assistance. Consequently, we could assume that a more involved mother company would 
benefit the fit between MCS and risks and that way also operational performance. Besides 
supplier culture, relationship length is another unaddressed variable, possibly positively 
influencing MCS fit. As both resembling organizational culture and relationship length are 
already proposed to be influential in outsourcing decisions (van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000) and strategic alliances (Dekker, 2004), a study comparing different 
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This study explores the impact of cultural resemblance on the management control system 
(MCS) of supplier relationships. Although MCSs are contingent on situational 
characteristics and this contingency fit is associated with good performance, it remains 
unclear whether cultural resemblance between manufacturer and supplier contributes to the 
speed of MCS change, so that temporary misfits due to changing circumstances are less 
likely to occur. To illustrate this effect of cultural resemblance on MCS dynamics, we 
perform a twofold longitudinal case study of similar automotive manufacturer-supplier 
relationships that differ with respect to cultural resemblance. Findings show that in case of 
high cultural resemblance, the speed of increasing the level of management control is 
higher. That way, upcoming contingency changes are appropriately anticipated by an 
increase in the level of management control, already before contingencies actually change. 
Consequently, a MCS misfit and potential decreasing operational performance are avoided. 
Oppositely, in case of low cultural resemblance, adjusting the MCS to changing 
circumstances requires more time. This leads to a temporal MCS misfit that contributes to 
escalating operational difficulties, until the MCS is changed. Furthermore, the case data 
show three mechanisms by which cultural resemblance enhances management control 
according to earlier findings in the literature: increased communication on the initiative of 
the supplier, proper information exchange and trust enhancing signals. Finally, our findings 
show that the manufacturer influences supplier decision making to install a manager of the 
manufacturer’s choice and that way influences the supplier’s culture.  
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1.  Introduction 
This study explores the impact of cultural resemblance on the management control of 
supplier relationships. Management control systems (MCSs) are contingent on situational 
characteristics and this MCS fit is associated with good performance (Donaldson, 2001). 
Consequently, it is worthwhile to investigate variables that influence the speed of MCS 
change, so that temporary misfits due to changing circumstances are less likely to occur 
(Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007; van Veen-Dirks, 2006). Since the buying 
firm’s MCS is the material artefact of its underlying organizational culture (Rousseau, 
1990), organizational culture might be such a variable (Harrison & McKinnon, 1999). Yet, 
despite calls for further research on the role of this variable in MCS design, studies on 
organizational culture, especially in inter-organizational relationships (IORs), are scarce 
(Chenhall, 2003; Scheytt & Soin, 2006; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). This 
paper aims to fill that research gap. In particular, we focus on the degree to which a 
supplier’s culture resembles the buyer’s culture. In strategic alliances, cultural differences 
between interacting parties may negatively influence performance (Dekker, 2004; Ireland, 
2002; Kale et al., 2000). Yet, whether this influence is associated with an impact on MCS 
dynamics remains unaddressed. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to illustrate whether the 
degree of cultural resemblance between buyer and supplier affects the MCS fit in times of 
changing contingencies. 
To that end, we propose a theoretical contingency framework, set up from the 
position of the buyer. First, this framework visualizes the associations between contingency 
variables influencing risks, and management control techniques governing these risks (Das 
& Teng, 2001; Dekker, 2004). Second, the framework includes the dynamic association 
between a contingency fitted MCS and operational performance (Donaldson, 2001). More 
specifically, we propose that if a supplier is incapable of dealing with changed 
contingencies, a misfitted MCS temporarily aggravates performance, until the MCS is 
changed towards a design fitting the changed contingencies and risks and therefore 
contributing to performance. Third, the framework represents the impact of supplier 
cultural resemblance on the MCS. Provided that we take on the position of the buyer, this 
variable is defined as the degree to which a supplier culture is hierarchical or 
developmental and resembles a developmental buyer culture. Whether an organizational 
culture is hierarchical or developmental depends on the organization’s preference for the 
values control versus flexibility and external focus versus internal focus of the Competing 
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Values Model (Quinn, 1988; Quinn & Kimberly, 1984; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1983). 
Supported by this conceptualization of organizational culture, we propose that supplier 
cultural resemblance is associated with a MCS that changes fast enough to fit changed 
contingencies and that way contributes to operational performance. 
We study this proposition for supplier relations in a less studied phase of the 
supply chain, namely manufacturing (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Langfield-Smith & 
Smith, 2003; Scannell, Vickery & Dröge, 2000). As organizational culture is found to affect 
the management control of outsourced service providers (van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000), we propose that this variable also impacts the MCS of suppliers 
performing outsourced manufacturing activities. More specifically, this paper presents a 
twofold in-depth longitudinal case study of “manufacturer-supplier relationships” (MSRs) 
between a Volvo Cars facility (VCG) and two of its high value-added just-in-sequence 
module suppliers, that are similar except for the degree of cultural resemblance to VCG. 
Case research is strong in illustrating the impact of MCS fit on performance, because it 
allows studying an extensive MCS of individual supplier controls (Ittner et al., 1999; 
Dekker, 2004). As culture needs to be observed more than measured (Schein, 1996), a case 
study makes it possible to move beyond static quantitative cross-sectional studies and 
explore the dynamics of MCSs and organizational culture in all its richness (Baskerville, 
2003; Harrison & McKinnon, 1999; Henri, 2006). To structure and interpret the 
longitudinal data in relation to our theoretical framework, we use the temporal bracketing 
and variance research methods (Rowe, Birnberg & Shields, 2008). Finally, the automotive 
industry suits our case research, because that sector is characterized by high levels of 
component outsourcing and extreme competitive pressure. As a result, manufacturers 
initiate continuous improvement projects with suppliers, which require appropriate MCSs 
to organize and manage the relation (Alford, Sackett & Nelder, 2000; Carr & Ng, 1995; 
Scannell et al., 2000). 
The case findings confirm our theoretical proposition by illustrating the impact of 
resembling organizational cultures on the timing of MCS changes and hence the fit-
performance association. In case the supplier’s culture resembles VCG’s culture, upcoming 
contingency changes are appropriately anticipated by increased management control, before 
the contingencies actually change. Consequently, a MCS misfit and potential decreasing 
operational performance are avoided. Oppositely, if the supplier’s culture differs from 
VCG’s culture, adjusting the MCS to changing circumstances requires more time. This 
119 Manuscript 3 
leads to a temporal MCS misfit that contributes to escalating operational difficulties, until 
the MCS is changed. Furthermore, the case data show three mechanisms by which cultural 
resemblance enhances management control according to earlier findings in the literature: 
increased communication on the initiative of the supplier, proper information exchange and 
trust enhancing signals. Finally, one of the MSRs shows a very specific management 
control technique, namely deliberately influencing supplier decision making to install a 
manager of VCG’s choice and that way influencing the supplier’s culture. As these findings 
benefited from conceptualizing organizational culture via the Competing Values Model, our 
study demonstrates the usefulness of applying this model for describing organizational 
culture in qualitative studies (Bhimani, 2003).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the second part, we provide 
a thorough literature study to explain and motivate the research question. The third part 
proposes a theoretical contingency framework, which guides the case analysis. In the fourth 
part, we briefly discuss the details of the case methodology. The fifth part forms the actual 
case study and describes how VCG’s MCS on two module suppliers evolved during periods 
of changing contingencies. In the sixth part, we discuss these findings. Finally, we conclude 
this paper by summarizing the main findings and highlighting some avenues for further 
research. 
2.  Literature study 
Organizational culture is important to the business community, because it affects all aspects 
of organizational interaction, intra-organizational as well as inter-organizational (Henri, 
2006). On the one hand, enhanced globalization made companies develop multi-national 
operations in offshore entities with different cultures (Chenhall, 2003). On the other hand, 
increased global outsourcing made every firm establish relations with suppliers from 
different countries with different organizational cultures (Harrison & McKinnon, 1999). 
Consequently, better cultural understanding results in better supply chain performance 
(Whitfield & Landeros, 2006). Nevertheless, research into organizational culture has been 
limited, so that this variable is very promising to study (Chenhall, 2003).  
Culture is often defined as the shared values, beliefs and assumptions that shape 
and guide social systems and communication processes (Schein, 1985). Prior research, 
mainly focusing on the difference between US and Asian cultures, found that differences in 
these values impact characteristics of MCS design, like the degree of formality in 
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monitoring and evaluating (e.g. Snodgrass & Grant, 1986; Ueno & Wu, 1993; Vance, 
McClaine, Boje & Stage, 1992). Like national culture, organizational culture refers to 
shared values, beliefs and assumptions in organizations that shape and guide human 
behaviour and its artefacts (Zammuto & Krakower, 1991). These artefacts are all visible 
structures and procedures that result from a firm’s culture, such as the MCS (Rousseau, 
1990; Scheytt & Soin, 2006).
42 Consequently, organizational culture influences the design 
and use of formal (or mechanistic) management controls (Chenhall, 2003). For example, 
Henri (2006) finds that firms of the flexibility dominant culture type use more performance 
measures and use these measures to focus organizational attention, support strategic 
decision-making and legitimate actions to a greater extent than firms of the control 
dominant culture type. Also informal (or organic) controls are affected by organizational 
culture, because these controls are grown out of shared values and norms that are shaped by 
frequent interaction, meetings and management attitude (Merchant, 1998; Ouchi, 1979). 
For example, trust appears higher in firms of the flexibility dominant culture type than in 
firms of the control dominant culture type (Ellonen, Blomqvist & Puumalainen, 
forthcoming).  
Given that a manufacturer’s MCS on a supplier is affected by the manufacturer’s 
culture, the supplier’s culture, in particular the degree of resemblance to the manufacturer’s 
culture, might impact the functioning of the MCS. Indications for this proposition result 
from prior alliance research. Indeed, studies found that cultural differences make an 
alliance difficult or impossible to manage (de Rond, 2003; White & Lui, 2005). Conversely, 
shared values positively influence the level of trust between alliance partners (Gulati, 1995; 
Luo, 2002). Furthermore, cultural differences between alliance partners may negatively 
influence performance (Dekker, 2004; Ireland, 2002; Kale et al., 2000). Yet, these results 
                                                 
42 By defining a company’s MCS as an artefact of the organizational culture, we consider culture and control to be 
different, yet related, constructs. However, some scholars look upon organizational culture differently, namely as 
part of the MCS. For example, Merchant (1998) speaks of cultural control to refer to a specific type of 
management control, built on the organizational culture and similar to what Burns & Stalker (1961) describe as 
organic control. Nevertheless, the influencing role of organizational culture on management control, as defined in 
our paper, is widely accepted. Chenhall (2003), for example, defines culture, both national and organizational, as 
an important contingency variable influencing both organic and mechanistic controls, besides inter alia 
technology and strategy. Also empirical studies like Henri (2006) and Ellonen, Blomqvist & Puumalainen 
(forthcoming) on the impact of organizational culture on management control, consider these constructs 
separately.   
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all relate to organizational culture effects in (strategic) alliances. Hence, the effect of 
organizational culture on MCS design in other types of IORs, like MSRs, remains 
unaddressed (Chenhall, 2003; Scheytt & Soin, 2006). Nevertheless, also MSRs require an 
appropriate MCS design, on which organizational culture has an important effect, which 
justifies further study (van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). Furthermore, prior 
alliance research addressed the effect of cultural differences on MCS design and 
performance separately. However, MCS design also affects performance, depending on the 
degree of fit on situational characteristics (Donaldson, 2001).  
More specifically, contingency theory proposes that a fit of the MCS design and 
situational contingencies, such as task uncertainty and environmental uncertainty, results in 
higher operational performance, whereas a misfit decreases performance (Donaldson, 
2001).
43 Although this association forms the underlying assumption of contingency studies 
on inter-organizational MCSs (Dekker, 2004; Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007), 
empirical evidence on the validity of this assumption is limited. Furthermore, there is little 
research on variables that influence the speed of MCS change, so that temporary misfits due 
to changing circumstances are less likely to occur (van Veen-Dirks, 2006). Yet, this 
research is justified, as a MCS misfit and associated decreasing operational performance 
might harm any manufacturer, until the misfitted MCS is changed towards a more 
appropriate design (Dekker, 2004; van Veen-Dirks, 2006). Therefore, any manufacturer is 
interested in variables contributing to the avoidance of such a performance decrease by 
preventing a MCS misfit. Organizational culture, in particular the degree of supplier 
cultural resemblance to the manufacturer’s culture, might be such a variable due to its 
impact on the functioning of the MCS (Harrison & McKinnon, 1999). Hence, further study 
is required on what role organizational cultural resemblance plays in the MCS fit-
                                                 
43 This paper uses Donaldson’s (2001) categorization of contingency theory elements. As a result, our study 
assumes a contingency approach to fit instead of a congruence approach, which are two very different approaches 
to fit with respect to the link between fit and performance (Gerdin & Greve, 2004). More specifically, the 
congruence approach assumes that a MCS fit on contingencies is the result of a natural selection process. 
Consequently, only the best performing firms survive and are therefore observable at any point in time. As there 
are no low performers, the congruence approach has no interest in the link with performance. The contingency 
approach, however, assumes that both high and low performers exist, because more or less successful MCS fits 
occur for extended periods of time. Hence, the goal of the contingency approach is to study performance 
fluctuations that depend on the interaction between the MCS and its situational contingencies (Gerdin & Greve, 
2004; Luft & Shields, 2003). 
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performance association (Harrison & McKinnon, 1999; Henri, 2006). 
The preferable method for such research is an in-depth qualitative case study, for 
three reasons. First, the relationship between MCSs and organizational culture can not be 
depicted as a simple matter of cause and effect (Henri, 2006; Scheytt & Soin, 2006). 
Second, case research copes with two important concerns on prior accounting studies using 
Hofstede’s (1984) values (Baskerville, 2003; Chenhall, 2003; Harrison & Mckinnon, 
1999).
44 On the one hand, Hofstede observes culture from the outside, which challenges 
mainstream social sciences that try to understand culture by being within. On the other 
hand, Hofstede’s value dimension conceptualization does not allow anchoring of culture in 
time, so that dynamics remain unexplored. Consequently, more qualitative research is 
called for that moves beyond static quantitative cross-sectional studies and explores the 
dynamics of MCSs and organizational culture in all its richness (Baskerville, 2003; 
Harrison & McKinnon, 1999; Henri, 2006). Third, prior survey research on the inter-
organizational MCS fit-performance association was unable to study extensive MCSs with 
formal and informal control techniques on individual suppliers (Anderson & Dekker, 2005; 
Ittner et al., 1999).
45 Consequently, more case research is called for that investigates this 
association in practice.
46 As we are not aware of any case study that investigates the 
associations between organizational culture, MCS design and performance in MSRs, our 
paper answers both research calls by means of an in-depth longitudinal case study of two 
MSRs.  
                                                 
44 Although previous accounting studies used Hofstede values to measure national culture, we argue that the 
concerns mentioned here are valid for any study on culture, including organizational culture.   
45 Ittner et al. (1999) and Anderson & Dekker (2005) study and find the MCS fit-performance association by 
means of a survey. Yet, both surveys only investigate a limited set of management control techniques. Ittner et al. 
(1999) focus on supplier selection and monitoring, the latter being captured by supplier certification and face-to-
face contact. Anderson & Dekker (2005) look at formal management control in the form of the supply contract. 
Moreover, both studies acknowledge the limitation of only reflecting average inter-organizational practices instead 
of closely examining individual supplier controls. 
46 The only case studies looking into the fit-performance association are van Veen-Dirks (2006) and Heikkilä 
(2002). Yet, van Veen-Dirks’ (2006) study on the alignment between production environment characteristics and 
MCS design remains within the boundaries of one organization and is based on complementarity theory. 
Conversely, Heikkilä (2002) does study IORs, but focuses on customer relations; in particular the demand chain 
structures that fit specific customer situations. 
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3.  Theoretical framework and research proposition 
To illustrate the impact of organizational cultural resemblance on MCS dynamics in 
practice, we propose a theoretical contingency framework for supplier relations in the 
manufacturing phase of the supply chain, which can be found in figure 3.1. 









Degree of fit Operational performance
Supplier cultural resemblance Management control system
Formal control
Informal control  
 
Figure 3.1: Theoretical contingency framework for MCS design of MSRs Manuscript 3 
On the left hand side of the framework we include supplier cultural resemblance, 
which represents the degree to which the supplier’s culture resembles the manufacturer’s 
culture. Despite our in-depth qualitative case study, our research requires a model of 
organizational culture to effectively compare two cultures and assess the degree of cultural 
resemblance. Therefore, we conceptualize organizational culture by means of the 
Competing Values Model (CVM) (Quinn, 1988; Quinn & Kimberly, 1984; Quinn & 
Rohrbaugh, 1983), a model suited for representing organizational culture (Howard, 1998) 
and used in earlier accounting studies of Bhimani (2003), Dunk & Lysons (1997) and Henri 
(2006). Despite its limited use in management control research, this model is appropriate 
for organizing and interpreting a wide variety of organizational phenomena, such as values, 
organizational forms and decision-making effectiveness (Quinn & Kimberly, 1984). Hence, 
it must be clear that we do not use the CVM to quantitatively measure organizational 
culture, but to represent organizational culture, while taking into account its richness and 
dynamics via case research. That way, we follow Bhimani (2003), who first describes a 
cultural change programme and new process based target costing system qualitatively, i.e. 
based on interviews and archival data, and later interprets these findings in terms of the 
CVM.  
In essence, the CVM assumes that different organizational cultures do not result 
from different sets of values, but from different emphases on a limited set of values. These 
values are grouped in two dimensions with two competing values at the poles. These 
dimensions should not be interpreted as a dichotomous split between the values at the pole, 
but as a continuum of these values (Henri, 2006). The first dimension consists of control 
versus flexibility and represents a firm’s preference for control, stability and order versus a 
preference for flexibility, change and spontaneity. That way, it involves a continuum from 
mechanistic to organic processes (Quinn, 1988).
47 The second dimension comprises 
internal focus versus external focus and represents the continuum of a company’s focus on 
activities occurring within the firm versus outside the firm. An internally-oriented firm 
                                                 
47 A similar distinction is made with respect to management control (Burns & Stalker, 1961). In particular, 
“mechanistic controls rely on formal rules, standardized operating procedures and routines”, while “organic 
systems are more flexible, responsive, involve fewer rules and standardized procedures and tend to be richer in 
data” (Chenhall, 2003, p. 131-132). Hence, the MCS of organizations with a control culture is likely to be 
characterized by a strong emphasis on mechanistic formal controls, while the MCS of organizations with a 
flexibility culture is likely to be characterized by a strong emphasis on organic informal controls (Henri, 2006).   
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expends resources to optimize existing operational equipment and practices. An externally-
oriented firm, on the other hand, scans the environment to assess relative strengths and 
weaknesses vis-à-vis competitors, suppliers and customers, and makes changes to the firm 
accordingly (McDermott & Stock, 1999). The two dimensions result in four types of 
organizational culture: hierarchical (control & internal focus), group (flexibility & internal 
focus), developmental (flexibility & external focus) and rational (control & external focus). 
As each type is an ideal, a firm has a combination of different cultures, although one type 
may be dominating the others (Quinn, 1988; Quinn & Kimberly, 1984; Quinn & 
Rohrbaugh, 1983). Therefore, we refer to the notion of dominant type in order to capture 
the position of an organization in the CVM (Henri, 2006). For example, an organizational 
culture of the hierarchical dominant type most closely resembles the hierarchical ideal type 
because of a large focus on control and internal activities, and  only a small focus on 
flexibility and external parties. That way, the dominant type positioning makes it possible to 
compare organizational cultures that are qualitatively studied from the inside instead of 
measured from the outside. A second advantage of the dominant type positioning is the 
possibility to integrate cultural dynamics. As the value dimensions are continuums, a 
change in culture can be modelled as a change in dimension positions and a shift from one 
dominant type to another. Yet, as the dominant type terminology would overload our 
argumentation, it is dropped in the remaining of this paper. Still, all organizational cultures 
should be interpreted as dominant types. 
Despite the clear advantages of qualitative research mentioned previously, this 
methodology limits a full study of the CVM. More specifically, a twofold supplier 
relationship study of a single manufacturer confines our investigation to two culture types. 
The first one is the manufacturer’s culture, while the second one is a substantially differing 
supplier culture, of which the influence can be contrasted to the influence of a resembling 
supplier culture. As a qualitative study benefits most from cases diverging as much as 
possible, a comparison between two culture types differing on both value dimensions seems 
most suited. Consequently, the most appropriate comparisons are hierarchical versus 
developmental and group versus rational. From these comparisons, the one between 
hierarchical and developmental culture already demonstrated its ability to shed more light 
on different perceived success of a new management accounting system in the study of 
Bhimani (2003). Therefore, we opt for the same two culture types, of which the 
developmental type is chosen as manufacturer culture. This choice is based on the 
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expectation that the influence of different degrees of supplier cultural resemblance on a 
developmental manufacturer’s MCS is larger than on a hierarchical manufacturer’s MCS. 
Hence, we define supplier cultural resemblance as the degree to which a supplier culture is 
hierarchical or developmental and resembles a developmental manufacturer culture.  
The constructs in the centre of the framework visualize the associations between 
contingency variables influencing risks, and management control techniques governing 
these risks.
48 The degree to which the level of management control fits the level of risks is 
conceptualized by means of the degree of fit construct. MSRs are subject to performance 
risk and relational risk. Performance risk is the probability of the supplier interrupting the 
supply chain and damaging the common goal. This goal is manufacturing as many products 
of the order book as possible, on time, with good quality and at the lowest possible cost. 
Relational risk implies the probability of the supplier acting opportunistically by not openly 
communicating or minimizing operational snags (Das & Teng, 2001). These risks are 
increased by four contingencies. First, task uncertainty relates to the complexity and added 
value of both the delivered product and its operational processes (Woodward, 1965). 
Second, task interdependence refers to the degree to which sequential subactivities of the 
value chain have been split up and made dependent on each other (Dekker, 2004). Third, 
environmental uncertainty regards general market uncertainties and uncertainty about 
unknown future contingencies (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). Fourth, relational stability 
aim concerns the manufacturer’s aim of continued future interactions with the supplier to 
build bilateral commitment (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004). MCSs contain two types of 
control, namely formal and informal control techniques (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). 
Formal controls are explicitly set up to coordinate the MSR and include outcome controls 
and behaviour controls. Outcome controls involve the measurement and evaluation of 
operational outcomes against pre-defined targets. Behaviour controls concern specifying, 
monitoring and evaluating compliance with pre-specified planning, procedures, rules and 
regulations (Dekker, 2004; Merchant, 1998; Ouchi, 1979). Informal controls are not 
explicitly designed, but are grown out of shared norms and values (Merchant, 1998; Ouchi, 
1979). Especially trust building has emerged as an important informal control instrument in 
                                                 
48 In the model, all contingencies interactively determine both risk types (cf Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 
2007; van Veen-Dirks, 2006). As a result, the model simultaneously depicts the associations between 
contingencies, risks and management controls. 
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inter-organizational MCSs (e.g. Dekker, 2004). Sako (1992) distinguishes three types of 
inter-organizational trust building, namely building contractual, competence and goodwill 
trust.
49 Besides trust building, MSRs are governed by clan control (Ouchi, 1979). Based on 
shared norms, values and a common goal, suppliers are motivated to achieve that goal (Das 
& Teng, 2001) because of inter-organizational social pressure exerted by the manufacturer 
(Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005; Speklé, 2001). 
To incorporate the fit-performance association, we add operational performance 
on the right hand side of the framework. Since product quality is emphasized more than 
timeliness and cost as supplier evaluation criterion (Waters-Fuller, 1996), we use this 
performance indicator to evaluate operational performance. In particular, we measure 
product quality by its most important evaluation metric in MSRs, namely percentage of 
defects (Gunasekaran, Patel & McGaughey, 2004). In automotive industry, this KPI is 
expressed in “parts per million” (PPM), i.e. the number of products claimed to be defective 
by the manufacturer out of one million products delivered (Lowe, Deibridge & Oliver, 
1997). The arrow to performance depicts the fit-performance association. A MCS fitted on 
MSR contingencies and risks is associated with good operational performance. Conversely, 
provided that the supplier is incapable of dealing with changed contingencies, a misfitted 
MCS is associated with poor operational performance (Kamminga & van der Meer-
Kooistra, 2007; van Veen-Dirks, 2006). However, since that kind of misfit over time results 
in escalating control problems, further damaging operational performance (Dekker, 2004), 
such misfitted MCS is changed towards a more suitable design (van Veen-Dirks, 2006). 
These dynamics are also captured by the fit-performance arrow and further justify our 
choice for a longitudinal case study. In essence, we assume that MCSs are equilibrating and 
return to a stable situation after being disturbed (van Veen-Dirks, 2006)
50. In contingency 
                                                 
49 Contractual trust is based on the expectation that the supplier will keep promises and comply with agreements 
made, whether these are contractually stipulated or not. Competence trust concerns the expectation that the 
supplier possesses the necessary technical and managerial competences to deliver the order as agreed. Goodwill 
trust regards the expectation that the supplier shares an open commitment, with the willingness to perform 
activities that are beneficial to the MSR, but possibly neither in the supplier’s interest nor required by the contract 
(Sako, 1992). 
50 Consistent with economics theory, contingency theory largely depends on the assumption of equilibrium, 
stipulating that organizations utilize the MCS best suited for the MSR, i.e. the MCS fitting the MSR’s risks. Yet 
contrary to economics, contingency theory assumes that also misfits occur for extended periods of time (Luft & 
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terminology, this change is called “Structural Adaptation to Regain Fit” or “SARFIT” 
(Donaldson, 2001): provided that the supplier is incapable of dealing with changed 
contingencies, a misfitted MCS only temporarily aggravates performance, until the MCS is 
changed towards a design fitting the changed contingencies and risks and therefore 
contributing to performance. 
Finally, the arrow from supplier cultural resemblance to MCS represents our 
research proposition: supplier cultural resemblance is positively associated with the speed 
at which the MCS changes, so that the MCS keeps (or quickly regains) its fit in case of 
changing contingencies. Indeed, White & Lui’s (2005) survey on alliances in the 
construction industry provides significant evidence that cultural differences between 
partners make the alliance more difficult to manage. In particular, an organization will 
expend significantly more managerial time and effort on interacting with a partner, which is 
very different in terms of organizational culture, in order to avoid or mitigate effects of 
miscommunication and conflict (White & Lui, 2005). Transposing these findings to a MSR 
setting learns that a difference in cultural resemblance between manufacturer and supplier 
is associated with a difference in time and effort needed to control the supplier. More 
specifically, more supplier cultural resemblance increases the speed of extending 
management control, because the manufacturer can evaluate suppliers with cultural 
similarities faster (Bierly III & Gallagher, 2007). That way, time is saved, which otherwise 
would be lost on trying to understand why people act the way they do (Aquilon, 1997). As 
time has become an important source of competitive advantage in manufacturing industries, 
a lot of emphasis is put on high awareness of time requirements and rapid decision making 
(Bierly III & Gallagher, 2007; Heikkilä, 2002; Stalk, 1988). In contingency terminology, 
this advantage means that when a MCS misfit is changed faster, performance picks up more 
quickly (Donaldson, 2001). 
                                                                                                                            
Shields, 2003). Obviously, the outcome of such a misfit could be the end of the IOR. Yet in that case, the change 
towards a MCS fitting the new level of risks does not occur. Consequently, this kind of “equilibrium” without 
MCS dynamics is not interesting for our research. Therefore, we abstract from the possibility that the manufacturer 
changes suppliers. In terms of research methodology, this abstraction is put into operation by studying a MSR in 
an industry, in which manufacturers are not inclined to switching suppliers during the manufacturing phase. 
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4.  Research methodology 
4.1.  Case study research 
An explanatory case study (Yin, 2003) suits studying our research proposition, as it 
involves refining existing inter-organizational management control theory from a dynamic 
perspective. More specifically, our case research seeks “to establish the plausibility of a 
specific theoretical perspective by demonstrating its capacity to illuminate some previously 
unappreciated aspect of management accounting practice” (Keating, 1995, p. 69). Indeed, 
the goal of this study is to refine inter-organizational management control theory by 
illustrating the impact of supplier cultural resemblance on the dynamics of MCS design in 
MSRs. 
Several inter-organizational management control case studies (e.g. Bhimani, 2003; 
Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Dekker, 2004; Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007) 
demonstrate that MCS design can be adequately investigated by means of case research. 
Furthermore, organizational cultures, subsequent behaviour of companies and the influence 
on the functioning of the MCS are very complex. Therefore, an in-depth study is needed to 
discover how different parties respond to a situational change and whether organizational 
culture has any effect on that response. Bhimani’s (2003) work clearly demonstrates this, as 
mainly the qualitative evidence provide insight in the actual reasons behind the influence of 
culture on perceived accounting system success, which was found by means of a survey. 
This observation not only justifies the choice for a case study, but also forms the reason 
why more of this research is requested (e.g. Chenhall, 2003; Dekker, 2004; Henri, 2006; 
Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Scheytt & Soin, 2006; van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2006). 
As theory refinement needs a clear theoretical starting point combined with 
openness to discover unexpected findings (Keating, 1995), we proposed a theoretical 
contingency framework to guide the data collection, but simultaneously used data 
collection techniques allowing sufficient openness. The collected data was longitudinal, 
because such data can reflect changes in MCS design and operational performance, which 
are needed to illustrate the impact of supplier cultural resemblance on the dynamics of the 
fit-performance association (Luo, 2002). Only by means of a longitudinal study, we are 
able to answer the call for more research on MCS dynamics (Anderson & Dekker, 2005; 
Dekker, 2004; 2007; Ittner et al., 1999; Scannell et al., 2000; van der Meer-Kooistra & 
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Vosselman, 2000). 
Like most inter-organizational studies, the unit of analysis is one dyadic relation 
between manufacturer and supplier (van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2006). Dyer & 
Singh (1998) explicitly propose this “relational view”, focusing on the manufacturer-
supplier dyad, as opposed to the “industry structure view” and “resource based view”, when 
analyzing cooperative strategy and sources of inter-organizational competitive advantage. 
Furthermore, we analyzed the relation after the manufacturer had decided to outsource the 
manufacturing activity. In other words, we addressed neither the make-or-buy decision nor 
related commercial negotiations, but collected data from the start of production onwards. 
4.2.  Case company selection 
The selection of the case companies was influenced by two selection concerns: theoretical 
suitability and open and flexible access to senior management.  
First, we chose the Belgian Volvo Cars Gent (VCG) production facility of the 
Swedish Volvo Cars Corporation (VCC) as manufacturing case company. On the one hand, 
we chose automotive, because this industry is considered a trendsetter in supplier 
relationships (cf Womack et al., 1990). Due to the high level of component outsourcing, 
extreme competitive pressure and resulting continuous improvement projects with 
suppliers, this sector needs appropriate MCSs to organize and manage supplier relations 
(Alford et al., 2000; Carr & Ng, 1995; Scannell et al., 2000). Furthermore, our research 
regarding MCS dynamics requires a MSR that heavily changes and is not terminated due to 
potential unsatisfactory supplier performance. The manufacturing phase of an automotive 
supply chain fulfils this need. For example, the manufacturing and delivery processes of 
suppliers drastically change, when a manufacturer starts producing a new car model. 
Moreover, manufacturer facilities are not inclined to switch suppliers because of a lack of 
capacity and sufficient supply quality at potential replacing suppliers. On the other hand, 
we chose VCG, because exploratory interviews learned that this manufacturer is considered 
a “best practice” by financial analysts, suppliers and umbrella organizations. For example, 
with respect to suppliers’ capability for build-to-order, VCG’s supplier park was evaluated 
best in a comparative case study, also including supplier parks of e.g. Ford, General Motors 
and Audi (Howard, 2006). In addition, VCG was subject to extremely changing supplier 
relations due to the introduction of two extra car models. Furthermore, VCG’s culture is of 
the developmental type with a focus on flexibility and external parties. Besides theoretical 
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suitability, exploratory interviews with VCG management showed remarkable openness, 
interest in the research topic and willingness to cooperate.  
Second, we chose the production facilities of two of VCG’s first-tier module 
suppliers as supplying case companies.
51 Besides willing to participate, these high value-
added just-in-sequence
52 suppliers met our theoretical suitability requirements. In 
particular, the suppliers are similar with respect to the four contingency variables, while 
they are very different with respect to their culture. More specifically, one supplier’s culture 
is of the developmental type, resembling VCG’s culture, while the other’s culture is of the 
hierarchical type. That way, our choice enables us to adequately investigate the effect of 
high and low supplier cultural resemblance on MCS dynamics, while keeping contingency 
effects on the MCS constant. Obviously, these contingencies must considerably change 
over the period under study, so that we can study the effect of supplier cultural resemblance 
on MCS dynamics following a contingency change. Yet, the change in contingencies has to 
be similar for both suppliers under study to preserve a constant external effect over time. 
The introduction of two extra models at VCG met these requirements, as both suppliers 
faced similar changes in their situational characteristics.   
4.3.  Data collection 
The data gathering consisted of 21 semi-structured interviews with high level managers of 
VCG, SAG1 and SAG2.
 Interviews were held in three rounds between February 2006 and 
December 2007. First, all VCG managers involved with suppliers were interviewed, 
including responsibles for quality, logistics, logistic engineering, material planning, IT, HR 
and purchase. That way, we got a general impression of VCG, its suppliers and its MCS. 
                                                 
51 For reasons of confidentiality, we call these production facilities “Supplier Automotive Gent 1 (SAG1)” and 
“Supplier Automotive Gent 2 (SAG2)”. The mother company headquarters are referred to as “Supplier 
Automotive 1 (SA1)” and “Supplier Automotive 2 (SA2)”. Concerning the delivered product, it suffices to know 
that both suppliers deliver a high value-added module. Examples of such modules supplied to VCG are seats, 
cockpits, engines, fuel tanks, bumpers, exhaust systems, door modules and wheels. For the same reason, the case 
description only refers to “X”, “Y” and “Z”, instead of people’s full last names. 
52 In order to reduce stocks and preserve maximum flexibility at VCG, components are delivered both just-in-time 
(JIT) and in-sequence. Just-in-time delivery means delivery when the car, for which the components are intended, 
has come onto VCG’s final assembly line. In-sequence delivery implies delivery in the same order as the cars on 
VCG’s production line. Suppliers delivering just-in-time and in-sequence are also called just-in-sequence (JIS) 
suppliers. 
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Second, we interviewed SAG1 and SAG2 management. In particular, we asked them to 
describe the history of the VCG-SAG relation. As a result, we got the suppliers’ impression 
of the relation with VCG, its history and its MCS, in the form of retrospective data. Third, 
we re-interviewed high level VCG managers specifically involved with both suppliers for 
several years. After asking them the same question, they added their view to the 
retrospective data of our study. Table 3.1 provides an interview data summary, describing 
the organization and position of the interviewees, the number of interviews, the duration of 
the interviews and the interview dates. 
134 Manuscript 3 
135 





VCG  Engineering Director & Material Planning & Logistics Manager  1 (joint)  122  8/02/2006 
  Supply Chain Control & Coordination Manager  2  55; 62  10/02/2006; 29/05/2006 
  Logistic Engineering Manager  1  68  10/02/2006 
  Supplier Support & Purchasing Manager  3  92; 95; 137  15/02/2006; 18/04/2006; 21/11/2007 
  Material Planning Manager  1  73  15/02/2006 
  Supplier Quality Assurance Manager  2  44; 96  15/02/2006; 29/05/2006 
          Human  Resource Manager 1  50 15/02/2006
          Finance Manager 1  47 15/02/2006
            IT Manager 1 67 13/03/2006
SAG1          CEO SA1 1  68 17/12/2007
            Plant Manager 1 67 17/12/2007
SAG2  Plant Manager  3  106; 74; 116  13/03/2006; 18/04/2006; 26/11/2007 
          Human  Resource Manager 1  51 29/03/2006
  Quality Manager  2  125; 121  29/03/2006; 18/07/2007 
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The interviews aimed at building a trusting relation and developing a dialogue 
with the interviewees, which permitted them to discuss their own concerns. All interviews 
were tape recorded electronically and structured by an interview protocol with open-ended 
questions, based on the theoretical framework. This approach allowed covering all 
framework constructs (i.e. theory attachment), while at the same time preserving openness 
for new findings (i.e. theory detachment). Interviews lasted between three quarters of an 
hour and two hours and a quarter, with an average duration of approximately one hour and 
twenty minutes. Afterwards, all taped interviews were transcribed and sent back to the 
interviewees for feedback and final approval. The feedback was transcribed as well. 
Interview transcripts were written in prose, as to avoid offending interviewees by literally 
transcribing their words on a very sensitive topic. Furthermore, by writing in prose, we 
were able to immediately write out certain parts of the interview that were not entirely clear 
on the tape. As the interviewees approved the final transcript, we received absolute 
certainty on the written documents and all interpretations made during transcribing.  
4.4.  Data analysis 
The data analysis followed a structured iterative approach. Already during interview 
transcribing, a first analysis was performed by highlighting parts of the transcript and 
writing down comments and related personal ideas.  
Then, both transcripts and personal notes formed the basis for a second analysis, 
which was completely done by hand. This analysis started with writing the case studies, for 
which all transcript extracts were ordered chronologically. The most important techniques 
to enhance theoretical sensitivity during the coding process were asking questions (who?, 
what?, when?, where?, why? and how?) and making comparisons (Strauss & Corbin, 1999). 
Also the tape recorder was used, to capture facts and findings coming up during the 
analysis. As with interviews, these tapes were transcribed and further studied. The coding 
process resulted in a document, containing an elaborate sample of ordered longitudinal 
data, which was used for writing up the case studies.  
  The coding of organizational culture required a specific approach, because our 
theoretical framework and therefore also our case study take on the research position of the 
manufacturer. This manufacturer knows its own organizational culture from the inside, but 
can only asses a supplier’s culture from the outside by considering supplier behaviour, 
resulting from the supplier’s cultural values. Yet, several supplier characteristics are 
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associated with supplier culture and indicative for supplier behaviour (Burton & Obel, 
2004). Hence, from a contingency point of view, the manufacturer might use the following 





56. The more a supplier is structured as a bureaucracy, larger, 
publicly owned and from a country with strong uncertainty avoidance and high power 
distance, the more the associated supplier culture is of the hierarchical type. To illustrate 
VCG’s usage of these contingencies, table 3.2
57 provides a sample of exemplary interview 
quotes out of our case data. Following our manufacturer research position, we use the same 
                                                 
53 Structure refers to the degree to which a supplier’s organization is structured as a bureaucracy (cf Perrow, 1970), 
which is characterized by a well defined authority hierarchy and high formalization, i.e. a large preference for 
rules and regulations (Burton & Obel, 2004). The more a supplier is structured as a bureaucracy, the more its 
underlying cultural focus lies on control and internal processes (Burton & Obel, 2004; Zammuto & Krakower, 
1991). 
54 A supplier’s size is positively associated with the level of procedure formalization and control sophistication. In 
addition, larger suppliers have a management style that is less personal and entrepreneurial and are less willing to 
cooperate with external parties. Consequently, large suppliers’ cultures are characterized by a greater focus on 
control and internal processes than on flexibility and external parties (Burton & Obel, 2004; Chenhall, 2003; 
Miller, 1987; Park & Ungson, 1997; Shan & Hamilton, 1991). 
55 Privately owned suppliers have a different culture compared to publicly owned suppliers. Family firms are often 
in the business for generations and have developed sound relationships with all stakeholders. Furthermore, family 
firms put less pressure on short term performance, so that the adoption of good long term investments stays 
assured. So in terms of the CVM, a privately owned supplier is likely to prefer a developmental culture with a 
focus on external stakeholders and flexibility towards future performance increasing opportunities (Padgett & 
Mukherjee, 2006; Stein, 1989). 
56 A supplier’s country of origin is associated with its organizational culture. When supplier headquarters are 
located in a country with strong uncertainty avoidance and high power distance, i.e. the two cultural values 
predominantly affecting organizational structure (Hofstede, 2001), the supplier has a preference for a strong 
bureaucracy with high formalization in a strict hierarchy.  Hence, the associated supplier culture is of the 
hierarchical type with a focus on internal control (Aquilon, 1997; Burton & Obel, 2004; Lachman, Nedd & 
Hinings, 1994). 
57 When interviewees refer to “Volvo”, they actually mean “Volvo Cars Gent” or (as we put it in the text) “VCG”. 
The indication “[*number]” refers to a certain supplier, which name is not mentioned for reasons of 
confidentiality. Yet, for clarity, we provide the characteristics of these suppliers: [*1] = supplier with hierarchical 
structure, large, publicly owned, American; [*2] = supplier with horizontal structure, small, privately owned, 
German; [*3] = supplier with hierarchical structure, large, publicly owned, American; [*4] = supplier with 
horizontal structure, small, privately owned, Belgian; [*5] = supplier with hierarchical structure, large, publicly 
owned, American. 
137 Manuscript 3 
contingencies to assess SAG1’s and SAG2’s culture in terms of the CVM. Given the 
insights on a supplier’s culture, a comparison with the manufacturer’s culture, also in terms 
of the CVM, determines the degree of supplier cultural resemblance. 
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Contingencies  Interview Quotes (Source: VCG managers) 
Structure  At [*1], the organization is ordered in pillars with a hierarchy. The JIS facility is put in one pillar or another, for example in the pillar Operations, next to the 
pillar Purchase and the pillar Sales. So, when something hurts in the other pillar, the JIS facility has no hold on that. At [*2], however, people say: “Your 
business is Volvo. Everything you need to do for that purpose, you must do. Do you have to go to Sweden? Go to Sweden. Do you have to go to Germany? Go 
to Germany. Do you have to call a supplier to your shop floor? Do that. Do whatever it takes.” So, when the plant manager has some arguments, people listen to 
him. [...] Such approach is impossible in a pillar organization with a clear hierarchy. In such organization, the JIS facility is a small grain in the big block of 
Operations; not to mention that the facility would go to the block of Purchase or Sales. The JIS facility has little or no meaning. At [*2], however, a plant 
manager is a business manager, who has his business and has authority over it. He receives freedom of enterprise. […] The plant manager receives more 
opportunities to think out-of-the-box; out of his current system. In a pillar organization, a plant manager is only expected to be occupied with the JIS facility’s 
current operations.  
  Sweden is flat. The reason for that is that Swedish companies aim for a horizontal structure, in which everyone is equal before the law. […] Volvo fits between 
the Swedish and Belgian culture and is therefore flat. Just like in family firms, there is a quicker flow of information and a quicker building up of relationships. 
  American companies are very hierarchical; German companies a bit less, although all the big ones follow the American pattern. That leads to a climate, in which 
the last link, the JIS facility, is considered a necessary evil to supply modules. So, people are avoiding that link as much as possible. At [*2], the reasoning is 
different: “If we install a JIS facility, we are going to make some kind of customer service centre of it. Our quality, our engineering and our support to the JIS 
facility will be enormous. That way, we are going to set up our satellite facility, positioned nearest to the customer, as good as possible.” 
Size  The supplying small and medium-sized enterprises of fifteen years ago now belong to big multinationals. That has little effect on local operational relations that 
still go by the same contacts, but has a huge effect on the settlement of potential difficulties, to which costs are attached. While previously such problems could 
be settled locally, those conversations are now held via a different structure. And in a large unwieldy organisation, it can take weeks or months to get through the 
organization and arrive at the right person.  
  Volvo, me included, feared that this approach with fantastic service would change, now that we had to work together with a gigantic American organization. We 
expected that when Volvo would now have a question, [*3] would not answer with a simple “No”. Still, we expected they would analyse the question, look what 
was in the contract, check up on what they had originally committed and verify whether they now fulfilled those commitments. 
  A couple of JIS facilities belong to large American groups, which are even larger than Volvo. Consequently, these local facilities must implement the standard 
application of the group. Volvo can not ask a lot from those suppliers, because they follow their own path and, that way, try to shield off their territory. They do 
not want to learn from the smaller suppliers and do not allow the smaller suppliers to learn from them. Yet, this goes against the philosophy of the supplier team, 
which purpose is to make all suppliers cooperate as a group. 
Ownership  A family firm has a broader picture. Furthermore, people in a family firm meet personally and frequently keep in touch with each other. For example, [*2] holds 
a yearly general assembly in Germany. [...] The conclusion was that they want to be a combination of the strength of a professional international multinational 
with the characteristics of a family firm, namely speed of work and openness in culture.  Manuscript 3 
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  If I am in a meeting with a family firm, there will always be someone of the family present; or at least someone who has something to say in the family. That 
gives the signal to the customer: “This is how it will be. Yes, we are going for it.” That is the message. And that works faster. That leads to more flexibility, 
because the culture and structures are there to support it. 
  Previously, [*4] was a family firm. […] The family characteristic led to the fact that Volvo only had to call the owner to get something done on a certain issue. 
In that case, everything had to give way to Volvo and everything immediately had to be put in order for the customer Volvo. That service was allowed to cost 
anything. Dealing with Volvo’s issue became first priority, without any discussion. 
Nationality  Apparently, national culture plays a role in the organizational culture of the local JIS facility and its mother company. Another factor potentially influencing 
organizational culture is the size of the organization. Such factors influence the organizational culture and that culture influences the speed at which the relation 
can switch to a friendly relation. […] As a result, our relation is smoother with a German family firm than with a big French multinational.  
  The art of situational leadership fits in a culture like the Swedish one, which also influences Volvo and where an executive is called “coach”. That signals: “we 
together”. In American companies, there is no situational leadership, but domination. There, an executive is called “boss”. That signals: “you alone”. […] An 
American supplier will usually choose the business approach. The supplier only verifies an outside question by means of the contract. And when the question is 
judged as not their responsibility, the case is closed. A Swedish supplier, however, rather chooses the friendly approach. So, when a question enters the 
company, the supplier will only be satisfied when there is a solution for the question. For the supplier, it does not matter whether the question is their 
responsibility or not. 
  [*5] is the house of distrust, while Volvo aspires the complete opposite. At Volvo, any employee can take decisions. At [*5], one needs five signatures of the top 
management. The reasons for that are the fact that [*5] is a very large organization and the fact that [*5] is an American organization, which only works by the 
rules. According to me, [*5] has loads of people writing books full of rules. […] Volvo, however, employs the consultation model with cooperation and helping 
each other.  
 
Table 3.2: Exemplary interview quotes concerning contingencies associated with supplier culture 
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Finally, we used the temporal bracketing and variance research methods to 
structure and interpret the case data in relation to the contingency framework (Langley, 
1999; Rowe et al., 2008).  Temporal bracketing means dividing the time length of a 
longitudinal case study into time periods, so that there are continuities of events within a 
time period and discontinuities of events between time periods. That way, temporal 
bracketing is suited for making comparisons of organizational change between time 
periods. The variance (or synthetic) method implies transforming original data from a story 
with events to a collection of variables that synthesize critical components of the events. 
These variables are the variables from our theoretical framework, which allow analyzing 
how change in an independent variable, i.e. MCS fit on risks, causes change in the 
dependent variable, i.e. operational performance (Langley, 1999; Rowe et al., 2008). 
The case study and following discussion were approved for publication by VCG, 
SAG1 and SAG2, without having to make changes. 
5.  Case study 
The case study section of this paper contains four parts. First, we describe VCG. We 
highlight organizational characteristics and behaviour, define VCG’s culture, and present 
VCG’s resulting supplier MCS. Second, we introduce two module suppliers with different 
cultural resemblance to VCG. We discuss the characteristics used by VCG to assess their 
culture and resulting behaviour. Third, we indicate to what extent the introduction of two 
new Volvo models changed the contingencies of both supplier relations. Based on the 
difference in supplier cultures, we propose different MCS dynamics. Fourth, we present the 
analyses of these dynamics, as result of the temporal bracketing and variance on actual case 
data. 
5.1.  Volvo Cars Gent 
Volvo Cars Gent (VCG) was set up in 1965 as the largest assembly unit of Volvo Cars 
Corporation (VCC), a Swedish automotive OEM that produces cars since 1927. In 1999, 
VCC became part of the Premier Automotive Group, including Jaguar, Aston Martin and 
Land Rover, owned by Ford Motor Company, the world's third largest car manufacturer. In 
2005, VCG employed 5.025 people, had a turnover of about €4,2 billion and produced 
258.479 cars. VCG’s organizational structure is horizontal and the counterpart of a 
bureaucracy with an authority hierarchy in vertical levels. This structure is associated with 
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VCC’s Swedish nationality, as Sweden is characterized by low power distance and 
uncertainty avoidance. In Sweden, people are considered equal, which results in a 
preference for empowerment and collaboration in a horizontal structure. For example, a 
VCG superior leading a team is called “a coach” to stress his stimulating and supporting, 
rather than controlling, role. Furthermore, the Swedish culture is a “we” culture, in which 
friendships are established; also in business. In these friendships, honest open 
communication and mutual cooperation are preferred above avoiding uncertainty and 
refusing unselfish assistance. VCC’s size sustains bringing this culture into the company. 
Despite being part of Ford’s Premier Automotive Group, VCC remains a relatively small 
autonomous company with only two major production facilities. As a result, VCG 
formalization is limited and does not hinder the entrepreneurial spirit of employees at all 
levels, who freely interact with colleagues and coaches at VCG, VCC and suppliers. 
Based on these characteristics, VCG’s culture most closely resembles a 
developmental culture with a high focus on flexibility and external oriented values. 
Naturally, some focus on flexibility is obvious in an automotive setting with high flexibility 
requirements due to numerous model variants, fluctuating demands and continuous product 
and process changes. Yet, VCG’s high focus on flexibility is visible in how the OEM deals 
with these requirements, namely by valuing empowerment. Instead of severely controlling 
employees, VCG grants them decision-making power to solve process changes and 
problems themselves based on their own expertise and lots of collaboration. As a result, 
VCG strongly values fairness, which means that employees are not penalized for making a 
mistake, but evaluated based on their behaviour in trying to resolve it. When employees 
openly communicate, quickly solve the problem and work on avoiding it in the future, VCG 
congratulates them with their way of action and does not punish them. In other words, VCG 
believes in human relations and values a spontaneous flexible response to situational 
changes at all company levels more than lower level obedience to control from the top.  
The same flexibility orientation holds for VCG’s just-in-sequence
58 suppliers. 
Instead of considering these supplier relations to be strictly business and focusing on the 
                                                 
58 In order to reduce stocks and preserve maximum operational flexibility at VCG, components are delivered both 
just-in-time (JIT) and in-sequence. Just-in-time delivery means delivery when the car, for which the components 
are intended, has come onto VCG’s final assembly line. In-sequence delivery implies delivery in the same order as 
the cars on VCG’s production line. Suppliers delivering just-in-time and in-sequence are also called just-in-
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own internal operations, VCG largely focuses on external suppliers in search of continuous 
collaboration. The OEM finds that manufacturer and suppliers strive for a common goal, 
which is manufacturing as many products of the order book as possible, on time, with good 
quality and at the lowest possible cost. As a result, VCG considers the suppliers as part of 
the “Volvo family” and openly communicates with them on both difficulties and possible 
improvements. This supplier interaction occurs not only individually, but also jointly via 
the “Suppliers Team Volvo Cars” (STVC). The purposes of this supplier team, which meets 
monthly, are creating openness and sharing competencies, by the exchange of information 
and real life experiences, in order to improve the performance of all parties. As the STVC is 
actually run by the suppliers, VCG signals her place is among suppliers instead of above 
them. 
Nevertheless, these suppliers are subject to a considerable amount of management 
control. Yet, this control bears the stamp of VCG’s culture. With respect to formal control, 
VCG frequently checks up on supplier outcome by means of several quality and logistic 
KPIs, of which parts per million is the most important. Furthermore, the OEM controls 
supplier behaviour by means of a syllabus (agreements regarding basic routines of 
operational business), frequent supplier follow-up and supplier company visits. Although 
these controls reflect VCG’s mechanistic control, they are influenced by VCG’s focus on 
flexibility. For example, whether VCG imposes a penalty for causing a line stop (standard 
formal procedure) is always first negotiated with the supplier and then based on an 
assessment of the supplier’s response to the issue. The empowerment and corresponding 
fairness values that underlie this behaviour towards suppliers correspond to VCG’s values 
towards employees. Concerning behaviour control, VCG not only visits suppliers for 
control purposes, but also for collaboration. This cooperation coincides with open 
information sharing from VCG and the suppliers in order to stimulate flexible problem 
solving and creative continuous improvement based on both parties’ expertise.  
Yet, VCG’s organic preferences are even more visible in the importance attached 
to informal supplier control; more specifically, trust building and clan control. First, VCG 
builds contractual trust based on prior positive experiences, so that the OEM trusts 
suppliers to execute oral and written agreements. Second, VCG also trusts suppliers to 
possess the necessary competences to deliver the goods as required and act on changes or 
                                                                                                                            
sequence (JIS) suppliers. 
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improvements as promised. This competence trust is primarily built on past performance 
and suppliers’ process certifications. Third, VCG continuously builds goodwill trust, i.e. the 
trust that the supplier openly and honestly communicates (even potential) delivery 
problems, which impact VCG and other JIS suppliers. This trust is increased by frequent 
interaction, and resulting bonds of friendship, with supplier managers, some already 
working with VCG for more than ten years. During this interaction, VCG continuously 
shares and promotes its norms and values, so that supplier managers are trusted to know 
that VCG values honest open communication more than opportunistic problem 
concealment. In addition, familiarity with the common goal and VCG’s norms and values 
driving that goal makes suppliers feel related to VCG, like in a team or clan. Consequently, 
every supplier manager faces negative personal feelings, when confronted with 
(opportunistic) mistakes harming that goal. As JIS suppliers face daily operational snags 
requiring problem solving, they are highly subject to this social pressure. On top of these 
bi-directional informal controls, VCG uses the STVC to effectively structure the clan, so 
that both informal controls are strengthened and extended towards all JIS suppliers. By 
means of socializing activities like a joint lunch, the STVC magnifies bi-directional trust 
and creates multi-directional trust among all JIS suppliers. The STVC also builds trust via 
frequent information and knowledge sharing, joint decision making and joint problem 
solving. Based on this trust, VCG and the suppliers quickly and openly work on solutions 
for problems by helping each other, instead of placing blame and negotiating penalties. 
Additionally, the STVC clan strengthens VCG’s social pressure on suppliers, because 
important supplier errors are reported and discussed at STVC meetings. The presence of all 
suppliers, towards which supplier managers are accountable, increases potential negative 
personal feelings and that way also the level of social pressure.  
In sum, VCG’s MCS shows the OEM’s focus on flexibility and external suppliers. 
This MCS benefits from a resembling supplier culture that leads to corresponding 
behaviour. For example, VCG’s STVC would not work without the willingness of suppliers 
to open up facilities during visits and share technical and managerial knowledge. In the next 
section, we introduce two module suppliers with a different degree of resemblance to 
VCG’s culture. 
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5.2.  Module suppliers SAG1 and SAG2 
SAG1 and SAG2 are two suppliers delivering high value-added modules from a facility in 
VCG’s supplier park. Their production processes involve complex core competences, 
which add considerable value to the modules. Because of JIS delivery, their 
interdependence with VCG is high. If one supplier disturbs the continuous delivery flow, 
not only VCG but also other JIS suppliers suffer. In addition, both suppliers must be highly 
flexible due to pull production and heavily fluctuating automotive demand. Together with 
the risk of VCG being closed down or VCC Purchase resourcing the module, this demand 
fluctuation results in high environmental uncertainty for the suppliers. Yet, as VCG is 
aware that the interdependence considerably impacts performance, the OEM strives for 
long term relational stability with both suppliers. Contrary to the supply relations with VCG 
that are similar, SAG1 and SAG2 have very different cultures, which VCG assesses by 
addressing their characteristics as described below.  
The Belgian module supplier SAG1 was founded in 1996 as the joint venture of 
two automotive suppliers entering a new, yet related, business, in response to VCG’s 
decision to outsource the particular module. One year later, the Belgian plant manager, Mr 
Z, had set up four similar companies supplying the same module to other OEMs, so that a 
mother company, SA1, was founded. In 2005, SA1 produced modules in 19 facilities world 
wide, with about 1.000 employees; despite the impressive growth rate, still a very small 
scale in automotive. All these years, SA1 has been led by Mr Z. Although he never owned 
SAG1 or SA1, he considers SA1 to be his own and receives full autonomous decision 
making power to act as SA1’s owner. Consequently, SA1 resembles a privately owned 
company and Mr Z’s business attitude completely permeated SAG1. That attitude is one of 
friendly relationships with lots of spontaneous bi-directional communication and 
collaboration at all levels with SA1 and VCG. As a result, SAG1 is part of a horizontal 
company structure, despite Belgian culture’s high level of power distance and uncertainty 
avoidance. Hence, SAG1 has full responsibility for the organization of current production 
processes and the planning of upcoming project changes. Naturally, SA1 highly influences 
SAG1 production, for example with respect to continuous improvement, but always in a 
climate of bi-directional collaboration and agreement. Especially Mr Z frequently visits 
SAG1 personally to offer assistance, since SA1 headquarters are located near SAG1 and Mr 
Z feels highly connected as SAG1’s original plant manager. That way, he makes sure that 
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SAG1’s flexible focus on its customer VCG is adequately supported by SA1 at all times. In 
sum, SAG1’s culture most closely resembles a developmental culture. 
SAG2, however, has a completely different culture. This supplier was set up in 
2000 as the production facility of SA2, a global American automotive supplier founded in 
1943 and quoted on the American stock market. In 2005, SA2 operated 79 facilities in 25 
countries on six continents with approximately 19.000 employees. Despite the American 
culture of medium power distance and uncertainty avoidance, SA2’s structure is a 
bureaucracy with a hierarchy and high formalization, in which SAG2 only has 
responsibility for production and delivery according to strict rules and procedures imposed 
by SA2. This means that functions like finance and HR are centralised and that SAG2’s 
plant manager only concentrates on budgeting and reporting. Furthermore, the SAG2 
production process is designed and installed by SA2 engineers without SAG2 involvement. 
Taken together, these characteristics point at a hierarchical culture, focusing on controlling 
current processes, instead of responding flexibly to operational difficulties and 
improvements, initiated by external collaboration and often in need of financial 
investments.  
5.3.  Contingency changes 
The previously described JIS supply relations refer to the situation in 2005. Yet, these 
circumstances followed a considerable change in contingencies in 2004. Before 2004, VCG 
operated in two shifts, manufacturing around 150.000 cars per year of two models (Volvo 
S60 and V70) on the P2 platform. In 2004, VCG started production of two extra models 
(Volvo S40 and V50) on another platform, P1. This substantially changed JIS supply 
relations. First, the level of task uncertainty increased, because production volume almost 
doubled (to around 250.000 cars per year), production activities became more complex, 
headcount increased and a third night shift was introduced. Second, task interdependence 
heightened due to an explosion of model variants and a considerable increase in JIS supply 
flexibility. Third, fluctuating demands for four Volvo models added to the level of 
environmental uncertainty. This demand dependence followed the extended production 
capacity for two models of which commercial success was uncertain. This uncertainty put 
additional pressure on operational performance, so that suppliers were inclined to keep 
operational difficulties in-house and solve snags themselves. VCG’s vulnerability towards 
this kind of opportunistic behaviour augmented. As JIS suppliers started to play a more 
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important role in VCG’s supply chain, the automaker’s striving for long term relational 
stability increased. Consequently, suppliers’ fear for retaliation, resulting from disclosed 
opportunism, reduced. In other words, the two extra models substantially changed 
situational characteristics and increased performance and relational risk of JIS supply 
relations. Hence, in order to preserve the MCS fit, VCG’s level of management control 
must be increased.  
Dependent on the degree of supplier cultural resemblance, we expect this MCS 
change to differ. As SAG1’s developmental culture corresponds to VCG’s culture, we 
expect VCG’s MCS on SAG1 to need less time to adjust to changing circumstances. 
Oppositely, SAG2’s hierarchical culture substantially differs from VCG’s developmental 
culture. Hence, we expect VCG’s MCS on SAG2 to need more time to adjust.  
5.4.  Case analysis of relation dynamics 
The case data concerning SAG1 and SAG2 were bracketed into time periods based on 
changes in the influencing variables, i.e. the level of contingencies, risks and the MCS. The 
substantial increase in the level of contingencies and risks demarcates periods 1 and 2, 
while different changes in the MCS demarcate periods 2 to 6. To facilitate within and 
between period comparisons of the different variables, the following analyses are organized 
by headings corresponding to the time periods. Consistent with the variance method, we 
interpret the case events in terms of the variables in the theoretical framework in order to 
compare the variables. Figure 3.2 and figure 3.3 show a timeline that summarizes the 
results for each variable per time period from 2003 to 2006 for SAG1 and SAG2 
respectively. Notice that performance is expressed in average parts per million (PPM) over 
the period under consideration. The level of this quality measure is visualized by means of 
a graph at the bottom of each figure. The high-low categorization in the tabular part of the 
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Figure 3.3: Low cultural resemblance VCG-SAG2 MCS fit and performance consequences over time Manuscript 3 
5.4.1.  SAG1 
Period 1 (September 1996 – December 2003) 
From the start of production in 1996, SAG1 showed a consistently positive performance 
level. As VCG’s values of an open collaborative focus on JIS suppliers fitted Mr Z’s 
business attitude and SAG1’s culture, SAG1 responded by developing (personal) 
relationships that allowed the sharing of information at all company levels and the building 
of trust. Mr Z and SAG1 felt part of the “Volvo family”, which resulted in bi-directional 
collaboration. For example, when VCG experienced substantial difficulties with a newly 
designed automatic pallet transportation system for SAG1 modules, SAG1 proposed to help 
redesign the delivery system, despite full VCG responsibility for logistics. In particular, 
SAG1 assisted in designing a new system that included automatic truck loads via a 
“carpet”
59, automatic transport at VCG via a conveyor bridge and additional labels by 
SAG1. It must be clear that these changes required considerable financial investments from 
SAG1, especially for the carpet. Yet, Mr Z readily offered assistance and considered the 
investment obvious, given his strong relation with VCG. Hence, during the period 1996-
2003, SAG1 became entirely aimed at satisfying all VCG needs as quickly as possible, 
irrespective of the cost. 
These cultural values and corresponding behaviour made VCG built high 
competence and goodwill trust. For example, SA1 set up a department that collected 
difficulties of a certain JIS production unit, quickly proposed a solution and then distributed 
both problem and solution to all SA1 facilities. The same approach held for continuous 
improvement. When a process or product amelioration was realised at a certain JIS facility, 
this improvement was always shared with all JIS units via SA1. When a potential 
improvement was developed centrally, SA1 always first consulted VCG. Yet, when VCG 
approved the innovation and SAG1 implemented it, SA1 spread it to other JIS units. Based 
on the open relation with SAG1, VCG was familiar with this approach and therefore trusted 
SAG1 to perform to the best of their ability at all times and to openly communicate both 
                                                 
59 This “carpet” is a kind of platform on which SAG1 places finished modules in-sequence. The carpet is 
electrically motorised and automatically loads the modules into a truck. At VCG a similar carpet is installed that 
automatically unloads the truck. As the modules are in-sequence, they are directly transported by a conveyor 
bridge to the module build-in station of the VCG assembly line. 
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internally with SA1 and externally with VCG. For example, when SAG1 adapted the 
outbound stock balance, VCG was informed and asked for their approval. Besides trust 
building, also social pressure was considerable present, especially on Mr Z. Mr Z and Mr 
X, a VCG supplier expert, developed a personal friendship, which resulted in the joint 
creation of the STVC together with two other supplier plant managers. As Mr Z even 
chaired the STVC for about one and a half years, it must be clear that his support, and 
therefore his susceptibility to social pressure, were very high.  
VCG’s formal controls mainly focused on outcome KPI’s (primarily PPM) and 
compliance with delivery rules and regulations drawn up in SAG1’s syllabus.  
Period 2 (January 2004 – March 2005) 
To preserve a MCS fitting the increased level of risk, resulting from the contingency 
changes in January 2004, VCG had to raise the level of management control. With respect 
to formal control, VCG set up cross-functional workgroups one and a half year upfront to 
control the VCG-SAG1 interface (e.g. information exchange and logistics) and make sure 
the supplier would be capable of handling the new module supply. The main type of 
information for this project phase behaviour control was an electronic flowchart (Excel file) 
clarifying the project phases and formulating related questions, to which the supplier had to 
provide the answer. In addition, the supplier also had to score the progress on every 
question, ranging from green (question completely in order; no further sub-questions to or 
from VCG/VCC) over orange (question not in order; issues need to be dealt with or sub-
questions need to be answered; yet no problem considering phase deadline) to red (question 
not in order and some problem; e.g. answer to (sub-)question unknown or insufficient 
information available). Every month, the supplier plant manager had to deliver an update of 
the flowchart to VCG and VCC. When a question was marked red, VCG/VCC addressed 
the supplier on this problem during the next “launch readiness review” meeting at VCG. 
The problem was discussed and a solution was agreed upon. Hence, the flowchart’s main 
goal was informing VCG/VCC engineers of the supplier’s project preparation progress and 
status. Yet, for this behaviour control to work properly, the supplier’s answers and scores 
had to honestly reflect reality. At SAG1, this was not an issue, as the supplier strongly 
valued open communication and even considered the flowchart a very helpful tool for the 
own planning and project follow-up. Consequently, a green score on a flowchart question 
regarding employee training on new procedures really meant that SAG1 had communicated 
all new procedures and trained all (new) employees involved. That way, VCG effectively 
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controlled the VCG-SAG1 interface during the project phase.  
SAG1’s open relationship with lots of interaction created opportunities for VCG to 
exercise additional behaviour control on SAG1’s internal production processes. During the 
project phase, SAG1 regularly invited VCG and VCC managers to SAG1 to explain and 
discuss how changes to internal processes were made. To that end, SAG1 management 
really anticipated VCG questions and prepared the answers in advance. Also VCG shop 
floor employees were invited to SAG1, as SAG1 considered it important for them to know 
SAG1 activities and meet SAG1 employees, with whom they would interact.  
Mr Z and some SA1 managers always attended these visits, to show SA1’s 
attention for the upcoming changes. Despite substantial extra costs, these changes were 
implemented in two phases, because SAG1 considered the risk of a complete line change 
too high. In addition, SAG1 installed extra production capacity to cope with interruptions, 
which always occur when production processes are radically changed. Furthermore, 
SAG1’s plant manager attended monthly VCC and SA1 R&D meetings. As a result, this 
manager already responded to potential production difficulties during the design phase and 
received VCC information first hand as quickly as possible. That way, he was best 
positioned to assist SA1 and supervise SAG1’s new production lay-out, so that all 
operational processes and procedures supported production of the new modules. Moreover, 
SAG1 management even anticipated on serious failures harming VCG delivery. An 
illustrative example was the installation of an extra carpet to load trucks. Until 2004, SAG1 
only possessed one carpet, so that in case of a carpet failure VCG delivery would inevitably 
halt. Due to the changed contingencies, SAG1 managers themselves assessed the risk of 
stopping the VCG line due to a carpet failure as unacceptably high. Therefore, they 
demanded SA1 financial resources for an additional carpet. As Mr Z was aware of the 
highly interdependent production environment and the social consequences of a VCG line 
stop on SAG1’s management and their reputation, he almost instantly granted SAG1 the 
resourced needed. So, without an actual carpet failure having caused a VCG line stop in the 
past, SAG1 installed an additional one, only to prevent VCG delivery from suffering from a 
potential carpet failure in the changed circumstances. Taken together, these signals built 
additional competence trust, on top of the considerable level VCG developed in the past.  
Hence, VCG’s MCS immediately followed the increase in risk based on behaviour 
control and trust building actually taking place before the contingencies changed. That way, 
VCG preserved a MCS fit, which was expected to sustain SAG1’s performance based on 
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the framework. And indeed, after the start of production, SAG1’s new module delivery did 
not run into substantial problems, so that its performance level remained outstanding.  
Period 3 (April 2005 – …) 
Following the 2004 situational changes and resulting difficulties at certain JIS suppliers 
(other than SAG1), VCG extended its basic formal control on SAG1 to fit the new 
production environment. Although already implemented in practice, the following 
extensions were confirmed in 2005: registration and evaluation of two logistic KPIs, 
namely line stop minutes (i.e. number of minutes that a supplier causes stoppage of the 
VCG assembly line) and dropped cars (i.e. number of cars dropped from VCG’s line 
planning, because a supplier is unable to deliver the requested part), strict application of the 
penalty system (including the negotiation policy) and more frequent supplier outcome and 
behaviour follow-up. Combined with the very high level of informal control, VCG used 
these extended formal controls to govern the high level of risks. Hence, consistent with 
theoretical expectations, SAG1 retained its excellent performance. 
5.4.2.  SAG2 
Period 1 (January 2000 – December 2003) 
From the start of production in 2000, SAG2 was an exemplary supplier with performance 
well above target. VCG’s MCS appeared to fit the supplier’s risk with basic KPI (primarily 
PPM) follow-up, a clear syllabus and a substantial level of competence trust, mainly based 
on previous good performance. VCG’s goodwill trust, however, was low. On the one hand, 
SAG2’s start-up and production did not create large problems, for which open and honest 
communication combined with collaborative problem solving were needed. On the other 
hand, SAG2’s plant manager was completely unknown to VCG, as he was only sent on 
secondment from another SA2 facility and did not engage in STVC meetings. Because of 
limited interaction, VCG neither got the opportunity to share norms and values, nor 
establish personal relationships with SAG2 management, so that also social pressure 
possibilities were limited. Because nothing disturbed SAG2 delivery, VCG left the supplier 
alone. 
Period 2 (January 2004 – June 2004) 
Following the contingency and risks increase in January 2004, VCG had to raise the level 
of management control to preserve a MCS fit. However, neither formal nor informal 
controls were considerably heightened. With respect to formal controls, VCG did set up 
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cross-functional workgroups and required SAG2 to report project progress by means of the 
electronic flowchart, but got deceived. While SAG2’s information provision to the 
workgroups and SAG2’s answers and scores on the flowchart questions told VCG that all 
necessary changes were made and issues were getting solved, the supplier actually 
neglected implementing the changes. Furthermore, the supplier neither communicated the 
changes in the organization, nor trained the employees. The fact that SAG2 did not 
participate in the design and implementation of the new production system, but simply 
received all installations from SA2 engineers, contributed to this negligence. SAG2 
managers, for example, had no contact with SA2 engineers, not to mention the VCC R&D 
department. Consequently, VCG approved an operational plan that did not reflect reality, 
and that way missed out on additional project phase behaviour control. Furthermore, VCG 
considered SAG2 to be manageable by a less experienced quality engineer based on the 
competence trust in SAG2.  
However, VCG did not receive any signals that SAG2 would be able to effectively 
handle the heightened supply requirements. For example, VCG did not get the impression 
that SA2 had worked hard to prepare SAG2. SA2 engineers had implemented the new 
production system at SAG2, successfully produced a couple of test modules, but then left. 
VCG neither received news about an extra production or quality engineer to ensure 
production quality in the new substantially more complex production system. In fact, SAG2 
communication was limited to the strictly necessary and did not include inviting VCG to 
SAG2 and discussing the upcoming changes with all people involved. Thus, VCG had no 
grounds to build additional competence trust in justification of lower project workgroup 
thoroughness and the appointment of a young quality engineer. VCG’s goodwill trust and 
social pressure possibilities on SAG2 were not heightened either and remained low. Hence, 
VCG’s MCS did not follow the increase in risks and evolved into misfit. Based on the 
framework, we expect this situation to deteriorate SAG2’s performance, which is exactly 
what happened. After the start of production, SAG2 struggled to fulfil the agreements made 
during the project phase and damaged VCG’s competence trust.  
Period 3 (July 2004 – August 2004) 
VCG responded by installing extra outcome controls, like third party inspection and taking 
a picture of every module. Furthermore, behaviour control sharpened by daily supplier 
company visits of a VCC/VCG team led by a VCG expert, Mr X. This team aimed at 
collaboratively solving snags during supplier review meetings. Nevertheless, VCG’s 
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collaborative behaviour control was hampered by SAG2’s opportunistic behaviour. Instead 
of responding openly and honestly to VCG concerns and accepting the assistance offered, 
SAG2 management initially kept VCG staff away from the issues. By continuously telling 
problems were taken care of, while in reality multiple issues remained, the plant manager 
further damaged goodwill trust. Moreover, SAG2’s poor performance made it clear that the 
supplier already deceived VCG during the project phase by distorting information. This 
deception carried on, until VCG monitored every detail of SAG2’s output and operational 
process. Those controls proved VCG’s remaining competence trust undeserved, as SAG2 
was unable to improve. Instead, all middle level managers quit, leaving the plant manager 
to handle the situation alone. Finally, this manager also lost VCG’s contractual trust by 
continuing to promise solutions, while in reality VCG kept suffering.  
Period 4 (September 2004 – December 2004) 
At that time, Mr X demanded active involvement from SA2. As a result, SAG2 got a new 
interim plant manager from another facility and operational assistance. That way, VCG 
tried to reinstall a sufficient level of trust in SAG2, because as long as the level of informal 
control did not fit the heightened level of risk, the framework predicted difficulties to 
remain. As the first plant manager was replaced by a new interim plant manager, who 
received SA2 assistance and initial VCG trust, performance was expected to pick up. 
Besides heightened informal control, the extra outcome controls and daily supplier visits 
were retained to contribute to the renewed MCS fit. Nevertheless, the new plant manager 
was unknown to VCG, so that his starting level of trust, based on previous interaction and 
reputation, was minimal. In addition, he only became interim manager, rendering social 
pressure unsuited as control instrument. Moreover, the fact that he only became interim 
plant manager reflected that he did not like being detached to SAG2. In other words, VCG 
only restated little trust in SAG2, so that the informal control insufficiently fitted the 
increased risks and continuing difficulties could be foreseen. Indeed, despite a slight 
performance increase and improved VCG access to SAG2’s shop floor, SAG2’s 
performance progress was too slow. Especially the interim plant manager turned out to 
prefer addressing symptoms with technical solutions instead of investigating causes 
together with VCG. This even worsened certain operational issues. Consequently, also this 
plant manager quickly lost VCG’s trust and left, leaving the VCG-SAG2 relation astray 
once again.  
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Period 5 (January 2005 – March 2005) 
However this time, Mr X acted differently by choosing and promoting a plant manager 
himself, in particular Mr Y, who VCG knew very well. Because of his outstanding 
relationship with VCG, he started with high levels of trust and VCG back-up in putting 
pressure on SA2. In addition, his managing attitude fitted VCG’s goal of tackling problem 
causes instead of symptoms in an open and collaborative way. In terms of management 
controls, VCG increased the level of trust and social pressure by installing a plant manager 
in which the starting levels of these controls were sufficiently high to fit the MSR’s risk. 
First, VCG reinstalled contractual trust, because the manufacturer was confident Mr Y 
would not make promises that he could not keep. Second, VCG knew he would openly 
communicate problems, prohibiting him from keeping promises made, because he had 
never acted opportunistically before. Third, VCG was familiar with Mr Y’s management 
style and desire to look for problem causes together, which contributed to their competence 
trust. Although he had to prove this type of trust during the first period of his appointment, 
joint problem solving was a genuine issue with previous plant managers, contributing to the 
inability to create a turnaround. Fourth, Mr Y was more aware of SAG2’s impact on VCG 
production and more familiar with VCG norms and values than previous plant managers. 
Many years of experience, a personal relationship with VCG managers (e.g. Mr X) and a 
good reputation made Mr Y sensitive towards social pressure. Moreover, the STVC now 
played a role of importance as well. SAG2’s first plant manager was only sent on 
secondment and did not engage in STVC meetings, while the second one was too occupied 
trying to restructure SAG2 and not interested in the STVC due to his temporary statute. Mr 
Y, however, already consistently participated in overall STVC meetings and chaired the IT 
workgroup. That way, the STVC contributed to VCG’s trust in Mr Y and increased social 
pressure of both VCG and JIS suppliers. These heightened informal controls fitted the high 
risk for the first time and formed the reason to deliberately choose Mr Y. Hence, the 
framework predicted performance to improve, which it rapidly did. Within months of Mr 
Y’s appointment and much quicker than anyone could have imagined, SAG2 realised a 
considerable turnaround. 
Period 6 (April 2005 – …) 
Consequently, VCG rapidly cut back formal controls. In fact, VCG lowered all extra 
controls from the moment SAG2 showed substantial improvements, building sufficient 
competence trust. Hence, formal control was put back to basic control resembling the 
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period 2000-2003; yet slightly extended, as VCG continued registering line stop minutes 
and dropped cars, reiterated the penalty system and kept supplier outcome and behaviour 
follow-up more frequent due to the new production environment. The level of informal 
control, however, was many times higher, with high levels of trust building and social 
pressure. As VCG used this combined MCS to govern risks in the new production situation, 
SAG2 regained its outstanding performance already one year later.  
6.  Discussion 
Previous case findings confirm our theoretical propositions. First, VCG’s developmental 
culture strongly influences the supplier MCS, as suggested by Chenhall (2003) and Scheytt 
& Soin (2006). More specifically, VCG’s MCS shows the OEM’s focus on flexibility and 
external suppliers by means of organic influences on formal controls, an important role for 
informal controls and the installation of the STVC, which builds a clan and extends 
informal control to all JIS suppliers. Second, the functioning of the MCS benefits from a 
resembling supplier culture, which supports propositions of Harrison & McKinnon (1999) 
and Henri (2006). When module supply contingencies and risks increased in 2004, VCG’s 
MCS needed to follow this increase in order to preserve a MCS fit, associated with good 
operational performance. VCG’s MCS on SAG1, a supplier with a similar culture, changed 
very rapidly, contrary to the MCS on SAG2, a supplier with a hierarchical culture. In fact, 
VCG’s MCS on SAG1 was heightened during the project phase before  the start of 
production, so that the risk increase in January 2004 was immediately subject to more 
control. Oppositely, SAG2’s MCS only grew about six months after the production start-up 
and then needed six more months and three attempts to get fitted on the new situation. That 
way, our case confirms alliance research findings of White & Lui (2005), associating this 
timing difference with a difference in partner’s cultural resemblance. Third, the case clearly 
shows how high cultural resemblance contributed to VCG’s speed of MCS change. As 
argued by Bierly III & Gallagher (2007), VCG was able to evaluate SAG1 earlier than 
SAG2,  i.e. during the project phase, by means of three mechanisms that enhance 
management control. Although these mechanisms result from our case data, they 
correspond to earlier findings in the literature, which supports their external validity. 
First, VCG’s external focus resulted in increased behaviour control by means of 
setting up cross-functional workgroups and requiring the supplier to communicate via an 
electronic flowchart. The fact that the supplier plant manager filled in the flowchart himself 
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followed VCG’s focus on flexibility. As SAG1’s developmental culture resulted in honest 
answers and even appreciation for the flowchart’s usefulness, VCG successfully increased 
behaviour control on SAG1. SAG2’s hierarchical culture, however, resulted in answers and 
scores that did not reflect reality. That way, VCG failed to increase behaviour control on 
SAG2. In other words, SAG1’s resembling culture heightened the effectiveness of VCG-
SAG1 communication by reinforcing proper information exchange towards VCG’s 
flowchart control technique. A similar positive influence of cultural resemblance on the 
level of behaviour control is proposed by Aquilon (1997) and Luo (2002).  
Second, VCG was able to increase behaviour control on SAG1’s internal 
processes due to increased communication. Although also this effect of cultural 
resemblance is documented in the literature by Chen, Chen & Meindl (1998) and 
McAllister (1995), our results add that not VCG, but SAG1 took the initiative for the 
increased communication. Because of its developmental culture, SAG1 offered 
opportunities to strengthen the open personal relationship with VCG by inviting VCG 
managers and shop floor workers. During these visits, VCG met SAG1 and SA1 managers, 
who showed and discussed upcoming changes and instantly answered expected VCG 
questions. So besides socializing, VCG controlled SAG1 activities and made suggestions 
for improvement by interacting with well informed supplier employees at the supplier 
facility, which are VCG’s preferred circumstances. SAG2, however, did not invite VCG 
personnel to the supplier facility during the project phase, as SAG2’s hierarchical culture 
did not focus on VCG involvement and VCG did not demand such visits.  
Third, VCG’s trust building in SAG1 and SAG2 substantially differed. Consistent 
with prior literature (Das & Teng, 1998; Luo, 2002), VCG built more trust in SAG1 based 
on SAG1’s resembling cultural values. This cultural resemblance eased cultural blending, 
so that socialization between VCG and SAG1 was strengthened and values and norms were 
shared more easily. The resulting inter-organizational familiarity helped building trust. 
Similar insights can be found in the literature. For example, Gulati (1995) finds that lower 
cultural inconsistency between alliance partners leads to less equity based alliances with 
more trust. For MSRs, this means that VCG will have more confidence in its ability to 
predict supplier behaviour, if both parties’ cultures are more resembling (Bierly III & 
Gallagher, 2007; Park & Ungson, 1997). In the VCG-SAG1 relation, this confidence 
resulted from several competence trust enhancing signals. Supported by SAG1’s large 
focus on VCG and resulting interaction, these signals confirmed that the supplier was 
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willing to invest in the relation (van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2004).  SA1, in 
particular the “owner” Mr Z, provided SAG1 with considerable attention and financial 
resources to cope with unforeseen difficulties and to keep monthly contact with VCC’s 
R&D department. So besides enhancing behaviour control, SAG1’s cultural resemblance 
facilitated trust building (Luo, 2002). From SAG2, however, VCG did not receive any 
signals to increase trust. In fact, when SAG2 got into a position to signal competence, i.e. 
when there was full running production and SAG2 ran up against the first difficulties, 
SAG2 damaged VCG’s competence trust by showing a lack of preparation and learning 
capacities. The same holds for VCG’s low level of goodwill trust, which entirely 
evaporated when SAG2 acted opportunistically by refusing timely communication and 
openness on issues that VCG wanted to discuss.  
Taken together, VCG’s MCS on SAG2 was not changed at the start of production, 
so that it got into misfit and contributed to a decrease in performance, as proposed by the 
theoretical model. Indeed, comparing SAG2’s degree of MCS fit and performance provides 
considerable evidence of the fit-performance association, underlying previous inter-
organizational MCS studies like Dekker (2004). In 2004, SAG2 struggled after starting 
module production and delivery for two new extra Volvo models. As VCG’s MCS no 
longer fitted SAG2’s heightened risks, the MCS aggravated performance, so that 
operational difficulties seriously escalated. As a result, VCG changed the MCS design 
towards a design fitting the level of risks. Supported by the new contingency fit, operational 
performance rapidly picked up. Therefore, we conclude that the VCG-SAG2 relation 
effectively illustrates the fit-performance association. That way, we support earlier findings 
of Ittner et al. (1999) and Anderson & Dekker (2005), stipulating that a MCS fitting 
situational characteristics benefits performance. Nevertheless, our longitudinal data on 
several periods refine their findings with respect to the actual dynamics of the fit-
performance association. Operational difficulties followed a MCS misfit resulting from 
changed contingencies, while operational improvements only set in when the MCS fitted 
the new situation. Furthermore, the evolution from MCS misfit to MCS fit did not occur 
immediately, but took VCG several attempts. 
  VCG’s final attempt implied actively and deliberately influencing supplier 
decision making to install a plant manger of their choice, in particular Mr Y, who VCG 
already trusted highly because of many years of experience and STVC involvement. In 
addition, Mr Y was susceptible to social pressure due to his personal relation with VCG 
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managers, good reputation and active involvement in the STVC. That way, we conclude 
that VCG created an adequate environment for the turnaround by specifically choosing Mr 
Y and instantly installing an informal control level that fitted the new situation and revived 
SAG2’s performance. A close examination of our data learns that this informal control 
increase via Mr Y coincided with Mr Y initiating a change in SAG2’s culture. As head of 
SAG2, Mr Y lowered SAG2’s hierarchical structure. To that end, he eliminated the level of 
shop floor team leaders and started to frequently visit the shop floor himself to discuss 
issues directly with shop floor workers. These changes are associated with Mr Y managing 
SAG2 like it was his own company. Mr Y worked day and night to resolve recurring 
problems and to search for their causes in open collaboration with SAG2 shop floor 
workers and VCG staff. Previous SAG2 plant managers neither put in that much effort, nor 
allowed large VCG involvement due to a different management style. This style complied 
with SA2’s tight job description, which was in line with SA2’s American culture. Mr Y, 
however, was well aware of the difference between SA2’s culture and his own business 
attitude. Therefore, he deliberately reacted against SA2’s cultural influence and shielded 
SAG2 from it as much as possible. VCG’s pressure on SA2 to finally resolve SAG2 
production difficulties and to support Mr Y in changing SAG2 helped Mr Y to successfully 
introduce his values in SAG2. To that end, he pushed through his business attitude on his 
new group of middle level managers. That way, Mr Y initiated a shift in SAG2’s culture 
from a hierarchical culture towards a developmental culture. Thus, assisted by the CVM 
conceptualization of organizational culture, our case demonstrates cultural dynamics, on 
which further study was called for by Baskerville (2003) and Harrison & McKinnon 
(1999). Furthermore, our data confirm that the relation between organizational culture and 
management control is not a simple matter of cause and effect (Henri, 2006; Scheytt & 
Soin, 2006). In fact, we find that VCG’s MCS influenced the degree of SAG2’s cultural 
resemblance by adapting the supplier’s culture via its plant manager Mr Y. 
Still, this influence on SAG2’s culture was the result of a substantial difference in 
organizational culture, on which VCG had no control.
60 Indeed, given VCG’s 
developmental culture, the OEM was lucky to work with a developmental supplier as 
                                                 
60 VCG lacked this control, because the OEM was not responsible for supplier choice, on which the VCC purchase 
department decided. Consequently, VCG had no other choice than to work with the supplier appointed by VCC 
and deal with its organizational culture. 
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SAG1, but just as well had bad luck to work with a hierarchical supplier as SAG2.
61 
Consequently, the awareness of the influence of supplier cultural resemblance on the speed 
of MCS increase might have helped VCG. Indeed, comparing SAG2 and SAG1 MCS 
dynamics illustrates that SAG2’s lack of control was associated with SAG2’s low cultural 
resemblance. Given awareness of this association, VCG managers might have responded by 
anticipating slower MCS dynamics when contingencies changed and installing additional 
management control. 
Yet, to that end, VCG first needed to be aware of their own values, the values on 
which the suppliers relied and resulting differences, as proposed by Ireland (2002) and 
confirmed by Henri (2006). VCG employees considered themselves as a family, also with 
respect to suppliers, on which they strongly focused via the STVC. A supplier like SAG1, 
with a resembling culture, responded to this behaviour by acting as part of the family. A 
supplier like SAG2, with a different culture, thought of VCG as the customer, which was 
not allowed to get involved in the supplier’s functioning. Assessing this kind of supplier 
values would have benefited VCG’s awareness of cultural differences. In that respect, our 
case confirms the usefulness of applying the CVM for describing organizational culture (cf 
Bhimani, 2003; Henri, 2006). Based on the CVM model, we were able to clearly 
distinguish the difference in cultural resemblance between SAG1’s developmental culture 
and SAG2’s hierarchical culture, compared to VCG’s developmental culture. That way, 
VCG managers have a specific means to assess a supplier’s degree of cultural resemblance.  
Besides demonstrating the need for VCG awareness on a supplier’s cultural 
resemblance, the SAG2 case also shows the importance of VCG awareness on the role of 
informal control, especially in times of important changes. During SAG2’s problem 
escalation, VCG managers were not sufficiently aware of the fact that they needed to 
heighten informal control on SAG2 by reinstalling more trust and installing social pressure. 
Despite VCG emphasising the reliance on personal relations and informal control, they 
really ignored this part of their MCS on SAG2. Consequently, they needed two 
                                                 
61 Based on previous case study and case analysis, it might seem that we have a preference for a developmental 
culture with open collaboration, linked to a relatively small scale privately owned horizontal organization. Yet, 
that is not the case. The point at issue is that VCG has a developmental culture and therefore a specific MCS with 
certain behaviour towards suppliers. Depending on whether the supplier’s culture resembles VCG’s developmental 
culture, this MCS will change faster. Thus, given VCG’s developmental culture, VCG’s MCS is better off with a 
supplier like SAG1, which has a resembling developmental culture.      
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unsuccessful attempts and faced increasing delivery problems, before they effectively 
increased informal control on SAG2 via its plant manager to fit the level of risks. So, 
without awareness on the reliance on informal control, the importance of increasing 
informal control is underestimated, either when contingencies drastically heighten risks or 
when the supplier damages trust by making errors or acting opportunistically. Furthermore, 
this awareness needs to be present at all levels of manufacturer and supplier management 
interacting with each other. Only that way, informal control, especially trust building, will 
not result in time losses when difficulties arise. As argued in the literature (Bierly III & 
Gallagher, 2007; Heikkilä, 2002; Stalk 1988), these time losses must be avoided to stand up 
to the fierce competition in the current economic (automotive) environment. 
7.  Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the inter-organizational management control literature by 
exploring the impact of cultural resemblance on the management control of manufacturer-
supplier relationships. Although MCSs are contingent on situational characteristics and this 
contingency fit is associated with good performance (Donaldson, 2001), it remains unclear 
which variables contribute to the speed of MCS change, so that temporary misfits due to 
changing circumstances are less likely to occur (van Veen-Dirks, 2006). Further research 
on these variables is justified, as a MCS misfit and associated decreasing operational 
performance might harm any manufacturer, until the misfitted MCS is changed towards a 
more appropriate design (Dekker, 2004; van Veen-Dirks, 2006). Organizational culture, in 
particular the degree of supplier cultural resemblance to the manufacturer’s culture, is 
proposed to be such a variable due to its impact on the design and use of the MCS 
(Chenhall, 2003; Harrison & McKinnon, 1999; Merchant, 1998; van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000). Also in strategic alliances, cultural differences between interacting 
parties make the alliance difficult to manage (de Rond, 2003; White & Lui, 2005) and may 
negatively influence performance (Dekker, 2004; Ireland, 2002; Kale et al., 2000). Hence, 
further research is called for on the role of organizational cultural resemblance in the MCS 
fit-performance association (Harrison & McKinnon, 1999; Henri, 2006), especially for 
other types of IORs, like MSRs, for which this type of research remains scarce (Chenhall, 
2003; Scheytt & Soin, 2006). The preferable method for such research is a qualitative case 
study, aiming to obtain an in-depth insight into the case companies’ cultures and compare 
the impact of different degrees of supplier cultural resemblance on the dynamics of MCS 
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design in times of changing circumstances (Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Chenhall, 2003; 
Henri, 2006; Scheytt & Soin, 2006).  
Therefore, we studied changes in two similar high value-added just-in-sequence 
MSRs that differ with respect to cultural resemblance in the manufacturing phase of the 
supply chain, relatively under-explored in the inter-organizational management control 
literature (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). More 
specifically, we investigated the relations between a Volvo Cars facility (VCG) and two 
module supplier facilities (SAG1 and SAG2) in the automotive industry, characterized by 
competitive pressure and continuous improvement (Carr & Ng, 1995). To refine inter-
organizational management control theory, we proposed a theoretical contingency 
framework including the dynamic associations between supplier cultural resemblance, 
MCS design, degree of MCS fit on contingencies and risks, and operational performance. 
The real contribution of our case study followed from its longitudinal design, because only 
this design allowed effectively exploring the impact of cultural resemblance on the timing 
of MCS changes and the impact of fit on performance in the course of time, following a 
severe contingency change. The theoretical proposition was that supplier cultural 
resemblance is positively associated with the speed at which the MCS changes, so that it 
keeps (or quickly regains) its fit in case of changing contingencies.  
Our longitudinal data, which are structured and interpreted by means of the 
temporal bracketing and variance methods (Rowe et al., 2008), provide substantial evidence 
supporting this theoretical proposition. The functioning of VCG’s MCS benefited from a 
resembling supplier culture, as proposed by Harrison & McKinnon (1999) and Henri 
(2006). As SAG1’s culture resembled VCG’s culture, upcoming contingency changes were 
appropriately anticipated by increased management control during the project phase, before 
contingencies actually changed. Consequently, the higher level of management control 
immediately fitted the risks increase at the start of production and contributed to sustaining 
good performance. Oppositely, SAG2’s culture differed from VCG’s culture, so that 
adjusting SAG2’s MCS to the changing circumstances required more time. In particular, 
SAG2’s level of management control only grew about six months after the start of 
production and then needed six more months and three attempts to get fitted on the new 
situation. As proposed, the resulting MCS misfit contributed to escalating operational 
difficulties, until VCG changed the MCS. In sum, this twofold case study illustrates the 
substantial impact of resembling organizational cultures on the timing of MCS changes in 
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MSRs and therefore supports prior alliance research findings of White & Lui (2005). In 
addition, the VCG-SAG2 relationship provided considerable evidence of the dynamic fit-
performance association, as assumed by e.g. Dekker (2004). By showing that operational 
difficulties followed a MCS misfit, while operational improvements only set in when the 
MCS fitted the new situation, we support and refine earlier findings of Ittner et al. (1999) 
and Anderson & Dekker (2005). 
Furthermore, the case clearly showed how high cultural resemblance contributed 
to VCG’s speed of MCS change. As argued by Bierly III & Gallagher (2007), VCG was 
able to evaluate SAG1 earlier than SAG2 based on three management control enhancing 
mechanisms. Although these mechanisms result from our case data, they correspond to 
earlier findings in the literature, which supports their external validity. First, VCG increased 
behaviour control on SAG1, because SAG1’s resembling developmental culture led to 
proper information exchange towards VCG’s flowchart control technique (Aquilon, 1997; 
Luo, 2002). Conversely, SAG2’s hierarchical culture led to answers and scores that did not 
reflect reality. Second, SAG1’s resembling developmental culture made the supplier invite 
VCG managers and shop floor workers to control SAG1 activities and make suggestions for 
improvement. Consequently, VCG’s behaviour control on SAG1’s internal processes was 
increased due to increased communication (Chen et al., 1998; McAllister, 1995) on the 
initiative of the supplier. Third, VCG built more trust in SAG1, the supplier with 
resembling culture, consistent with prior literature (Bierly III & Gallagher, 2007; Das & 
Teng, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Luo, 2002; Park & Ungson, 1997). To that end, VCG received 
several competence trust enhancing signals (van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2004) 
due to SAG1’s large focus on VCG and resulting interaction. 
Finally, the VCG-SAG2 relation showed a very specific management control 
technique, namely deliberately influencing supplier decision making to install a new plant 
manager (Mr Y) of the manufacturer’s choice and  that way influencing the supplier’s 
culture. The first finding made us conclude that VCG created an adequate environment for 
SAG2’s turnaround by specifically choosing Mr Y and instantly increasing the level of 
informal control to fit the new situation. The second finding learned that Mr Y initiated a 
shift in SAG2’s culture from a hierarchical culture towards a developmental culture. In 
other words, VCG’s MCS influenced the degree of SAG2’s cultural resemblance by 
shifting its culture via its plant manager. That way, our case demonstrated cultural 
dynamics, as called for by Baskerville (2003) and Harrison & McKinnon (1999) and 
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confirmed that the relation between organizational culture and management control is not a 
simple matter of cause and effect (Henri, 2006; Scheytt & Soin, 2006). Obviously, these 
findings benefited from conceptualizing organizational culture via the CVM, as this model 
clearly distinguished SAG1’s developmental culture and SAG2’s hierarchical culture and 
allowed culture to shift by means of the notion of dominant types. That way, our study 
contributes to the literature by demonstrating the usefulness of applying the CVM for 
describing organizational culture in qualitative studies, as proposed by Bhimani (2003).  
Besides researchers, also manufacturer management might use the CVM and 
associated supplier characteristics as a mean to assess supplier cultural resemblance. Yet, to 
that end, managers first need to be aware of the importance of such assessment. 
Undoubtedly, this awareness forms an important lesson of this study for VCG and other 
manufacturers. In particular, they should be aware of the influence of supplier cultural 
resemblance on the speed of MCS dynamics, in case contingencies change. That way, 
slower MCS changes can be anticipated and responded to by installing additional controls. 
To that end, the manufacturer needs to be aware of the own values, the values on which the 
suppliers rely and resulting differences, as proposed by Ireland (2002) and confirmed by 
Henri (2006). Finally, the SAG2 case also shows the importance of awareness on the role of 
informal control, especially in times of important changes. During SAG2’s problem 
escalation, VCG managers were not sufficiently aware of the fact that they needed to 
heighten informal control on SAG2, so that they needed two unsuccessful attempts and 
faced increasing supply problems. Hence, only by being aware of the reliance on informal 
control, this control type, especially trust building, will not result in time losses when 
difficulties arise.  
Although the case study method was specifically chosen for its methodological 
qualities for studying the dynamics of an extensive MCS, we acknowledge studying only 
two supplier relationships of one manufacturer hampers generalizing our findings. First, it 
is uncertain whether a different manufacturer, whether or not with a differing culture, 
would lead to similar results. For example, it remains unclear whether manufacturers 
without a supplier team, which provides the opportunity to build personal relations with 
supplier managers, are able to choose supplier managers to their advantage. Second, we 
have no idea to what extent our findings hold for other types of MSRs than the two high 
value-added JIS MSRs in our case. Third, theoretical suitability made us chose two MSRs 
that extremely diverged with respect to supplier cultural resemblance, so that a comparison 
165 Manuscript 3 
would lead to substantially different insights. Yet, at the same time, these extreme MSRs 
might not be representative for other MSRs. Fourth, we do not exactly know to what extent 
the learning curve impacted the performance of SAG1 and SAG2 when contingencies 
changed. Before the changes in 2004, SAG1 successfully completed a start-up in 1996 and 
a new Volvo model introduction in 2000, while SAG2 only successfully completed the 
start-up in 2000. Also the turnaround of SAG2 performance in 2005, after Mr Y took over, 
might be influenced by organizational learning. Fifth, we abstracted from previous supply 
chain phases, like procurement and R&D, so that it remains unclear to what extent these 
supply chain phases impact the supplier relationships during manufacturing. Nevertheless, 
the limited generalizability immediately offers a first avenue for future research, which 
could compare our findings to other MSRs between other companies, both in the 
automotive industry and others like consumer electronics.  
A second avenue for further research might be to design a real-time longitudinal 
case study, instead of a retrospective case like in this paper. Although finding access to 
study contingency changes, MCS dynamics and potential operational difficulties at the 
moment of occurrence will probably be a big challenge, the advantage is clear. Real-time 
data, especially from interviews, are more accurate. Although our study’s data came from 
both VCG and supplier managers, and were triangulated with performance data, we admit 
that managers’ opinions on events were probably biased two years after the events 
occurred. Moreover, the retrospective research design prohibited us from interviewing the 
initial SAG2 managers, so that their perceptions on the events were not available. A real-
time study could cope with these limitations. 
A third avenue for further research could investigate the effect of cultural 
differences between other culture types of the CVM. Our study focused on the comparison 
between hierarchical and developmental culture, following its explicative power in the 
study of Bhimani (2003). Hence, whether comparisons between other culture types, like 
group versus rational or group versus developmental, fit our theoretical model and lead to 
similar results remains unknown. Moreover, this future research stream might benefit from 
introducing a completely different conceptualization of organizational culture, for example 
based on the “Organizational Culture for Diversity Inventory” (OCDI) (Cooke and Szumal 
1993; Whitfield & Landeros, 2006), and investigate whether this conceptualization leads to 
different results.  
Fourth, further research might take on the position of the supplier, contrary to this 
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paper’s position of the manufacturer. Insights from a culture assessment from within the 
supplier, instead of an assessment from the outside, might shed more light on the role of 
cultural resemblance in MSRs. For example, prior research found that buyer and supplier 
have different perceptions about their relationship (John & Reve, 1982). In case that 
perception difference also concerns each other’s culture, it might influence MCS dynamics.  
A fifth research avenue could examine the impact of supplier cultural resemblance 
on the level of risks. This theoretical association was not included in our model due to our 
conceptualization of risk, namely objective risk, inherent in a given MSR and influenced by 
four supply contingencies (Das & Teng, 2001). This objective risk is not associated with 
supplier cultural resemblance. Yet, subjective risk, i.e. the manager’s estimate of objective 
risk (Das & Teng, 2001), might be. Because of a lower level of supplier cultural 
resemblance, the manufacturer might perceive the level of risks higher, given the same 
level of contingency variables. By way of illustration, consider the VCG-SAG2 relationship 
in 2004. Assuming that VCG was sufficiently aware of the cultural differences (which in 
reality was not the case), VCG might have perceived SAG2 as unable to adequately cope 
with changes imposed by the manufacturer, which would have increased perceived 
performance risk (McAfee, Glassman & Honeycutt Jr., 2002). In addition, VCG might have 
perceived SAG2 as unable or unwilling to openly interact and communicate with VCG, 
which would have augmented perceived relational risk (Luo, 2002). It must be clear that 
our study was unsuited to investigate the association of supplier cultural resemblance and 
perceived risks, as we examined events as objectively as possible after they occurred. Our 
focus lied on inherent risks only, in order to gain an understanding of the existence of these 
risks in the absence of any management controls (cf Anderson, Christ & Sedatole, 2006). 
Nevertheless, the association between supplier cultural resemblance and subjective risks is 
worth studying, maybe by means of a survey, which could ask manufacturer staff to grade 
their perceived risks on a (e.g. seven-point) Likert-scale. Subsequently, this survey would 
allow a quantitative analysis of the potential mediating impact. 
A sixth and final avenue for further research might examine other potential MCS 
influencing variables not addressed in this study. Two of those variables might be 
relationship length and fair benefit sharing, already proposed to be influential by Dekker 




The general purpose of this doctoral dissertation is to contribute to the unravelling of MCS 
design for supplier relationships in the manufacturing phase of the supply chain. As the 
economic environment demands an effective supply chain, supplier relationships have a 
high potential impact on performance, if effectively governed (Anderson & Dekker, 2005; 
Ittner et al., 1999). Nevertheless, inter-organizational MCSs only recently received 
substantial interest in the literature (Dekker, 2003). As a result, the role of inter-
organizational MCSs has been studied from several angles, including outsourcing relations 
(e.g. Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003), inter-organizational cost management relations (e.g. 
Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), strategic alliances (e.g. Dekker 2004), and joint ventures (e.g. 
Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). Yet, the main emphasis lied on relational 
collaboration during the procurement and R&D phases of the supply chain. Although this 
historical focus is certainly justified, MCS design in another supply chain phase, namely 
manufacturing, remains relatively under-explored (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Langfield-
Smith & Smith, 2003). Purchased products and services for manufacturing, however, 
account for more than 60% of the average company’s total costs (Degraeve & Roodhooft, 
2001) and are subject to numerous joint cost reduction programs with suppliers that also 
require effective management control (Gietzmann, 1996; Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005; Seal et 
al., 1999). Therefore, this dissertation specifically studies MCS design for supplier relations 
in the manufacturing phase of the supply chain. To that end, the dissertation contains three 
manuscripts, of which each has a specific research objective.  
As a general conclusion, we highlight the most important contributions of the 
empirical findings of these manuscripts to the inter-organizational management control 
literature. Next, we suggest potential implications for business practice. Finally, we end this 
section with several suggestions for future research.  
1.  Contributions to the academic literature 
The academic contributions of this dissertation are threefold. First, the dissertation 
contributes to the literature by illustrating MCS design for the relatively under-explored 
MSRs from both a static and dynamic perspective. More specifically, our case study offers 
empirical evidence on the importance of informal control (manuscript 1) and the dynamic 
relation between formal control and trust (manuscript 2). The second contribution concerns 
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explaining MCS design for MSRs, again both statically and dynamically. Using a 
contingency theory lens, the dissertation offers insights into variables that affect static 
cross-sectional MCS design (manuscript 1), MCS dynamics over time (manuscript 2), the 
speed of these MCS dynamics (manuscript 3) and the association with performance 
(manuscripts 2 and 3). Third, our dissertation makes some methodological contribution 
with respect to the object under study, i.e. fluctuating performance (manuscripts 2 and 3), 
and the model for organizational culture, i.e. the Competing Values Model (manuscript 3). 
The following paragraphs discuss these contributions in greater detail. 
1.1.  Illustrating MCS design for MSRs  
Manuscript 1 contributes to the academic literature by illustrating MCS design for MSRs 
and how important informal controls are in that design. Contrary to supplier relations 
during procurement and R&D, which research found to be governed by a combination of 
formal and informal controls (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Dekker, 2004; Kamminga & 
van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007), MSRs are more formal, so that they could be governed by 
primarily formal controls with little informal controls (Das & Teng, 2001; Bijlsma-
Frankema & Costa, 2005). To investigate these management controls of hybrid MSRs, we 
use transaction cost economics theory (Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1985, 1991, 1993, 1996), 
supplemented with relational perspectives in order to make up for TCE’s negligence of 
social controls (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Gietzmann, 1996). Consequently, our 
conceptualization of a MCS includes both formal and informal controls (Langfield-Smith & 
Smith, 2003).  
Findings of an in-depth case study of VCG’s MCS design for a cross-section of 
eight MSRs at one point in time contradict that MSRs are governed by little informal 
control. Besides formal outcome and behaviour controls, VCG pays considerable attention 
to informal control, more specifically to different kinds of trust building techniques and 
social pressure. In that respect, the most striking finding of the first manuscript is the 
existence and the role of a structured supplier team (STVC) in controlling MSRs. In fact, 
the STVC functions as a clan which not only structures, and that way strengthens, trust 
building and social pressure, but also extends this control towards all JIS suppliers. Hence, 
the case findings of the first manuscript strengthen the external validity of prior case 
findings on less formal IORs, like R&D collaboration (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004), 
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strategic alliances (Dekker, 2004) and joint ventures (Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 
2007). 
Manuscript 2 extends this static contribution with respect to MCS design by 
refining the dynamic relation between formal control and trust, i.e. the outcome of informal 
trust building (Anderson & Dekker, 2005; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2006). 
More specifically, the second manuscript’s longitudinal data on VCG’s MCS of one 
particular MSR suggest that formal control and trust are complements and substitutes at the 
same time, depending on the level of formal control. By distinguishing two categories of 
formal control based on our findings, it appears that trust and basic formal control (i.e. 
formal control continuously exercised under all circumstances) are complements, while 
trust and extra formal control (i.e. formal control set up on top of basic formal control) are 
substitutes. Compared to prior research, this result contradicts earlier findings of Chiles & 
McMackin (1996) (substitutes), Poppo & Zenger (2002) (complements) and Klein 
Woolthuis et al. (2005) (either complements or substitutes, but not in one IOR). In addition, 
the result refines findings of Dekker (2004) and Van den Abbeele (2006) by showing that 
trust and formal control are both complements and substitutes in one IOR at the same time 
of the relation life cycle. Finally, the data indicate a timing difference in the substitutive 
relation. The building up of extra formal control proceeds gradually, while the lowering 
happens almost immediately. That way, our findings support that the complementary-
substitutive ambiguity in the literature might be the result of earlier studies neglecting MCS 
dynamics (Van den Abbeele, 2006).  
1.2.  Explaining MCS design for MSRs  
Manuscript 1 further contributes to the literature by explaining MCS design, since evidence 
on contingency theory’s explicative power in MSRs remains limited. With respect to 
Donaldson’s (2001) categorization of contingency theory elements, manuscript 1 concerns 
the first element, proposing that certain contingencies are associated with MCS design. To 
investigate this proposition, we suggest a refined theoretical contingency framework for 
MSRs, set up from the position of the manufacturer and based on recent inter-
organizational management control theory. In particular, the theoretical foundations for the 
included risks and contingencies, which influence MCS design, are transaction cost 
economics theory and organization theory. The first theory emphasizes the possibility of 
supplier opportunistic behaviour and provides two contingencies positively associated with 
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this relational risk, namely environmental uncertainty and relational stability aim 
(Williamson, 1979). Following prior studies (e.g. Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; van der 
Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000) using TCE frameworks to conceptualize inter-
organizational MCS design, we also incorporate supplier knowledge importance as 
contingency variable. Second, organization theory supplements TCE’s risk of opportunism 
by identifying the risk of a supply chain interruption and the need to coordinate the MSR 
and control for this performance risk. Regarding contingencies, organization theory 
proposes that task uncertainty and task interdependence are positively associated with this 
risk (Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Dekker, 2004).  
The contribution of the explanatory case study lies in illustrating the validity of the 
resulting contingency framework in practice by showing substantial evidence of the 
proposed associations. More specifically, the identification of three supplier types, namely 
batch, low value-added just-in-sequence and high value-added just-in-sequence suppliers, 
characterized by different levels of contingencies and risks, visualizes the association with 
VCG’s MCS designed to govern the risks. For example, high value-added just-in-sequence 
suppliers score relatively high on all contingencies and subsequently on both performance 
and relational risk. Consequently, VCG designs the MCS accordingly, with high levels of 
outcome control, behaviour control, trust building and social pressure. That way, our case 
findings illustrate the framework’s explicative power in automotive manufacturing. As our 
theoretical framework drew on findings concerning MCS design of other less formal IORs 
(e.g. Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Dekker, 2004; Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 
2007), the case not only confirms that MSRs are governed depending on situational 
characteristics, but also offers more evidence of those findings’ external validity. Hence, by 
studying an under-explored phase of the supply chain, for which the literature proposes 
different supplier MCS designs, the first manuscript contributes to the literature by reducing 
a perceived gap between literature and management practice, as called for by Nixon & 
Burns (2005).  
Contrary to manuscript 1’s contingency study of cross-sectional MCS design at 
one point in time, manuscript 2 aims at illustrating MCS dynamics  over  time and the 
association with performance. More specifically, the second manuscript contributes to the 
literature by refining the dynamics of the fit-performance association, the third and most 
important element of contingency theory (Donaldson, 2001). This association proposes that 
a fit between the level of management control and the level of contingencies and risks, as 
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found in manuscript 1, is positively associated with performance. Although some studies 
provide theoretical models incorporating this association (e.g. Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005), 
most research only assumes this association to hold (Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 
2007). As a result, case research is proposed to be a powerful tool to further investigate the 
fit-performance association, especially by means of a longitudinal design, which allows 
effectively exploring the impact of fit on performance in the course of time by the sequence 
of events (Ittner et al., 1999; Dekker, 2004). Therefore, manuscript 2 contributes to the 
literature by performing an in-depth longitudinal follow-up case study of an exemplary high 
value-added just-in-sequence VCG supplier relationship that was subject to a considerable 
change and severe performance difficulties in the course of time.  
As proposed (cf Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007; van Veen-Dirks, 
2006), case findings show that when the supplier was incapable of dealing with the changed 
contingencies, a MCS contingency misfit was associated with poor operational 
performance. That way, this case effectively illustrates the static fit-performance 
association, underlying previous inter-organizational MCS studies like Dekker (2004) and 
manuscript 1 of this dissertation. Furthermore, the case supports earlier findings of Ittner et 
al. (1999) and Anderson & Dekker (2005). Nevertheless, the between period comparisons 
of our longitudinal data refine their findings with respect to the dynamics of the fit-
performance association. The MCS misfit was only temporal, as VCG adapted the MCS to 
fit the changed MSR and regain performance. Furthermore, the case demonstrates the 
importance of informal control on supplier management, as formal controls appeared 
unable to overcome operational difficulties and a turnaround only set in when informal 
controls were sufficiently installed. In that respect, the case also clarifies the active role of 
VCG in establishing trust building and social pressure by choosing a suitable supplier plant 
manager. This choice created a leap of trust in the supplier, which also shows that trust not 
always has to be built up gradually.  
Summarizing these contributions, manuscripts 1 and 2 illustrate the validity of all 
three elements of Donaldson’s (2001) categorization of contingency theory for the under-
explored MSRs: (1) the static fit between contingencies and MCS design in manuscript 1, 
(2) the dynamic fit between contingencies and MCS design in manuscript 2 and (3) the fit-
performance association, both statically and dynamically, also in manuscript 2. With 
reference to the third element, manuscript 2’s case study shows the negative consequence 
of a misfitted MCS, namely decreasing performance, and illustrates VCG’s attempts to 
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change the MCS and regain a MCS fit. Following up on these findings, it is worthwhile to 
investigate variables that influence the speed of this MCS change, so that temporary MCS 
misfits due to changing circumstances are less likely to occur (Kamminga & van der Meer-
Kooistra, 2007; van Veen-Dirks, 2006). Since the manufacturer’s MCS is the material 
artefact of its underlying organizational culture (Rousseau, 1990), the degree of supplier 
cultural resemblance to the manufacturer’s culture might be such a variable (Harrison & 
McKinnon, 1999; Henri, 2006). Therefore, the third manuscript contributes to the literature 
by illustrating the effect of different degrees of supplier cultural resemblance on the 
dynamics of MCS design in times of changing circumstances, as called for by Anderson & 
Dekker (2005), Chenhall (2003) and Scheytt & Soin (2006). To that end, we extended the 
longitudinal case study of the second manuscript with a similar high value-added just-in-
sequence VCG MSR that only differed with respect to supplier cultural resemblance.  
Findings show that the functioning of VCG’s MCS benefited from a resembling 
supplier culture, as proposed by Harrison & McKinnon (1999) and Henri (2006). In case of 
high cultural resemblance, the speed of increasing the level of management control was 
higher, which supports prior findings of White & Lui (2005). That way, upcoming changes 
were appropriately anticipated by an increase in the level of management control, already 
before contingencies actually changed. Yet, the main contribution of the third manuscript 
regards illustrating how high cultural resemblance contributed to VCG’s speed of MCS 
change. As argued by Bierly III & Gallagher (2007), VCG was able to evaluate the 
resembling supplier earlier by means of three mechanisms that enhance management 
control according to earlier findings in the literature: proper information exchange 
(Aquilon, 1997; Luo, 2002), increased communication (Chen et al., 1998; McAllister, 
1995) on the initiative of the supplier and trust enhancing signals (van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2004).  
The previous summary of this dissertation’s contributions on explaining MCS 
design for MSRs demonstrates the consecutive character of the three manuscripts, both 
theoretically and empirically. With respect to theory, the second manuscript extends the 
theoretical framework of manuscript 1 by adding the relation between degree of MCS fit 
and performance and introducing dynamics in the previously static associations. The third 
manuscript’s framework builds on the dynamic associations of manuscript 2 by introducing 
a variable that influences the speed of MCS dynamics, namely supplier cultural 
resemblance. That way, manuscripts 2 and 3 address the role of two variables, namely 
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performance and organizational culture respectively, which were already put forward in 
manuscript 1, but remained unaddressed. Regarding empirics, manuscript 2’s longitudinal 
case follows up on manuscript 1’s cross-sectional case by investigating one of the eight 
MSRs more in-depth and over time. Also the case of manuscript 3 is a follow-up study. 
More specifically, this manuscript resumes VCG’s MCS design findings of manuscript 1 
and then compares longitudinal findings on the VCG-SAG2 relation of manuscript 2 with 
longitudinal findings on a similar MSR (VCG-SAG1) that differs with respect to cultural 
resemblance. Consequently, both manuscripts 2 and 3 reiterate certain findings of prior 
manuscripts, as they are written as stand-alone papers. Yet, these reiterations serve their 
purpose in answering the research questions of the manuscripts. More specifically, the 
VCG-SAG case in manuscript 2 is used to illustrate the association between a MCS 
fit/misfit and performance over time. In manuscript 1, however, the same case relation 
provides evidence on the MCS design of the specific type of high value-added just-in-
sequence MSRs at one point in time. Furthermore, the VCG-SAG case is also studied in 
manuscript 3 to contrast the effect of low and high cultural resemblance on MCS dynamics. 
Finally, manuscript 3 only resumes VCG’s MCS design findings of manuscript 1 in order 
to clarify the effect of VCG’s culture on the MCS design.  
In other words, each manuscript’s theoretical framework and case research design 
suit the manuscript’s specific research question. As these research questions are follow-up 
questions in the context of a larger doctoral dissertation, so are the theoretical frameworks 
and case studies to study the questions. For an additional research question in a follow-up 
manuscript, we extend the theoretical framework of the previous manuscript with an 
additional construct and gather additional data. Based on the analysis of both old and new 
data, the additional research question is then answered by additional insights that converge 
with the insights of the previous manuscript. For example, the potential influence of 
organizational culture and cultural resemblance was already put forward in manuscripts 1 
and 2, but remained unaddressed until manuscript 3 due to the limited scope of one research 
paper. By devoting a complete study to these influences, extending the existing theoretical 
framework and gathering more case data, manuscript 3 provides additional insights on the 
findings of manuscripts 1 and 2. Consider the additional insights from re-analysing the 
VCG-SAG2 case findings of manuscript 2 from a different theoretical viewpoint based on 
the extra theoretical construct of supplier cultural resemblance. The comparison with the 
additional MSR (VCG-SAG1) definitely led to an important new insight, namely the 
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identification of three mechanisms affecting the speed of MCS change, which the VCG-
SAG2 relation lacked due to a lower degree of supplier cultural resemblance. Yet, also 
another finding of manuscript 2 was re-interpreted, namely the fact that continuing 
operational difficulties made VCG influence supplier decision making to install a plant 
manager of VCG’s choice, namely Mr Y. By including the additional perspective of 
organizational culture in the analysis, manuscript 3 explains how Mr Y initiated a shift in 
SAG2’s culture to a more developmental culture, resembling VCG’s culture. That way, the 
analysis in manuscript 3 shows that the VCG-SAG2 case also demonstrates cultural 
dynamics, on which further study was called for by Baskerville (2003) and Harrison & 
McKinnon (1999). Hence, it must be clear that the insights of manuscript 3 add to the 
insights of manuscript 2 and converge with the findings of manuscript 2 in explaining cause 
and consequence of MCS dynamics in case of changing contingencies. 
1.3.  Research methodology  
The final main contribution of our dissertation is methodological. First, manuscripts 2 and 3 
contribute to the literature by specifically focusing on a changing MSR with fluctuating 
performance, contrary to the literature, which seems to under-value in-depth research into 
poor performance by primarily studying success instead of failure. Obviously, we can learn 
a lot from investigating good performance, but we believe we can learn even more from 
looking into operational difficulties. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the issue seriously 
hampering this kind of research, namely finding access to study operational difficulties and 
obtaining permission to publish the results (Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007). 
Naturally, there exist some ways to overcome these difficulties, such as studying rather old 
cases, exclusively relying on second hand data and disguising company names, so that 
confidentiality becomes less of an issue (cf Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). Yet, that kind of 
data reduces a study’s internal validity. Therefore, first hand data on more recent IORs, not 
requiring full company disguising, are still preferable. Thanks to VCG’s openness and 
desire to learn, and our emphasis on research ethics and confidentiality, we were able to 
gather that kind of data on the VCG-SAG2 relation for the second and third manuscript. 
Second, manuscript 3 contributes to the literature by demonstrating the usefulness 
of applying the Competing Values Model for describing organizational culture in 
qualitative studies, as proposed by Bhimani (2003). Our findings clearly benefited from 
conceptualizing organizational culture via the CVM. On the one hand, the model 
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distinguished the developmental and hierarchical culture types, needed to conceptualize a 
low degree of cultural resemblance. On the other hand, the CVM allowed conceptualizing a 
culture shift by means of the notion of dominant types.  
2.  Implications for business practice 
Besides contributing to the academic literature, our findings have some important 
implications for business practice. First, our case reveals that VCG attaches great 
importance to MCS design. This finding corresponds to studies emphasizing the revised 
(Gietzmann, 1996) or extended make-or-buy decision (van der Meer-Kooistra & 
Vosselman, 2000; Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004). This type of decision not only deals with 
the decision to make or buy, but also with supplier selection and MCS design. Our findings 
indicate that VCG actively considers this extension by designing a comprehensive MCS 
with formal and informal controls. Hence, provided that VCG is considered a best practice, 
practitioners might assess the extent to which they implement the extended make-or-buy 
decision and spend resources on MCS design. 
Second, manuscript 2 shows that an appropriate MCS design, fitted on 
contingencies, benefits performance. Consequently, this dissertation incites practitioners to 
be aware of the benefits of well designed MCSs in MSRs, especially in a very competitive 
business environment like automotive. Given that this awareness is present, manuscript 1 
provides a practical managerial contribution, namely a tool for some kind of supplier 
relationship portfolio management. More specifically, the theoretical framework of 
manuscript 1 might be used to characterize MSR’s via the contingency variables and design 
the MCS accordingly. To that end, VCG’s three supplier types (batch, low value-added 
just-in-sequence and high value-added just-in-sequence) can be interpreted as ideal types on 
three continuums, depicting the evolution from low to high contingencies, low to high risks 
and therefore low to high management controls. By positioning the ideal types on these 
continuums, it becomes clear that a relatively low/high position on the contingency 
continuum corresponds to a relatively low/high position on the MCS continuum. Such 
continuum interpretation supports the initial theoretical model, associating contingencies 
with management controls, and is comparable to recent case based management control 
findings (e.g. Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007; Sartorius & Kirsten, 2005; van 
Veen-Dirks; 2006). For example, during van Veen-Dirks’ (2006) intra-organizational study 
of production MCSs, the controller of company B “considered the case study framework a 
176 General conclusion 
useful diagnostic instrument for the management control system” (van Veen-Dirks, 2006, p. 
94). Similarly, our proposed theoretical framework, supplemented with the three 
continuums, offers practitioners a management tool to position suppliers and create a 
supplier portfolio. That way, manufacturer management gets insight into how the MCS of a 
positioned MSR should be designed to govern the risks following its contingencies. 
Strengthened by our findings of contingent MCS design (cf Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; 
Dekker, 2004; Kamminga & van der Meer-Kooistra, 2007) and the contribution of this 
contingency fit to performance (cf Anderson & Dekker, 2005; Ittner et al., 1999), we 
believe this kind of assessment would benefit other OEMs. 
Third, VCG’s MCS design is a combination of several formal and informal control 
techniques. That way, our case confirms that informal controls are very important in the 
21st century business practice (Nixon & Bruns, 2005), even in manufacturing. Although 
supplier relations, especially in automotive, seem to become more demanding once the 
manufacturing phase starts, VCG clearly holds on to cooperative interaction, comparable to 
the procurement and R&D phase. Instead of lowering collaboration and informal controls in 
favour of a more demanding approach with more formal controls, VCG balances formal 
and informal controls and highly values the role of trust building and social pressure. 
Moreover, the longitudinal analysis of SAG2 in manuscripts 2 and 3 reveals the importance 
of these informal controls. Only when Mr Y was chosen as new plant manager, the VCG-
SAG2 relation regained high trust and lots of social pressure. Without this reinstatement of 
high informal control, performance would not have picked up; or at least not that quickly. 
Hence, practitioners should be well aware of the importance of informal controls in MCS 
design for MSRs.  
Fourth, our findings describe a specific means to strengthen this type of control, 
namely a supplier team (STVC). This STVC functions as a clan, which not only structures, 
and that way strengthens, VCG trust building and social pressure on individual suppliers, 
but also extends this control towards all JIS suppliers. The trust building follows STVC 
activities like networking, frequent information and knowledge sharing, joint decision 
making and joint problem solving. The social pressure results from the fact that supplier 
errors are discussed during STVC (workgroup) meetings. Yet, these controls only follow 
from the STVC’s first goal, which is stimulating and facilitating collaboration, in order to 
continuously improve manufacturing processes. In that respect, the STVC cooperation 
between VCG and JIS supplier facilities during manufacturing is comparable to the inter-
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organizational teams that work together during R&D (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004). If 
Western Europe’s automotive sector wants to survive the current delocalization to the East 
and believes in the knowledge economy to help realise that goal, it is important to actively 
share that knowledge in the manufacturing phase, after the example of successful Japanese 
OEMs like Toyota and other supply chain phases such as R&D. VCG seems to have 
understood that importance and has designed its MCS accordingly, with an important role 
for the STVC. Other OEMs might follow this example. 
Fifth, our results warn practitioners about the potential pitfalls of informal control 
and a related supplier team. On the one hand, the VCG-SAG2 case reveals that high 
reliance on informal controls, in particular trust building, also has a down side. When trust 
decreases, time can be lost by responding slowly in building up extra formal controls and 
collaboratively working on reinstalling sufficient trust. Hence, relying on informal controls 
requires practitioners to be well aware of its use. Otherwise, the importance of increasing 
informal control will be underestimated in case of heightened risks or damaged trust, which 
will lead to time losses. On the other hand, informal control via the supplier team would not 
work without the willingness of all suppliers to open up their facilities during supplier visits 
and share both technical and managerial knowledge. This openness among suppliers is not 
as evident as between the manufacturer and particular suppliers, because some supplier 
facilities are competitors on mother company level. Obviously, this competition negatively 
impacts facility managers’ willingness or permission to open up factories and share 
proprietary knowledge. Nevertheless, VCG’s STVC overcomes this barrier by arguing that 
competitiveness only plays during commercial negotiations. During the manufacturing 
phase, all suppliers serve the same purpose regarding their product, namely supplying the 
right product, on time, with good quality and at the lowest possible cost. By considering 
this common goal and allowing suppliers to hold back certain production infrastructure or 
process knowledge which is patented, the STVC finds most suppliers prepared to 
collaborate. Thus, OEMs following VCG’s example and installing a similar supplier team 
must consider the extent of supplier competition and develop a clear strategy to handle this 
problem.  
Sixth, manuscript 3 shows that practitioners should be aware of the important 
influence of supplier cultural resemblance on the speed of MCS change in case of changing 
contingencies. That way, slower MCS changes can be anticipated and responded to by 
installing additional controls. To that end, the manufacturer needs to be aware of the own 
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values, the values on which the suppliers rely and resulting differences. For that purpose, 
practitioners might use the Competing Values Model, and associated supplier 
characteristics (i.e. structure, size, ownership and nationality), as a mean to assess supplier 
culture.    
3.  Suggestions for future research 
Our main suggestions for further research on this dissertation’s findings result from the case 
methodology. Although this method was specifically chosen for its methodological 
qualities, e.g. with respect to studying MCS dynamics in manuscripts 2 and 3, we 
acknowledge a singly case study limits (statistically) generalizing our findings towards a 
larger population of companies. By only looking at one specific industry (i.e. automotive) 
and exclusively studying one type of IORs (i.e. MSRs) of one OEM (i.e. VCG), we aimed 
at maximizing comparison opportunities and minimizing extraneous variation within the 
case. Yet, at the same time, we limited generalizability possibilities outside this context.  
Obviously, this generalizability was not the main purpose of our research. Instead, 
we wanted to “take a particular case and come to know it well, not primarily as to how it is 
different from others but what it is, what it does” (Stake, 1995, p. 8). With our case study, 
we emphasized uniqueness, which implies knowledge of others that the case is different 
from. Still, our first research aim was to understand the case itself (cf Stake, 1995). Ahrens 
& Chapman (2006) even argue that the question of generalizability and replication in case 
research is inappropriate, as insights into the objective reality are not available, when made 
by subjective observers. Valid and reliable case research is based on the trusting conviction 
that researchers do not lie about the field. Additionally, the research process should be one 
of “iteratively seeking to generate a plausible fit between problem, theory and data”, subject 
to researcher discipline (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006, p. 836). That way, case studies provide 
thorough refinement and illustration possibilities of existing theory, which is acknowledged 
by recent inter-organizational management control literature valuing this type of research 
(Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003; Dekker, 2004; Hakansson & Lind, 2004). Moreover, the 
environment, in which our observations have been made, is presented in the manuscripts, so 
that an opportunity to rely on the contextual generalization rhetoric exists. “In descriptive 
case studies, this contextual generalization rhetoric provides a way to move from isolated 
observations to results of a more general status” (Lukka and Kasanen, 1995, p. 85). 
Nevertheless, the case research design leaves several questions unanswered.  
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First, it is uncertain whether studying a different automotive OEM would lead to 
similar findings. With respect to MCS design (cf manuscript 1), it remains unclear to what 
extent VCG’s developmental culture determines the use of informal controls compared to 
other OEMs. As a result, we wonder whether manufacturers without a supplier team, which 
provides the opportunity to build personal relations with supplier managers (cf manuscript 
1), are also able to choose supplier managers to their advantage (cf manuscripts 2 and 3). 
To answer these kinds of questions, future research could study another OEM. Despite the 
value of our case study, we believe that every manuscript in this dissertation might benefit 
from an additional one in order to create more theory driven variance and divergence in the 
data (Yin, 2003). After investigating VCG, the purpose of replication in another OEM is 
identifying whether some of the first findings have replicate nature (Eisenhardt, 1989). For 
that reason, it is important to have some similarities and some differences between the cases 
(Leonard-Barton, 1990; Yin, 2003), which makes a second automotive OEM an appropriate 
choice. The main resemblance would be the production of automobiles, while the most 
striking difference could lie in the other OEM’s culture. As VCG is characterized by a 
developmental culture, it might be interesting to choose a second OEM with a completely 
differing hierarchical culture. An interesting research design would then be to study a 
collective high value-added just-in-sequence supplier, supplying both VCG and the 
additional OEM, so that differences in MCS design (cf manuscript 1) and/or MCS 
dynamics (cf manuscript 2 and 3) could be effectively investigated.  
Second, we do not know to what extent our findings hold for OEMs in other 
industries, like consumer electronics, which also manufacture complex functional products 
and are subject to continuous cost reduction (Fisher, 1997). Hence, further research could 
investigate how OEMs in such industries design the MCS to control different types of 
MSRs (cf manuscript 1). Also the roles of personal relations between interacting managers 
(cf manuscript 2) and supplier cultural resemblance (cf manuscript 3) are worth further 
study. An additional case study might shed more light on the external validity of our 
automotive findings in that kind of industries.  
Third, we limited our research in the manufacturing phase of the supply chain to 
supplier relationships. Yet, this under-explored supply chain phase might also entail other 
types of IORs, like joint ventures, alliances or licensing agreements. In automotive, for 
example, joint ventures and alliances to jointly develop and manufacture a new type of car 
or engine are common practice. Consequently, future research might be interested to 
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investigate how well VCG’s MCS on MSRs compares to the MCS on the joint venture or 
alliance partner during the manufacturing phase of such joint project.  
Fourth, our research of supplier relationships was restricted to the manufacturing 
phase of the supply chain, as this phase remained under-studied compared to prior supply 
chain phases, like procurement and R&D (Cooper & Slagmulder, 2004; Langfield-Smith & 
Smith, 2003; Scannell et al., 2000). More specifically, we deliberately abstracted from these 
phases, to minimize extraneous variation in our research setting of manufacturing. In terms 
of research methodology, this abstraction was put into operation by studying relationships 
between a manufacturer facility and supplier facilities that only dealt with manufacturing, 
while procurement and R&D were handled by their respective mother companies. 
However, despite the benefits of this abstraction, the impact of procurement and R&D on 
supplier relationships in the manufacturing phase remains unaddressed. Therefore, future 
research might relate our findings to findings on supplier relations in prior supply chain 
phases and investigate the interdependencies between them.  
Fifth, further research might investigate whether taking the research perspective of 
the supplier leads to additional insights, compared to this dissertation’s perspective of the 
manufacturer. Indeed, despite interviewing both VCG and supplier managers in order to 
increase the data’s internal validity, all MSRs and related MCSs were studied through the 
lens of VCG. Consequently, insights from, for example, a culture assessment from within 
the supplier, instead of an assessment from the outside, might shed more light on the role of 
supplier cultural resemblance in MSRs (cf manuscript 3). In that respect, prior research 
found that buyer and supplier have different perceptions about their relationship (John & 
Reve, 1982). In case that perception difference also concerns each other’s culture, it might 
influence MCS dynamics.  
Besides dealing with previous research questions, future research might also 
consider choosing a different research methodology. Despite the clear advantages of the 
case study method for this dissertation’s research, we argue that another research avenue 
lies in testing our findings via a comprehensive large-scale survey. By means of such 
survey, several OEMs from different industries might be questioned about their MCS on 
different types of MSRs. That way, the survey’s large sample would make up for with this 
dissertation’s low level of generalizability. Yet, while a survey would very well suit testing 
the research findings of manuscript 1, we believe this research method would be unsuited to 
test the findings of manuscript 2 and 3, because these manuscripts study MCS dynamics 
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instead of a cross-section of MCS designs. Obviously, these dynamics are very difficult to 
conceptualize by means of a structured questionnaire. In addition, we believe that 
confidentiality issues would limit organizations’ willingness to fill in that kind of survey 
and that way hamper a sufficient response rate. Therefore, we think that additional 
questions concerning our findings on MCS dynamics can be most adequately studied by 
means of an accessory longitudinal case study, already suggested before.  
In that respect, an extra methodological contribution might be to design the 
longitudinal case study as a real-time case, instead of a retrospective case like in this 
dissertation. Although finding access to study contingency changes, MCS dynamics and 
potential operational difficulties at the moment of occurrence will probably be a big 
challenge, the advantage is clear. Real-time data, especially from interviews, are more 
accurate. Although our studies’ data came from both VCG and supplier managers, and were 
triangulated with performance data, we admit that managers’ opinions on events were 
probably biased two years after the events occurred. Moreover, the retrospective research 
design prohibited us from interviewing the initial SAG2 managers, so that their perceptions 
on the events were not available. A real-time study could cope with these limitations. 
In addition to previous future research suggestions, dealing with unanswered 
questions of our research setting and research design, we provide some specific further 
research ideas following our second and third manuscript. On the one hand, we have no 
idea to what extent the findings of these manuscripts hold for other MSRs than the two high 
value-added just-in-sequence MSRs (SAG1 and SAG2) of these studies. Theoretical 
suitability made us chose these MSRs, because we expected substantially differing insights 
due to their extreme divergence on supplier cultural resemblance. Yet, at the same time, 
these extreme MSRs might not be representative for other MSRs. On the other hand, we do 
not exactly know to what extent the learning curve impacted the performance of SAG1 and 
SAG2, when contingencies changed. Before the changes in 2004, SAG1 successfully 
completed a start-up in 1996 and a new Volvo model introduction in 2000, while SAG2 
only successfully completed the start-up in 2000. Also the turnaround of SAG2 
performance in 2005, after Mr Y took over, might be influenced by organizational learning. 
Hence, future research might consider studying MCS dynamics for other MSRs and taking 
into account the potential influence of organizational learning. 
With respect to specific findings of the third manuscript, three potential avenues 
for further research can be identified. A first avenue could investigate the effect of cultural 
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differences between other culture types of the CVM. Our study focused on the comparison 
between hierarchical and developmental culture, following its explicative power in the 
study of Bhimani (2003). Hence, whether comparisons between other culture types, like 
group versus rational or group versus developmental, fit our theoretical model and lead to 
similar results remains unknown. Moreover, this future research stream might benefit from 
introducing a completely different conceptualization of organizational culture, for example 
based on the “Organizational Culture for Diversity Inventory” (OCDI) (Whitfield & 
Landeros, 2006), and investigate whether this conceptualization leads to similar results.  
A second research avenue could examine the impact of supplier cultural 
resemblance on the level of risks. This theoretical association was not included in our 
theoretical model due to our conceptualization of risk, namely objective risk, inherent in a 
given MSR and influenced by four supply contingencies (Das & Teng, 2001). This 
objective risk is not associated with supplier cultural resemblance. Yet, subjective risk, i.e. 
the manager’s estimate of objective risk (Das & Teng, 2001), might be. Because of a lower 
level of supplier cultural resemblance, the manufacturer might perceive the level of risks 
higher, given the same level of contingency variables. By way of illustration, consider the 
VCG-SAG2 relationship in 2004. Assuming that VCG was sufficiently aware of the 
cultural differences (which in reality was not the case), VCG might have perceived SAG2 
as unable to adequately cope with changes imposed by the manufacturer, which would have 
increased perceived performance risk (McAfee, Glassman & Honeycutt Jr., 2002). In 
addition, VCG might have perceived SAG2 as unable or unwilling to openly interact and 
communicate with VCG, which would have augmented perceived relational risk (Luo, 
2002). It must be clear that the research design of manuscript 3 was unsuited to investigate 
the association of supplier cultural resemblance and perceived risks, as we examined events 
as objectively as possible after they occurred. Our focus lied on inherent risks only, in order 
to gain an understanding of the existence of these risks in the absence of any management 
controls (cf Anderson, Christ & Sedatole, 2006). Nevertheless, the association between 
supplier cultural resemblance and subjective risks is worth studying. 
A third and final avenue for further research on manuscript 3 might examine other 
potential MCS influencing variables besides supplier cultural resemblance. Two of those 
variables might be relationship length and fair benefit sharing, already proposed to be 
influential by Dekker (2004), Gietzmann (1996), Tomkins (2001) and van der Meer-
Kooistra & Vosselman (2000).  
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For every manufacturer, supplier relationships form an important component of 
the competitive advantage. However, these MSRs require an appropriate MCS design to 
realise the benefits aspired. This dissertation provides insights into this MCS design and 
illustrates its effect on performance over time for one automotive OEM. The research 
findings largely contribute to the academic literature and offer several implications for 
business practitioners, summed up in this concluding section of the dissertation. 
Nevertheless, this conclusion also makes clear that MCS design of MSRs still presents 
many interesting research opportunities. We hope that these suggestions inspire future 
researchers to take up the challenge of designing new empirical research that addresses 
some of the many relevant research questions at hand. 
 
184  
List of tables 
Table 0.1  Interview data summary .....................................................................................24 
Table 1.1  Interview data summary......................................................................................41 
Table 1.2 Exemplary interview quotes concerning VCG’s MSR contingencies and risks..50 
Table 1.3 Exemplary interview quotes concerning VCG’s formal management controls...55 
Table 1.4  Exemplary interview quotes concerning VCG’s informal management controls63 
Table 2.1  Interview data summary......................................................................................87 
Table 3.1  Interview data summary....................................................................................135 





List of figures 
Figure 0.1  Generic theoretical framework..........................................................................10 
Figure 1.1  Theoretical contingency framework for MCS design of MSRs........................32 
Figure 1.2  MCS design of MSRs at VCG..........................................................................45 
Figure  2.1 Theoretical contingency framework for MCS design and the impact on 
operational performance of MSRs ....................................................................81 
Figure 2.2   VCG-SAG MCS fit and operational performance over time..........................102 
Figure 3.1  Theoretical contingency framework for MCS design of MSRs......................125 
Figure 3.2  High cultural resemblance VCG-SAG1 MCS fit and performance consequences 
over time .........................................................................................................148 
Figure 3.3  Low cultural resemblance VCG-SAG2 MCS fit and performance consequences 





Abernethy, M.A., & Lillis, A.M. (1995). The impact of manufacturing flexibility on 
management control system design. Accounting, Organizations and Society 20(4), 241-258. 
 
Alford, D., Sackett, P., & Nelder, G. (2000). Mass customization – an automotive 
perspective. International Journal of Production Economics 65(1), 99-110. 
 
Anderson, S.W., Christ, M.H., & Sedatole, K.L. (2006). Managing Strategic Alliance Risk: 
Survey Evidence of Control Practices in Collaborative Inter-Organizational Settings. 
Altamonte Springs, Florida: The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation. 
 
Anderson, S.W., & Dekker, H.C. (2005). Management Control for Market Transactions: 
The Relation Between Transaction Characteristics, Incomplete Contract Design and 
Subsequent Performance. Management Science 51(12), 1734-1752. 
 
Anderson, S.W., Glenn, D., & Sedatole, K.L. (2000). Sourcing parts of complex products: 
evidence on transactions costs, high-powered incentives and ex-post opportunism. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 25(8), 723-749. 
 
Aquilon, M. (1997). Cultural dimensions in logistics management: a case study from the 
European automotive industry. Supply Chain Management 2(2), 76-87 
 
Baskerville, R.F. (2003). Hofstede never studied culture. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 28(1), 1-14. 
 
Berry, A.J. (1994). Spanning traditional boundaries: organization and control of embedded 
operations. Leadership & Organization Development Journal 15, 4-10. 
 
Bhimani, A. (2003). A study of the emergence of management accounting system ethos and 
its influence on perceived system success. Accounting, Organizations and Society 28(6), 
523-548. 
 
Bierly III, P.E., & Gallagher, S. (2007). Explaining Alliance Partner Selection: Fit, Trust 
and Strategic Expediency. Long Range Planning 40(2), 134-153. 
 
Bijlsma-Frankema, K., & Costa, A.C. (2005). Understanding the trust-control nexus. 
International Sociology 20(3), 259-282.  
 
Birnberg, J. G. (1998). Control in inter-firm co-operation relationships. Journal of 
Management Studies 35(4), 421-428. 
 
Bouwens, J., & Abernethy, M.A. (2000). The consequences of customization on 
management accounting system design. Accounting, Organizations and Society 25(3), 221-
241. 
 
Burns, T., & Stalker, G. (1961). The management of innovation. London: Tavistock. 
 
187 References 
Burton, R.M., & Obel, B. (2004). Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: The 
Dynamics of Fit, third ed. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
 
Cagwin, D., & Bouwman, M.J. (2002). The association between activity-based costing and 
improvement in financial performance. Management Accounting Research 13(1), 1-39. 
 
Carr, C., & Ng, J. (1995). Total Cost Control: Nissan and its U.K. Supplier Partnerships. 
Management Accounting Research 6(4), 347-365. 
 
Chalos, P., & O’Connor, N.G. (2004). Determinants of the use of various control 
mechanisms in US-Chinese joint ventures. Accounting, Organizations and Society 29(7), 
591-608. 
 
Chen, C. C., Chen, X. P., & Meindl, J. R. (1998). How can cooperation be fostered? The 
cultural effects of individualism-collectivism. Academy of Management Review 23 (2), 285-
304. 
 
Chenhall, R.H. (2003). Management control systems design within its organizational 
context: findings from contingency-based research and directions for the future. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 28(2-3), 127-168. 
 
Chiles, T.H., & McMackin, J.F. (1996). Integrating variable risk preferences, trust, and 
transaction cost economics. Academy of Management Review 21(1), 73-99. 
 
Christopher, M., & Jüttner, U. (2000). Supply Chain Relationships: Making the Transition 
to Closer Integration. International Journal of Logistics: Research & Applications 3(1), 5-
23. 
 
Cooke, R.A. & Szumal, J.L. (1993). Measuring Normative Beliefs and Shared Behavioral 
Expectations in Organizations. Psychological Reports 72(3), 1299-1330. 
 
Cooper, R., & Kaplan, R.S. (1999). The Design of Cost Management Systems: Text and 
Cases, second ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
 
Cooper, R., & Slagmulder, R. (1999). Supply chain development for the lean enterprise. 
Interorganizational cost management. Portland, OR: Productivity Press. 
 
Cooper, R., & Slagmulder, R. (2004). Interorganizational cost management and relational 
context. Accounting, Organizations and Society 29(1), 1-26. 
 
Das, T.K., & Teng, B.S. (1998). Between trust and control: developing confidence in 
partner cooperation alliances. The Academy of Management Review 23(3), 491-512. 
 
Das, T.K., & Teng, B.S. (2000). Instabilities of Strategic Alliances: An Internal Tensions 
Perspective. Organization Science 11(1), 77-101. 
 
Das, T.K., & Teng, B.S. (2001) Trust, Control, and Risk in Strategic Alliances: An 
Integrated Framework. Organization Studies 22(2), 251-283. 
 
188 References 
Degraeve, Z., & Roodhooft, F. (2001). A smarter Way to Buy. Harvard Business Review 
79(6), 22-23. 
 
Dekker, H.C. (2003). Value chain analysis in inter-firm relationships: a field study. 
Management Accounting Research 14(1), 1-23. 
 
Dekker, H.C. (2004). Control of inter-organizational relationships: evidence on 
appropriation concerns and coordination requirements. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 29(1), 27-49. 
 
Dekker, H.C. (2007). Partner selection and governance design in interfirm relationships. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society. In Press, Corrected Proof, Available online 6 April 
2007. 
 
de Rond, M. (2003). Strategic Alliances as Social Facts. Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, U.K. 
 
Donaldson, L. (2001). The contingency theory of organizations. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Dunk, A. S., & Lysons, A. F. (1997). An analysis of departmental effectiveness, 
participative budgetary control processes and environmental dimensionality within the 
competing values framework: A public sector study. Financial Accountability & 
Management 13(1), 1-15. 
 
Dyer, J.H. (1996(a)). Specialized Supplier Networks as a Source of Competitive 
Advantage: Evidence from the Auto Industry. Strategic Management Journal, 17(4), 271-
292. 
 
Dyer, J.H. (1996(b)). Does Governance Matter? Keiretsu Alliances and Asset Specificity as 
Sources of Japanese Competitive Advantage. Organization Science 7(6), 649-666. 
 
Dyer, J.H. (1997). Effective Inter-firm Collaboration: How Firms Minimize Transaction 
Costs and Maximize Transaction Value. Strategic Management Journal 18(7), 535-556. 
 
Dyer, J.H., & Singh, H. (1998). The relational view: cooperative strategy and sources of 
interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review 23(4), 660-
679. 
 
Dyer, J.H., & Nobeoka, K. (2000). Creating and Managing a High Performance 
Knowledge-Sharing Network: The Toyota Case. Strategic Management Journal 21(3), 345-
367. 
 
Dyer, J.H., & Chu, W. (2000). The Determinants of Trust in Supplier-Buyer Relations in 
the U.S., Japan, and Korea. Journal of International Business Studies 31(2), 259-285. 
 
Dyer, J.H., & Chu, W. (2003). The Role of Trustworthiness in Reducing Transaction Costs 
and Increasing Information Sharing: Empirical Evidence from the United States, Japan, and 
Korea. Organization Science 14(1), 57-68. 
 
189 References 
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989). Building Theories from Case Study Research. Academy of 
Management Review 14(4), 532-550. 
 
Ellonen, R., Blomqvist, K. & Puumalainen, K. (forthcoming). Is There a Link Between 
Organizational Culture, Trust and Innovation Performance? Creativity and Innovation 
Management. 
 
Elmuti, D. (2002). The perceived impact of supply chain management on organizational 
effectiveness. Journal of Supply Chain Management 38(3), 49-57. 
 
Fisher, M.L. (1997). What is the right supply chain for your product? Harvard Business 
Review 75(2), 105-116. 
 
Fisher, J.G. (1998). Contingency Theory, Management Control Systems and Firm 
Outcomes: Past Results and Future Directions. Behavioral Research in Accounting 10, 47-
64. 
 
Gerdin, J., & Greve, J. (2004). Forms of contingency fit in management accounting 
research - a critical review. Accounting, Organizations and Society 29(3-4), 303-326. 
 
Gietzmann, M. B. (1996). Incomplete contracts and the make or buy decision: governance 
design and attainable flexibility. Accounting, Organizations and Society 21(6), 611-626. 
 
Groves, G., & Valsamakis, V. (1998). Supplier-Customer Relationships and Company 
Performance. International Journal of Logistics Management 9(2), 51-64. 
 
Gulati, R. (1995). Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for 
contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal 38(1), 85-112. 
 
Gulati, R., & Singh, H. (1998). The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing Coordination 
Costs and Appropriation Concerns in Strategic Alliances. Administrative Science Quarterly 
43(4), 781-814. 
 
Gunasekaran, A., Patel, C., & McGaughey, R.E. (2004). A framework for supply chain 
performance measurement. International Journal of Production Economics 87(3), 333-347. 
 
Hakansson, H., & Lind, J. (2004). Accounting and network coordination. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 29(1), 51-72. 
 
Harrison, A., & New, C. (2002). The role of coherent supply chain strategy and 
performance management in achieving competitive advantage: an international survey. 
Journal of Operational Research Society 53, 263-271. 
 
Harrison, G. L., & McKinnon, J. L. (1999). Cross-cultural research in management control 
systems design: a review of the current state. Accounting, Organizations and Society 24(5-
6), 483-506. 
 
Heikkilä, J. (2002). From supply to demand chain management: efficiency and customer 
satisfaction. Journal of Operations Management 20(6), 747-767. 
190 References 
Henri, J.-F. (2006). Organizational culture and performance measurement systems. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society 31(1), 77-103. 
 
Hofstede, G. H. (1984). The cultural relativity of the quality of life concept. Academy of 
Management Review 9(3), 389-398. 
 
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture's consequences, second ed. Beverly Hills: SAG2e 
Publications. 
 
Hopwood, A.G. (1996). Looking across rather than up and down: On the need to explore 
the lateral processing of information. Accounting, Organizations and Society 21(6), 589-
590. 
 
Hoque, Z., & James, W. (2000). Linking Balanced Scorecard Measures to Size and Market 
Factors: Impact on Organizational Performance. Journal of Management Accounting 
Research 12, 1-17. 
 
Howard, L.W. (1998). Validating the Competing Values Model as a Representation of 
Organizational Cultures. The International Journal of Organizational Analysis 6(3), 231-
250.  
 
Howard, M., Miemczyk, J., & Graves, A. (2006). Automotive supplier parks: An 
imperative for build-to-order? Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management 12(2), 91-
104. 
 
Hutt, M.D., Stafford, E.R., Walker, B.A., & Reingen, P.H. (2000). Defining the Social 
Network of a Strategic Alliance. Sloan Management Review 41(2), 51-62. 
 
Ireland, R.D., Hitt, M.A., & Vaidynanath, D. (2002). Alliance management as a source of 
competitive advantage. Journal of Management 28(3), 413-446. 
 
Ittner, C.D., Larcker, D.F., Nagar, V., & Rajan, M.V. (1999). Supplier selection, 
monitoring practices and firm performance. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 18(3), 
253-281. 
 
Ittner, C.D., Lanen, W.N., & Larcker, D.F. (2002). The Association Between Activity-
Based Costing and Manufacturing Performance. Journal of Accounting Research 40(3), 
711-726. 
 
Ittner, C.D., Larcker, D.F., & Randall T. (2003). Performance implications of strategic 
performance measurement in financial services firms. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 28(7-8), 715-741.  
 
John, G., & Reve, T. (1982). The Reliability and Validity of Key Informant Data from 
Dyadic Relationships in Marketing Channels. Journal of Marketing Research 19(4), 517-
524. 
 
Kajüter, P., & Kulmala, H.I. (2005). Open-book accounting in networks. Potential 
achievements and reasons for failures. Management Accounting Research 16(2), 179–204. 
191 References 
Kale, P., Singh, H., & Perlmutter, H. (2000). Learning and protection of proprietary assets 
in strategic alliances: Building relational capital. Strategic Management Journal 21(Special 
issue), 217-237. 
 
Kamminga, P.E., & van der Meer-Kooistra, J. (2007). Management control patterns in joint 
venture relationships: a model and an exploratory study. Accounting, Organizations and 
Society 32(1-2), 131-154. 
 
Keating, P.J. (1995). A Framework for Classifying and Evaluating the Theoretical 
Contributions of Case Research in Management Accounting. Journal of Management 
Accounting Research 7, 66-86. 
 
Klein Woolthuis, R., Hillebrand, B., & Nooteboom, B. (2005). Trust, contract and 
relationship development. Organization Studies 26(6), 813-840. 
 
Kulmala, H.I., Paranko, J., & Uusi-Rauva, E. (2002). The role of cost management in 
network relationships. International Journal of Production Economics 79(1), 33-43. 
 
Lachman, R., Nedd, A. & Hinings, B. (1994). Analyzing Cross-national Management and 
Organizations: A Theoretical Framework. Management Science 40(1), 40-55.  
 
Lamming, R.C. (1993). Beyond partnership: Strategies for innovation and lean supply. 
New York: Prentice Hall. 
 
Langfield-Smith, K., & Smith, D. (2003). Management control systems and trust in 
outsourcing relationships. Management Accounting Research 14(3), 281-307. 
 
Langley, A. (1999). Strategies for Theorizing from Process Data. Academy of Management 
Review 24(4), 691-710.  
 
Lawrence, P., & Lorsch, J. (1967). Organization and Environment. Irwin: Homewood. 
 
Leiblein, M.J., Reuer, J.J., & Dalsace, F. (2002). Do make or buy decisions matter? The 
influence of organizational governance on technological performance. Strategic 
Management Journal 23(9), 817-833. 
 
Leonard-Barton, D. (1990). A dual methodology for case studies: synergistic use of a 
longitudinal single site with replicated multiple sites. Organization Science 1(3), 248-266. 
 
Lillis, A.M. (2002). Managing multiple dimensions of manufacturing performance - an 
exploratory study. Accounting, Organizations and Society 27(6), 497-529. 
 
Lowe, J., Deibridge, R., & Oliver, N. (1997). High-Performance Manufacturing: Evidence 
From the Automotive Components Industry. Organization Studies 18(5), 783-798. 
 
Luft, J., & Shields, M.D. (2003). Mapping management accounting: graphics and 




Lukka, K., & Kasanen, E. (1995). The problem of generalizability: anecdotes and evidence 
in accounting research. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal 8(5), 71-90. 
 
Luo, Y. (2002). Building Trust in Cross-Cultural Collaborations: Towards a Contingency 
Perspective. Journal of Management 28(5), 669-694. 
 
Maiga, A.S., & Jacobs, F.A. (2003). Balanced Scorecard, Activity-Based Costing And 
Company Performance: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Managerial Issues 15(3), 283-
301.     
 
McAfee, R.B., Glassman, M., & Honeycutt Jr., E.D. (2002). The Effects of Culture and 
Human Resource Management Policies on Supply Chain Management. Journal of Business 
Logistics 23 (1), 1-18. 
 
McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect- and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal 
cooperation in organizations. Academy of Management Journal 38 (1), 24-59. 
 
McDermott, C.M., & Stock, G.N. (1999). Organizational culture and advanced 
manufacturing technology implementation. Journal of Operations Management 17 (5), 
521-533. 
 
Merchant, K.A. (1998). Modern Management Control Systems: Text and Cases. New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
 
Miller, G.A. (1987). Meta-analyses and the Culture Free Hypothesis. Organizational 
Studies 8(4), 309-326. 
 
Mouritsen, J., Hansen, A., & Hansen, C.Ø. (2001). Inter-organizational controls and 
organizational competencies: episodes around target cost management/functional analysis 
and open book accounting. Management Accounting Research 12(2), 221–244. 
 
Mouritsen, J., & Thrane, S. (2006). Accounting, network complementarities and the 
development of inter-organizational relations. Accounting, Organizations and Society 
31(3), 241-275. 
 
Munday, M. (1992). Accounting cost data disclosure and buyer-supplier partnerships: a 
research note. Management Accounting Research 3(3), 245-250. 
 
Nicholson, B., Jones, J., & Espenlaub, S. (2006). Transaction costs and control of 
outsourced accounting: Case evidence from India. Management Accounting Research 
17(3), 238-258. 
 
Nixon, W.A.J., & Burns, J. (2005). Management control in the 21st century. Management 
Accounting Research 16(3), 260-268. 
 
Nooteboom, B., Berger, H., & Noorderhaven, N.G. (1997). Effects of trust and governance 
on relational risk. Academy of Management Journal 40(2), 308-338. 
 
193 References 
Osborn, R. N., & Hagedoorn, J. (1997). The institutionalization and evolutionary dynamics 
of interorganizational alliances and networks. Academy of Management Journal 40(2), 261-
278. 
 
Otley, D.T. (1994). Management control in contemporary organizations: towards a wider 
framework. Management Accounting Research 5(3-4), 289-299. 
 
Ouchi, W.G. (1979). A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control 
mechanisms. Management Science 25(9), 833-848. 
 
Padgett, C., & Mukherjee, S. (2006). Return Differences Between Family and Non-Family 
Firms: Absolute and Index Differences. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=949448, 1-44. 
 
Park, S.H., & Ungson, G.R. (1997). The Effect of National Culture, Organizational 
Complementarity, and Economic Motivation on Joint Venture Dissolution. The Academy of 
Management Journal 40(2), 279-307. 
 
Perrow, C. (1970). Organizational analysis: a sociological view. California: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company. 
 
Poppo, L., & Zenger, T.R. (2002). Do formal contracts and relational governance function 
as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal 23(8), 707-725. 
 
Powell, W.W. (1990). Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization. In 
L. L. Cummings and B. M. Staw (Eds.), Research in Organizational Behaviour. 
Greenwich: JAI Press. 
 
Quinn, R. E. (1988). Beyond rational management. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Quinn, R. E., & Kimberly, J. R. (1984). Paradox planning and perseverance: guidelines for 
managerial practice. In Kimberly, J.R., & Quinn, R.E. (Eds.). Managing organizational 
transitions (pp. 295-313). Homewood, IL: Dow-Jones-Irwin. 
 
Quinn, R. E., & Rohrbraugh, F. (1983). A spatial model of effectiveness criteria: towards a 
competing values approach to organizational analysis. Management Science 29 (3), 363-
377. 
 
Rinehart, L.M., Eckert, J.A., Hanfield, R.B., Page, T.J.Jr., & Atkin, T. (2004). An 
Assessment of Supplier-Customer Relationships. Journal of Business Logistics 25(1), 25-
62. 
 
Rousseau, D. M. (1990). Organizational culture: The case for multiple methods. In B. 
Schneider (Ed.), Organizational climate and culture. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Rousseau, D.M., Sitkin, S.B., Burt, R.S., & Camerer, C. (1998). Not so different after all: a 




Rowe, C., Birnberg, J.G., & Shields, M.D. (2008). Effects of organizational process change 
on responsibility accounting and managers’ revelations of private knowledge. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 33 (2-3), 164-198. 
 
Sako, M. (1992). Prices, quality and trust: inter-firm relationships in Britain and Japan. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sampson, R.C. (2004). The Cost of Misaligned Governance in R&D Alliances. Journal of 
Law, Economics, and Organization 20(2), 484-526. 
 
Sartorius, K., & Kirsten, J. (2005). The boundaries of the firm: why do sugar producers 
outsource sugarcane production? Management Accounting Research 16(1), 81-99. 
 
Scannell, T.V., Vickery, S.K., & Dröge, C.L. (2000). Upstream Supply Chain Management 
and Competitive Performance in the Automotive Industry. Journal of Business Logistics 
21(l), 23-48. 
 
Scapens, R. W. (1990). Researching management accounting practice: the role of case 
study methods. The British Accounting Review 22(3), 259-281. 
 
Scapens, R.W., & Bromwich, M. (2001). Management Accounting Research: the first 
decade. Management Accounting Research 12(2), 245-254. 
 
Schein, E. H. (1985). Organizational cultures and leadership. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-
Bass. 
 
Schein, E. H. (1996). Culture: The Missing Concept in Organization Studies. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 41(2), 229–240.  
 
Scheytt, T., &  Soin, K. (2006). Culture and control. In Berry, A.J., Broadbent, J., & Otley, 
D. (Ed.). Management Control: Theories, Issues and Performance. Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
 
Seal, W., Berry, A., Cullen, J., Dunlop, A., & Ahmed, M. (1999). Enacting a European 
supply chain: a case study on the role of management accounting. Management Accounting 
Research 10(3), 303-322. 
 
Seal, W., Berry, A., & Cullen, J. (2004). Disembedding the supply chain: institutionalized 
reflexivity and inter-firm accounting. Accounting, Organizations and Society 29(1), 73-92. 
 
Shan, W., & Hamilton, W. (1991). Country-specific advantage and international 
cooperation. Strategic Management Journal 12(6), 419-432. 
 
Snodgrass, C., & Grant, J. H. (1986). Cultural influences on strategic planning and control 
systems. Advances in Strategic Management 4, 205-228. 
 
Speklé, R.F. (2001). Explaining management control structure variety: a transaction cost 
economics perspective. Accounting, Organizations and Society 26(4-5), 419-441. 
 
195 References 
Stake, R.E. (1995). The Art of Case Study Research. London: Sage Publications. 
Stalk, G. (1988). Time: the next strategic advantage. Harvard Business Review 66 (4), 41-
51. 
 
Stein, J. (1989). Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A model of Myopic Corporate 
Behaviour. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104(4), 655-669. 
 
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1999). Basics of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications. 
 
Taylor, A. (1994). The Auto Industry Meets the New Economy. Fortune 130(5), 52-60. 
 
Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organizations in action. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Timme, S., & Williams-Timme, C. (2000). The financial-SCM Connection. Supply Chain 
Management Review 4(2), 33-40. 
 
Tomkins, C. (2001). Interdependencies, trust and information in relationships, alliances and 
networks. Accounting, Organizations and Society 26(2), 161–191. 
 
Trent, R.J., & Monczka, R.M. (2002). Pursuing competitive advantage through integrated 
global sourcing. Academy of Management Executives 16(2), 66-80. 
 
Ueno, S., & Wu, A. (1993). The comparative influence of culture on budget control 
practices in the United States and Japan. International Journal of Accounting 28 (1), 17-39. 
 
Vance, C. M., McClaine, S. R., Boje, D. M., & Stage, D. (1992). An examination of the 
transferability of traditional performance appraisal principles across cultural boundaries. 
Management International Review 32 (4), 313-326. 
 
Van den Abbeele, A. (2006). Management control of inter-firm relations: the role of 
information. PhD thesis, KULeuven. 
 
van den Bogaard, M.A., & Speklé, R.F. (2003). Reinventing the hierarchy: strategy and 
control in the Shell Chemicals carve-out. Management Accounting Research 14(2), 79-93. 
 
van der Meer-Kooistra, J., & Vosselman, E.G. (2000). Management control of inter-firm 
transactional relationships: the case of industrial renovation and maintenance. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 25(1), 51-77. 
 
van der Meer-Kooistra, J., & Vosselman, E. G. (2004). Accounting for the alignment of 
interest and commitment in inter-firm transactional relationships. ERIM Report Series 
Research in Management, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. 
 
van der Meer-Kooistra, J., & Vosselman, E.G. (2006). Research on management control of 
interfirm transactional relationships: Whence and whither. Management Accounting 
Research 17(3), 227-237. 
 
196 References 
van Veen-Dirks, P. (2006). Complementary choices and management control: Field 
research in a flexible production environment. Management Accounting Research 17(1), 
72-105. 
 
Vasilash, G. (1997). OEMs, Suppliers and the New Competitive Landscape. Automotive 
Manufacturing & Production 109(4), 67-69. 
 
Von Corswant, F. (2003). Organizing Interactive Product Development. PhD Thesis, 
Chalmers School of Technology. 
 
Waters-Fuller, N. (1996). The benefits and costs of JIT sourcing. International Journal of 
Physical Distribution & Logistics Management 26(4), 35-50. 
 
Whitfield, G., & Landeros, R. (2006). Supplier Diversity Effectiveness: Does 
Organizational Culture Really Matter? The Journal of Supply Chain Management 42(4), 
16-28. 
 
White, S., & Lui, S.S.-Y. (2005). Distinguishing Cost of Cooperation and Control in 
Alliances. Strategic Management Journal 26(10), 913-932. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies. New York: Free Press. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1979). Transaction cost economics: the governance of contractual 
relations. Journal of Law and Economics 22, 233–261. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1991). Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete 
Structural Alternatives. Administrative Science Quarterly 36(2), 269-296. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1993). Opportunism and its critics. Managerial and Decision 
Economics 14, 97-107. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1996). The mechanisms of governance. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Womack, J.P., Jones, D.T., & Roos, D. (1990). The Machine that Changed the World. New 
York: Rawson Ass. 
 
Woodward, J. (1965). Industrial Organization: theory and practice. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Yan, A., & Gray, B. (1994). Bargaining power, management control and performance in 
United States-China joint ventures: a comparative case study. Academy of Management 
Journal 37(6), 1478-1517. 
 




Zammuto, R. F., & Krakower, J. Y. (1991). Quantitative and qualitative studies of 
organizational culture. Research in Organizational Change and Development 5, 83-114. 
198  
Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
(from August 1, 1971)  
1. GEPTS,  Stefaan 
Stability and efficiency of resource allocation processes in discrete commodity spaces. 
Leuven, KUL, 1971. 86 pp. 
 2.  PEETERS, Theo 
Determinanten van de internationale handel in fabrikaten. 
Leuven, Acco, 1971. 290 pp. 
 3.  VAN LOOY, Wim 
Personeelsopleiding: een onderzoek naar investeringsaspekten van opleiding. 
Hasselt, Vereniging voor wetenschappelijk onderzoek in Limburg, 1971. VII, 238 pp. 
 4.  THARAKAN, Mathew 
Indian exports to the European community: problems and prospects. 
Leuven, Faculty of economics and applied economics, 1972. X,343 pp. 
 5.  HERROELEN, Willy 
Heuristische programmatie: methodologische benadering en praktische toepassing op 
complexe combinatorische problemen. 
Leuven, Aurelia scientifica, 1972. X, 367 pp. 
 6.  VANDENBULCKE, Jacques 
De studie en de evaluatie van data-organisatiemethodes en data-zoekmethodes. 
Leuven, s.n., 1973. 3 V. 
 7.  PENNYCUICK, Roy A. 
The economics of the ecological syndrome. 
Leuven, Acco, 1973. XII, 177 pp. 
 8.  KAWATA, T. Bualum 
Formation du capital d'origine belge, dette publique et stratégie du développement au 
Zaire. 
Leuven, KUL, 1973. V, 342 pp. 
 9.  DONCKELS, Rik 
Doelmatige oriëntering van de sectorale subsidiepolitiek in België: een theoretisch 
onderzoek met empirische toetsing. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, 1974. VII, 156 pp. 
10. VERHELST,  Maurice 
Contribution to the analysis of organizational information systems and their financial 
benefits. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, 1974. 2 V. 
199 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
11. CLEMEUR,  Hugo 
Enkele verzekeringstechnische vraagstukken in het licht van de nutstheorie. 
Leuven, Aurelia scientifica, 1974. 193 pp. 
12. HEYVAERT,  Edward 
De ontwikkeling van de moderne bank- en krediettechniek tijdens de zestiende en 
zeventiende eeuw in Europa en te Amsterdam in het bijzonder. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, 1975. 186 pp. 
13. VERTONGHEN,  Robert 
Investeringscriteria voor publieke investeringen: het uitwerken van een operationele 
theorie met een toepassing op de verkeersinfrastructuur. 
Leuven, Acco, 1975. 254 pp. 
14.  Niet toegekend. 
 
15. VANOVERBEKE,  Lieven 
Microeconomisch onderzoek van de sectoriële arbeidsmobiliteit. 
Leuven, Acco, 1975. 205 pp. 
16. DAEMS,  Herman 
The holding company: essays on financial intermediation, concentration and capital 
market imperfections in the Belgian economy. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, 1975. XII, 268 pp. 
17. VAN  ROMPUY,  Eric 
Groot-Brittannië en de Europese monetaire integratie: een onderzoek naar de 
gevolgen van de Britse toetreding op de geplande Europese monetaire unie. 
Leuven, Acco, 1975. XIII, 222 pp. 
18. MOESEN,  Wim 
Het beheer van de staatsschuld en de termijnstructuur van de intrestvoeten met een 
toepassing voor België. 
Leuven, Vander, 1975. XVI, 250 pp. 
19. LAMBRECHT,  Marc 
Capacity constrained multi-facility dynamic lot-size problem. 
Leuven, KUL, 1976. 165 pp. 
20. RAYMAECKERS,  Erik 
De mens in de onderneming en de theorie van het producenten-gedrag: een bijdrage 
tot transdisciplinaire analyse. 
Leuven, Acco, 1976. XIII, 538 pp. 
21. TEJANO,  Albert 
Econometric and input-output models in development planning: the case of the 
Philippines. 
Leuven, KUL, 1976. XX, 297 pp. 
200 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
22. MARTENS,  Bernard 
Prijsbeleid en inflatie met een toepassing op België. 
Leuven, KUL, 1977. IV, 253 pp. 
23. VERHEIRSTRAETEN,  Albert 
Geld, krediet en intrest in de Belgische financiële sector. 
Leuven, Acco, 1977. XXII, 377 pp. 
24. GHEYSSENS,  Lieven 
International diversification through the government bond market: a risk-return 
analysis. 
Leuven, s.n., 1977. 188 pp. 
25. LEFEBVRE,  Chris 
Boekhoudkundige verwerking en financiële verslaggeving van huurkooptransacties en 
verkopen op afbetaling bij ondernemingen die aan consumenten verkopen. 
Leuven, KUL, 1977. 228 pp. 
26. KESENNE,  Stefan 
Tijdsallocatie en vrijetijdsbesteding: een econometrisch onderzoek. 
Leuven, s.n., 1978. 163 pp. 
27. VAN  HERCK,  Gustaaf 
Aspecten van optimaal bedrijfsbeleid volgens het marktwaardecriterium: een risico-
rendementsanalyse. 
Leuven, KUL, 1978. IV, 163 pp. 
28. VAN  POECK,  Andre 
World price trends and price and wage development in Belgium: an investigation into 
the relevance of the Scandinavian model of inflation for Belgium. 
Leuven, s.n., 1979. XIV, 260 pp. 
29. VOS,  Herman 
De industriële technologieverwerving in Brazilië: een analyse. 
Leuven, s.n., 1978. onregelmatig gepagineerd. 
30. DOMBRECHT,  Michel 
Financial markets, employment and prices in open economies. 
Leuven, KUL, 1979. 182 pp. 
31.  DE PRIL, Nelson 
Bijdrage tot de actuariële studie van het bonus-malussysteem. 
Brussel, OAB, 1979. 112 pp. 
32. CARRIN,  Guy 
Economic aspects of social security: a public economics approach. 
Leuven, KUL, 1979. onregelmatig gepagineerd 
201 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
33. REGIDOR,  Baldomero 
An empirical investigation of the distribution of stock-market prices and weak-form 
efficiency of the Brussels stock exchange. 
Leuven, KUL, 1979. 214 pp. 
34.  DE GROOT, Roger 
Ongelijkheden voor stop loss premies gebaseerd op E.T. systemen in het kader van de 
veralgemeende convexe analyse. 
Leuven, KUL, 1979. 155 pp. 
35. CEYSSENS,  Martin 
On the peak load problem in the presence of rationizing by waiting. 
Leuven, KUL, 1979. IX, 217 pp. 
36. ABDUL  RAZK  ABDUL 
Mixed enterprise in Malaysia: the case study of joint venture between Malysian public 
corporations and foreign enterprises. 
Leuven, KUL, 1979. 324 pp. 
37.  DE BRUYNE, Guido 
Coordination of economic policy: a game-theoretic approach. 
Leuven, KUL, 1980. 106 pp. 
38. KELLES,  Gerard 
Demand, supply, price change and trading volume on financial markets of the 
matching-order type. = Vraag, aanbod, koersontwikkeling en omzet op financiële 
markten van het Europese type. 
Leuven, KUL, 1980. 222 pp. 
39.  VAN EECKHOUDT, Marc 
De invloed van de looptijd, de coupon en de verwachte inflatie op het 
opbrengstverloop van vastrentende financiële activa. 
Leuven, KUL, 1980. 294 pp. 
40. SERCU,  Piet 
Mean-variance asset pricing with deviations from purchasing power parity. 
Leuven, s.n., 1981. XIV, 273 pp. 
41. DEQUAE,  Marie-Gemma 
Inflatie, belastingsysteem en waarde van de onderneming. 
Leuven, KUL, 1981. 436 pp. 
42. BRENNAN,  John 
An empirical investigation of Belgian price regulation by prior notification: 1975 - 
1979 - 1982. 
Leuven, KUL, 1982. XIII, 386 pp. 
202 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
43. COLLA,  Annie 
Een econometrische analyse van ziekenhuiszorgen. 
Leuven, KUL, 1982. 319 pp. 
44.  Niet toegekend. 
 
45. SCHOKKAERT,  Eric 
Modelling consumer preference formation. 
Leuven, KUL, 1982. VIII, 287 pp. 
46. DEGADT,  Jan 
Specificatie van een econometrisch model voor vervuilingsproblemen met proeven 
van toepassing op de waterverontreiniging in België. 
Leuven, s.n., 1982. 2 V. 
47.  LANJONG, Mohammad Nasir 
A study of market efficiency and risk-return relationships in the Malaysian capital 
market. 
s.l., s.n., 1983. XVI, 287 pp. 
48. PROOST,  Stef 
De allocatie van lokale publieke goederen in een economie met een centrale overheid 
en lokale overheden. 
Leuven, s.n., 1983. onregelmatig gepagineerd. 
49. VAN  HULLE,  Cynthia (  /08/83) 
Shareholders' unanimity and optimal corporate decision making in imperfect capital 
markets. 
s.l., s.n., 1983. 147 pp. + appendix. 
50.  VAN WOUWE, Martine (2/12/83) 
Ordening van risico's met toepassing op de berekening van ultieme ruïnekansen. 
Leuven, s.n., 1983. 109 pp. 
51. D'ALCANTARA,  Gonzague  (15/12/83) 
SERENA: a macroeconomic sectoral regional and national account econometric 
model for the Belgian economy. 
Leuven, KUL, 1983. 595 pp. 
52. D'HAVE,  Piet  (24/02/84) 
De vraag naar geld in België. 
Leuven, KUL, 1984. XI, 318 pp. 
53.  MAES, Ivo (16/03/84) 
The contribution of J.R. Hicks to macro-economic and monetary theory. 
Leuven, KUL, 1984. V, 224 pp. 
203 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
54. SUBIANTO,  Bambang  (13/09/84) 
A study of the effects of specific taxes and subsidies on a firms' R&D investment 
plan. 
s.l., s.n., 1984. V, 284 pp. 
55. SLEUWAEGEN,  Leo  (26/10/84) 
Location and investment decisions by multinational enterprises in Belgium and 
Europe. 
Leuven, KUL, 1984. XII, 247 pp. 
56.  GEYSKENS, Erik (27/03/85) 
Produktietheorie en dualiteit. 
Leuven, s.n., 1985. VII, 392 pp. 
57. COLE,  Frank  (26/06/85) 
Some algorithms for geometric programming. 
Leuven, KUL, 1985. 166 pp. 
58.  STANDAERT, Stan (26/09/86) 
A study in the economics of repressed consumption. 
Leuven, KUL, 1986. X, 380 pp. 
59.  DELBEKE, Jos (03/11/86) 
Trendperioden in de geldhoeveelheid van België 1877-1983: een theoretische en 
empirische analyse van de "Banking school" hypothese. 
Leuven, KUL, 1986. XII, 430 pp. 
60. VANTHIENEN,  Jan  (08/12/86) 
Automatiseringsaspecten van de specificatie, constructie en manipulatie van 
beslissingstabellen. 
Leuven, s.n., 1986. XIV, 378 pp. 
61. LUYTEN,  Robert  (30/04/87) 
A systems-based approach for multi-echelon production/inventory systems. 
s.l., s.n., 1987. 3V. 
62. MERCKEN,  Roger  (27/04/87) 
De invloed van de data base benadering op de interne controle. 
Leuven, s.n., 1987. XIII, 346 pp. 
63.  VAN CAYSEELE, Patrick (20/05/87) 
Regulation and international innovative activities in the pharmaceutical industry. 
s.l., s.n., 1987. XI, 169 pp. 
64.  FRANCOIS, Pierre (21/09/87) 
De empirische relevantie van de independence from irrelevant alternatives. Assumptie 
indiscrete keuzemodellen. 
Leuven, s.n., 1987. IX, 379 pp. 
204 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
65. DECOSTER,  André  (23/09/88) 
Family size, welfare and public policy. 
Leuven, KUL. Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen, 
1988. XIII, 444 pp. 
66.  HEIJNEN, Bart (09/09/88) 
Risicowijziging onder invloed van vrijstellingen en herverzekeringen: een 
theoretische analyse van optimaliteit en premiebepaling. 
Leuven, KUL. Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen, 
1988. onregelmatig gepagineerd. 
67.  GEEROMS, Hans (14/10/88) 
Belastingvermijding. Theoretische analyse van de determinanten van de 
belastingontduiking en de belastingontwijking met empirische verificaties. 
Leuven, s.n., 1988. XIII, 409, 5 pp. 
68. PUT,  Ferdi  (19/12/88) 
Introducing dynamic and temporal aspects in a conceptual (database) schema. 
Leuven, KUL. Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen, 
1988. XVIII, 415 pp. 
69.  VAN ROMPUY, Guido (13/01/89) 
A supply-side approach to tax reform programs. Theory and empirical evidence for 
Belgium. 
Leuven, KUL. Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen, 
1989. XVI, 189, 6 pp. 
70.  PEETERS, Ludo (19/06/89) 
Een ruimtelijk evenwichtsmodel van de graanmarkten in de E.G.: empirische 
specificatie en beleidstoepassingen. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven. Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1989. XVI, 412 pp. 
71.  PACOLET, Jozef (10/11/89) 
Marktstructuur en operationele efficiëntie in de Belgische financiële sector. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven. Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1989. XXII, 547 pp. 
72. VANDEBROEK,  Martina  (13/12/89) 
Optimalisatie van verzekeringscontracten en premieberekeningsprincipes. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven. Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1989. 95 pp. 
73.  WILLEKENS, Francois () 
Determinance of government growth in industrialized countries with applications to 
Belgium. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven. Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1990. VI, 332 pp. 
205 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
74.  VEUGELERS, Reinhilde (02/04/90) 
Scope decisions of multinational enterprises. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven. Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1990. V, 221 pp. 
75.  KESTELOOT, Katrien (18/06/90) 
Essays on performance diagnosis and tacit cooperation in international oligopolies. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven. Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1990. 227 pp. 
76.  WU, Changqi (23/10/90) 
Strategic aspects of oligopolistic vertical integration. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1990. VIII, 222 pp. 
77.  ZHANG, Zhaoyong (08/07/91) 
A disequilibrium model of China's foreign trade behaviour. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1991. XII, 256 pp. 
78.  DHAENE, Jan (25/11/91) 
Verdelingsfuncties, benaderingen en foutengrenzen van stochastische grootheden 
geassocieerd aan verzekeringspolissen en -portefeuilles. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1991. 146 pp. 
79.  BAUWELINCKX, Thierry (07/01/92) 
Hierarchical credibility techniques. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1992. 130 pp. 
80. DEMEULEMEESTER,  Erik  (23/3/92) 
Optimal algorithms for various classes of multiple resource-constrained project 
scheduling problems. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1992. 180 pp. 
81. STEENACKERS,  Anna  (1/10/92) 
Risk analysis with the classical actuarial risk model: theoretical extensions and 
applications to Reinsurance. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1992. 139 pp. 
82. COCKX,  Bart  (24/09/92) 
The minimum income guarantee. Some views from a dynamic perspective. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1992. XVII, 401 pp. 
206 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
83.  MEYERMANS, Eric (06/11/92) 
Econometric allocation systems for the foreign exchange market: Specification, 
estimation and testing of transmission mechanisms under currency substitution. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1992. XVIII, 343 pp. 
84. CHEN,  Guoqing  (04/12/92) 
Design of fuzzy relational databases based on fuzzy functional dependency. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1992. 176 pp. 
85.  CLAEYS, Christel (18/02/93) 
Vertical and horizontal category structures in consumer decision making: The nature 
of product hierarchies and the effect of brand typicality. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1993. 348 pp. 
86.  CHEN, Shaoxiang (25/03/93) 
The optimal monitoring policies for some stochastic and dynamic production 
processes. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1993. 170 pp. 
87. OVERWEG,  Dirk  (23/04/93) 
Approximate parametric analysis and study of cost capacity management of computer 
configurations. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1993. 270 pp. 
88. DEWACHTER,  Hans  (22/06/93) 
Nonlinearities in speculative prices: The existence and persistence of nonlinearity in 
foreign exchange rates. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1993. 151 pp. 
89.  LIN, Liangqi (05/07/93) 
Economic determinants of voluntary accounting choices for R & D expenditures in 
Belgium. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1993. 192 pp. 
90.  DHAENE, Geert (09/07/93) 
Encompassing: formulation, properties and testing. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1993. 117 pp. 
207 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
91. LAGAE,  Wim  (20/09/93) 
Marktconforme verlichting van soevereine buitenlandse schuld door private 
crediteuren: een neo-institutionele analyse. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1993. 241 pp. 
92.  VAN DE GAER, Dirk (27/09/93) 
Equality of opportunity and investment in human capital. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1993. 172 pp. 
93.  SCHROYEN, Alfred (28/02/94) 
Essays on redistributive taxation when monitoring is costly. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1994. 203 pp. + V. 
94. STEURS,  Geert  (15/07/94) 
Spillovers and cooperation in research and development. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1994. 266 pp. 
95. BARAS,  Johan  (15/09/94) 
The small sample distribution of the Wald, Lagrange multiplier and likelihood ratio 
tests for homogeneity and symmetry in demand analysis: a Monte Carlo study. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1994. 169 pp. 
96.  GAEREMYNCK, Ann (08/09/94) 
The use of depreciation in accounting as a signalling device. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1994. 232 pp. 
97.  BETTENDORF, Leon (22/09/94) 
A dynamic applied general equilibrium model for a small open economy. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1994. 149 pp. 
 98.  TEUNEN, Marleen (10/11/94) 
Evaluation of interest randomness in actuarial quantities. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1994. 214 pp. 
 99.  VAN OOTEGEM, Luc (17/01/95) 
An economic theory of private donations. 
Leuven. K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1995. 236 pp. 
208 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
100. DE SCHEPPER, Ann (20/03/95) 
Stochastic interest rates and the probabilistic behaviour of actuarial functions. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1995. 211 pp. 
101. LAUWERS, Luc (13/06/95) 
Social choice with infinite populations. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1995. 79 pp. 
102. WU, Guang (27/06/95) 
A systematic approach to object-oriented business modeling. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1995. 248 pp. 
103. WU, Xueping (21/08/95) 
Term structures in the Belgian market: model estimation and pricing error analysis. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1995. 133 pp. 
104. PEPERMANS, Guido (30/08/95) 
Four essays on retirement from the labor force. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1995. 128 pp. 
105. ALGOED, Koen (11/09/95) 
Essays on insurance: a view from a dynamic perspective. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1995. 136 pp. 
106. DEGRYSE, Hans (10/10/95) 
Essays on financial intermediation, product differentiation, and market structure. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1995. 218 pp. 
107. MEIR, Jos (05/12/95) 
Het strategisch groepsconcept toegepast op de Belgische financiële sector. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1995. 257 pp. 
108. WIJAYA, Miryam Lilian (08/01/96) 
Voluntary reciprocity as an informal social insurance mechanism: a game theoretic 
approach. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1996. 124 pp. 
209 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
109. VANDAELE, Nico (12/02/96) 
The impact of lot sizing on queueing delays: multi product, multi machine models. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1996. 243 pp. 
110. GIELENS, Geert (27/02/96) 
Some essays on discrete time target zones and their tails. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1996. 131 pp. 
111. GUILLAUME, Dominique (20/03/96) 
Chaos, randomness and order in the foreign exchange markets. Essays on the 
modelling of the markets. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1996. 171 pp. 
112. DEWIT, Gerda (03/06/96) 
Essays on export insurance subsidization. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1996. 186 pp. 
113. VAN DEN ACKER, Carine (08/07/96) 
Belief-function theory and its application to the modeling of uncertainty in financial 
statement auditing. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1996. 147 pp. 
114. IMAM, Mahmood Osman (31/07/96) 
Choice of IPO Flotation Methods in Belgium in an Asymmetric Information 
Framework and Pricing of IPO’s in the Long-Run. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1996. 221 pp. 
115. NICAISE, Ides (06/09/96) 
Poverty and Human Capital. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1996. 209 pp. 
116. EYCKMANS, Johan (18/09/97) 
On the Incentives of Nations to Join International Environmental Agreements. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1997. XV + 348 pp. 
117. CRISOLOGO-MENDOZA, Lorelei (16/10/97) 
Essays on Decision Making in Rural Households: a study of three villages in the 
Cordillera Region of the Philippines. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1997. 256 pp. 
210 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
118. DE REYCK, Bert (26/01/98) 
Scheduling Projects with Generalized Precedence Relations: Exact and Heuristic 
Procedures. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1998. XXIV + 337 pp. 
119. VANDEMAELE Sigrid (30/04/98) 
Determinants of Issue Procedure Choice within the Context of the French IPO 
Market: Analysis within an Asymmetric Information Framework. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1998. 241 pp. 
120. VERGAUWEN Filip (30/04/98) 
Firm Efficiency and Compensation Schemes for the Management of Innovative 
Activities and Knowledge Transfers. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1998. VIII + 175 pp. 
121. LEEMANS Herlinde (29/05/98) 
The Two-Class Two-Server Queueing Model with Nonpreemptive Heterogeneous 
Priority Structures. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1998. 211 pp. 
122. GEYSKENS Inge (4/09/98) 
Trust, Satisfaction, and Equity in Marketing Channel Relationships. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1998. 202 pp. 
123. SWEENEY John (19/10/98) 
Why Hold a Job ? The Labour Market Choice of the Low-Skilled. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1998. 278 pp. 
124. GOEDHUYS Micheline (17/03/99) 
Industrial Organisation in Developing Countries, Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1999. 251 pp. 
125. POELS Geert (16/04/99) 
On the Formal Aspects of the Measurement of Object-Oriented Software 
Specifications. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1999. 507 pp. 
211 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
126. MAYERES Inge (25/05/99) 
The Control of Transport Externalities: A General Equilibrium Analysis. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1999. XIV + 294 pp. 
127. LEMAHIEU Wilfried (5/07/99) 
Improved Navigation and Maintenance through an Object-Oriented Approach to 
Hypermedia Modelling. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1999. 284 pp. 
128. VAN PUYENBROECK Tom (8/07/99) 
Informational Aspects of Fiscal Federalism. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1999. 192 pp. 
129. VAN DEN POEL Dirk (5/08/99) 
Response Modeling for Database Marketing Using Binary Classification. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1999. 342 pp. 
130. GIELENS Katrijn (27/08/99) 
International Entry Decisions in the Retailing Industry: Antecedents and Performance 
Consequences. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1999. 336 pp. 
131. PEETERS Anneleen (16/12/99) 
Labour Turnover Costs, Employment and Temporary Work. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1999. 207 pp. 
132. VANHOENACKER Jurgen (17/12/99) 
Formalizing a Knowledge Management Architecture Meta-Model for Integrated 
Business Process Management. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 1999. 252 pp. 
133. NUNES Paulo (20/03/2000) 
Contingent Valuation of the Benefits of Natural Areas and its Warmglow Component. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2000. XXI + 282 pp. 
134. VAN DEN CRUYCE Bart (7/04/2000) 
Statistische discriminatie van allochtonen op jobmarkten met rigide lonen. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2000. XXIII + 441 pp. 
212 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
135.  REPKINE Alexandre (15/03/2000) 
Industrial restructuring in countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Combining 
branch-, firm- and product-level data for a better understanding of Enterprises' 
behaviour during transition towards market economy. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2000. VI + 147 pp. 
 
136.  AKSOY, Yunus (21/06/2000) 
Essays on international price rigidities and exchange rates. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2000. IX + 236 pp. 
 
137.  RIYANTO, Yohanes Eko (22/06/2000) 
Essays on the internal and external delegation of authority in firms. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2000. VIII + 280 pp. 
 
138.  HUYGHEBAERT, Nancy (20/12/2000) 
The Capital Structure of Business Start-ups. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2000. VIII + 332 pp. 
 
139.  FRANCKX Laurent (22/01/2001) 
Ambient Inspections and Commitment in Environmental Enforcement. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2001 VIII + 286 pp. 
 
140. VANDILLE  Guy  (16/02/2001) 
Essays on the Impact of Income Redistribution on Trade. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2001 VIII + 176 pp. 
 
141.  MARQUERING Wessel (27/04/2001) 
Modeling and Forecasting Stock Market Returns and Volatility. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2001. V + 267 pp. 
 
142.  FAGGIO Giulia (07/05/2001) 
Labor Market Adjustment and Enterprise Behavior in Transition.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2001. 150 pp. 
 
143. GOOS  Peter  (30/05/2001) 
The Optimal Design of Blocked and Split-plot experiments. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 




213 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
144. LABRO  Eva  (01/06/2001) 
Total Cost of Ownership Supplier Selection based on Activity Based Costing and 
Mathematical Programming.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2001. 217 pp. 
 
145.  VANHOUCKE Mario (07/06/2001) 
Exact Algorithms for various Types of Project Scheduling Problems. Nonregular 
Objectives and time/cost Trade-offs. 316 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2001. 316 pp. 
 
146.  BILSEN Valentijn (28/08/2001) 
Entrepreneurship and Private Sector Development in Central European Transition 
Countries.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2001. XVI + 188 pp. 
 
147. NIJS  Vincent  (10/08/2001) 
Essays on the dynamic Category-level Impact of Price promotions. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2001. 
 
148. CHERCHYE  Laurens  (24/09/2001) 
Topics in Non-parametric Production and Efficiency Analysis.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2001. VII + 169 pp. 
 
149. VAN DENDER Kurt (15/10/2001) 
Aspects of Congestion Pricing for Urban Transport.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2001. VII + 203 pp. 
 
150. CAPEAU Bart (26/10/2001) 
In defence of the excess demand approach to poor peasants' economic behaviour. 
Theory and Empirics of non-recursive agricultural household modelling.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2001. XIII + 286 blz. 
 
151. CALTHROP Edward (09/11/2001) 
Essays in urban transport economics. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2001. 
 
152. VANDER BAUWHEDE Heidi (03/12/2001) 
Earnings management in an Non-Anglo-Saxon environment. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2001. 408 pp. 
 
214 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
153. DE BACKER Koenraad (22/01/2002) 
Multinational firms and industry dynamics in host countries : the case of Belgium. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2002. VII + 165 pp. 
 
154. BOUWEN Jan (08/02/2002) 
Transactive memory in operational workgroups. Concept elaboration and case study. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2002. 319 pp. + appendix 102 pp. 
 
155. VAN DEN BRANDE Inge (13/03/2002) 
The psychological contract between employer and employee : a survey among 
Flemish employees. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2002. VIII + 470 pp. 
 
156. VEESTRAETEN Dirk (19/04/2002) 
Asset Price Dynamics under Announced Policy Switching. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2002. 176 pp. 
 
157. PEETERS Marc (16/05/2002) 
One Dimensional Cutting and Packing : New Problems and Algorithms. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2002. 
 
158. SKUDELNY Frauke (21/05/2002) 
Essays on The Economic Consequences of the European Monetary Union. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2002. 
 
159. DE WEERDT Joachim (07/06/2002) 
Social Networks, Transfers and Insurance in Developing countries. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2002. VI + 129 pp. 
 
160. TACK Lieven (25/06/2002) 
Optimal Run Orders in Design of Experiments. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2002. XXXI + 344 pp. 
 
161. POELMANS Stephan (10/07/2002) 
Making Workflow Systems work. An investigation into the Importance of Task-
appropriation fit, End-user Support and other Technological Characteristics. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 




215 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
162. JANS Raf (26/09/2002) 
Capacitated Lot Sizing Problems : New Applications, Formulations and Algorithms. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2002. 
 
163. VIAENE Stijn (25/10/2002) 
Learning to Detect Fraud from enriched Insurance Claims Data (Context, Theory and 
Applications). 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2002. 315 pp. 
 
164. AYALEW Tekabe (08/11/2002) 
Inequality and Capital Investment in a Subsistence Economy.Leuven, K.U.Leuven, 
Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen, 2002. V + 148 
pp. 
 
165. MUES Christophe (12/11/2002) 
On the Use of Decision Tables and Diagrams in Knowledge Modeling and 
Verification. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2002. 222 pp. 
 
166. BROCK Ellen (13/03/2003) 
The Impact of International Trade on European Labour Markets. 
K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische Wetenschappen, 
2002. 
 
167. VERMEULEN Frederic (29/11/2002) 
Essays on the collective Approach to Household Labour Supply. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2002. XIV + 203 pp. 
 
168. CLUDTS Stephan (11/12/2002) 
Combining participation in decision-making with financial participation : theoretical 
and empirical perspectives. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2002. XIV + 247 pp. 
 
169. WARZYNSKI Frederic (09/01/2003) 
The dynamic effect of competition on price cost margins and innovation. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. 
 
170. VERWIMP Philip (14/01/2003) 
Development and genocide in Rwanda ; a political economy analysis of peasants and 
power under the Habyarimana regime. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. 
 
216 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
171. BIGANO Andrea (25/02/2003) 
Environmental regulation of the electricity sector in a European Market Framework. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. XX + 310 pp. 
 
172. MAES Konstantijn (24/03/2003) 
Modeling the Term Structure of Interest Rates Across Countries. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. V+246 pp. 
 
173. VINAIMONT Tom (26/02/2003) 
The performance of One- versus Two-Factor Models of the Term Structure of Interest 
Rates. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. 
 
174. OOGHE Erwin (15/04/2003) 
Essays in multi-dimensional social choice. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. VIII+108 pp. 
 
175. FORRIER Anneleen (25/04/2003) 
Temporary employment, employability and training. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. 
 
176. CARDINAELS Eddy (28/04/2003) 
The role of cost system accuracy in managerial decision making.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. 144 pp.  
 
177. DE GOEIJ Peter (02/07/2003) 
Modeling Time-Varying Volatility and Interest Rates.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. VII+225 pp.  
 
178. LEUS Roel (19/09/2003) 
The generation of stable project plans. Complexity and exact algorithms.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003.  
 
179.MARINHEIRO Carlos (23/09/2003) 
EMU and fiscal stabilisation policy : the case of small countries. 






217 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
180. BAESENS Bart (24/09/2003) 
Developing intelligent systems for credit scoring using machine learning techniques. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. 
 
181. KOCZY Laszlo (18/09/2003) 
Solution concepts and outsider behaviour in coalition formation games. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. 
 
182. ALTOMONTE Carlo (25/09/2003) 
Essays on Foreign Direct Investment in transition countries : learning from the 
evidence. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. 
 
183. DRIES Liesbeth (10/11/2003) 
Transition, Globalisation and Sectoral Restructuring: Theory and Evidence from the 
Polish Agri-Food Sector.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. 
 
184. DEVOOGHT Kurt (18/11/2003) 
Essays On Responsibility-Sensitive Egalitarianism and the Measurement of Income 
Inequality.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. 
 
185. DELEERSNYDER Barbara (28/11/2003) 
Marketing in Turbulent Times.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. 
 
186. ALI Daniel (19/12/2003) 
Essays on Household Consumption and Production Decisions under Uncertainty in 
Rural Ethiopia.”.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2003. 
 
187. WILLEMS Bert (14/01/2004) 
Electricity networks and generation market power. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2004. 
 
188. JANSSENS Gust (30/01/2004) 
Advanced Modelling of Conditional Volatility and Correlation in Financial Markets.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2004. 
 
218 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
189. THOEN Vincent (19/01/2004) 
"On the valuation and disclosure practices implemented by venture capital providers" 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2004. 
 
190. MARTENS Jurgen (16/02/2004) 
“A fuzzy set and stochastic system theoretic technique to validate simulation 
models”.Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2004. 
 
191. ALTAVILLA Carlo (21/05/2004) 
 “Monetary policy implementation and transmission mechanisms in the Euro area.”, 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2004. 
 
192. DE BRUYNE Karolien (07/06/2004) 
“Essays in the location of economic activity”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2004. 
 
193. ADEM Jan (25/06/2004) 
 “Mathematical programming approaches for the supervised classification problem.”, 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2004. 
 
194. LEROUGE Davy  (08/07/2004) 
 “Predicting Product Preferences : the effect of internal and external cues.”, 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2004. 
 
195. VANDENBROECK Katleen  (16/07/2004) 
“Essays on output growth, social learning and land allocation in agriculture : micro-
evidence from Ethiopia and Tanzania”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2004. 
 
196. GRIMALDI Maria (03/09/004) 
“The exchange rate, heterogeneity of agents and bounded rationality”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2004. 
 
197. SMEDTS Kristien (26/10/2004) 
“Financial integration in EMU in the framework of the no-arbitrage theory”. 






219 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
198. KOEVOETS Wim (12/11/2004) 
“Essays on Unions, Wages and Employment” 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2004. 
 
199. CALLENS Marc  (22/11/2004) 
 “Essays on multilevel logistic Regression” 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2004. 
 
200. RUGGOO Arvind (13/12/2004) 
“Two stage designs robust to model uncertainty” 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2004. 
 
201. HOORELBEKE Dirk (28/01/2005) 
”Bootstrap and Pivoting Techniques for Testing Multiple Hypotheses.” 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2005. 
 
202. ROUSSEAU Sandra (17/02/2005) 
“Selecting Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Incomplete 
Compiance”, 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2005. 
 
203. VAN DER MEULEN Sofie (17/02/2005) 
  “Quality of Financial Statements : Impact of the external auditor and applied 
accounting standards”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2005. 
 
204. DIMOVA Ralitza (21/02/2005) 
“Winners and Losers during Structural Reform and Crisis : the Bulgarian Labour 
Market Perspective”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2005. 
 
205. DARKIEWICZ Grzegorz (28/02/2005) 
“Value-at-risk in Insurance and Finance : the Comonotonicity Approach” 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2005. 
 
206. DE MOOR Lieven (20/05/2005) 
“The Structure of International Stock Returns : Size, Country and Sector Effects in 
Capital Asset Pricing” 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2005. 
 
220 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
207. EVERAERT Greetje (27/06/2005) 
“Soft Budget Constraints and Trade Policies : The Role of Institutional and External 
Constraints” 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2005. 
 
208. SIMON Steven (06/07/2005) 
“The Modeling and Valuation of complex Derivatives : the Impact of the Choice of 
the term structure model”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2005. 
 
209. MOONEN Linda (23/09/2005) 
“Algorithms for some graph-theoretical optimization problems”.  
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2005. 
 
210. COUCKE Kristien (21/09/2005) 
“Firm and industry adjustment under de-industrialisation and globalization of the 
Belgian economy”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2005. 
 
211. DECAMPS MARC (21/10/2005) 
“Some actuarial and financial applications of generalized diffusion processes”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2005. 
 
212. KIM HELENA (29/11/2005) 
“Escalation games: an instrument to analyze conflicts.  The strategic approach to the 
bargaining problem”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2005. 
 
213. GERMENJI ETLEVA (06/01/2006) 
“Essays on the economics of emigration from Albania”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
214. BELIEN JEROEN (18/01/2006) 
“Exact and heuristic methodologies for scheduling in hospitals: problems, 
formulations and algorithms”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
215. JOOSSENS KRISTEL (10/02/2006) 
“Robust discriminant analysis”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
221 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
216. VRANKEN LIESBET (13/02/2006) 
“Land markets and production efficiency in transition economies”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
217. VANSTEENKISTE ISABEL (22/02/2006) 
“Essays on non-linear modelling in international macroeconomics”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
218. WUYTS Gunther (31/03/2006) 
“Essays on the liquidity of financial markets”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
219. DE BLANDER Rembert (28/04/2006) 
“Essays on endogeneity and parameter heterogeneity in cross-section and panel data”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
220. DE LOECKER Jan (12/05/2006) 
“Industry dynamics and productivity”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
221. LEMMENS Aurélie (12/05/2006) 
“Advanced classification and time-series methods in marketing”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
222. VERPOORTEN Marijke (22/05/2006) 
“Conflict and survival: an analysis of shocks, coping strategies and economic mobility 
in Rwanda, 1990-2002”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
223. BOSMANS Kristof (26/05/2006) 
“Measuring economic inequality and inequality aversion”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
224. BRENKERS Randy (29/05/2006) 
“Policy reform in a market with differentiated products: applications from the car 
market”. 





222 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
225. BRUYNEEL Sabrina (02/06/2006) 
“Self-econtrol depletion: Mechanisms and its effects on consumer behavior”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
226. FAEMS Dries (09/06/2006) 
“Collaboration for innovation: Processes of governance and learning”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
227. BRIERS Barbara (28/06/2006) 
“Countering the scrooge in each of us: on the marketing of cooperative behavior”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
228. ZANONI Patrizia (04/07/2006) 
“Beyond demography: Essays on diversity in organizations”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
229. VAN DEN ABBEELE Alexandra (11/09/2006) 
“Management control of interfirm relations: the role of information”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
230. DEWAELHEYNS Nico (18/09/2006) 
“Essays on internal capital markets, bankruptcy and bankruptcy reform”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
231. RINALDI Laura (19/09/2006) 
“Essays on card payments and household debt”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
232. DUTORDOIR Marie (22/09/2006) 
“Determinants and stock price effects of Western European convertible debt 
offerings: an empirical analysis”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
233. LYKOGIANNI Elissavet (20/09/2006) 
“Essays on strategic decisions of multinational enterprises: R&D decentralization, 
technology transfers and modes of foreign entry”. 





223 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
234. ZOU Jianglei (03/10/2006) 
“Inter-firm ties, plant networks, and multinational firms: essays on FDI and trade by 
Japanse firms.”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
235. GEYSKENS Kelly (12/10/2006) 
“The ironic effects of food temptations on self-control performance”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
236. BRUYNSEELS Liesbeth (17/10/2006) 
“Client strategic actions, going-concern audit opinions and audit reporting errors”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
237. KESSELS Roselinde (23/10/2006) 
“Optimal designs for the measurement of consumer preferences”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
238. HUTCHINSON John (25/10/2006) 
“The size distribution and growth of firms in transition countries”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
239. RENDERS Annelies (26/10/2006) 
“Corporate governance in Europe: The relation with accounting standards choice, 
performance and benefits of control”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
240. DE WINNE Sophie (30/10/2006) 
“Exploring terra incognita: human resource management and firm performance in 
small and medium-sized businesses”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
241. KADITI Eleni (10/11/2006) 
“Foreign direct investments in transition economies”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
242. ANDRIES Petra (17/11/2006) 
“Technology-based ventures in emerging industries: the quest for a viable business 
model”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
224 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
243. BOUTE Robert (04/12/2006) 
“The impact of replenishment rules with endogenous lead times on supply chain 
performance”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
244. MAES Johan (20/12/2006) 
“Corporate entrepreneurship: an integrative analysis of a resource-based model.   
Evidence from Flemish enterprises”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
245. GOOSSENS Dries (20/12/2006) 
“Exact methods for combinatorial auctions”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
246. GOETHALS Frank (22/12/2006) 
“Classifying and assessing extended enterprise integration approaches”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
247. VAN DE VONDER Stijn (22/12/2006) 
“Proactive-reactive procedures for robust project scheduling”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2006. 
 
248. SAVEYN Bert (27/02/2007) 
“Environmental policy in a federal state”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2007. 
 
249. CLEEREN Kathleen (13/03/2007) 
“Essays on competitive structure and product-harm crises”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2007. 
 
250. THUYSBAERT Bram (27/04/2007) 
“Econometric essays on the measurement of poverty”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2007. 
 
251. DE BACKER Manu (07/05/2007) 
“The use of Petri net theory for business process verification”. 





225 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
252. MILLET Kobe (15/05/2007) 
“Prenatal testosterone, personality, and economic behavior”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2007. 
 
253. HUYSMANS Johan (13/06/2007) 
“Comprehensible predictive models: New methods and insights”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2007. 
 
254. FRANCKEN Nathalie (26/06/2007) 
“Mass Media, Government Policies and Economic Development: Evidence from 
Madagascar”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2007. 
 
255. SCHOUBBEN Frederiek (02/07/2007) 
“The impact of a stock listing on the determinants of firm performance and 
investment policy”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2007. 
 
256. DELHAYE Eef (04/07/2007) 
“Economic analysis of traffic safety”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2007. 
 
257. VAN ACHTER Mark (06/07/2007) 
“Essays on the market microstructure of financial markets”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2007. 
 
258. GOUKENS Caroline (20/08/2007) 
“Desire for variety: understanding consumers’ preferences for variety seeking”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2007. 
 
259. KELCHTERMANS Stijn (12/09/2007) 
“In pursuit of excellence: essays on the organization of higher education and 
research”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2007. 
 
260. HUSSINGER Katrin (14/09/2007) 
“Essays on internationalization, innovation and firm performance”. 




226 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
261. CUMPS Bjorn (04/10/2007) 
“Business-ICT alignment and determinants”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economische en Toegepaste Economische 
Wetenschappen, 2007. 
 
262. LYRIO Marco (02/11/2007) 
“Modeling the yield curve with macro factors”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2007. 
 
263. VANPEE Rosanne (16/11/2007) 
“Home bias and the implicit costs of investing abroad”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2007. 
 
264. LAMBRECHTS Olivier (27/11/2007) 
“Robust project scheduling subject to resource breakdowns”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2007. 
 
265. DE ROCK Bram (03/12/2007) 
“Collective choice behaviour: non parametric characterization”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2007. 
 
266. MARTENS David (08/01/2008) 
“Building acceptable classification models for financial engineering applications”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008. 
 
267. VAN KERCKHOVEN Johan (17/01/2008) 
“Predictive modelling: variable selection and classification efficiencies”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008. 
 
268. CIAIAN Pavel (12/02/2008) 
“Land, EU accession and market imperfections”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008. 
 
269. TRUYTS Tom (27/02/2008) 
“Diamonds are a girl’s best friend: five essays on the economics of social status”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008. 
 
270. LEWIS Vivien (17/03/2008) 
“Applications in dynamic general equilibrium macroeconomics”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008. 
 
271. CAPPELLEN Tineke (04/04/2008) 
“Worldwide coordination in a transnational environment: An inquiry into the work 
and careers of global managers”. 





227 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
272. RODRIGUEZ  Victor (18/04/2008) 
“Material transfer agreements: research agenda choice, co-publication activity and 
visibility in biotechnology”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008. 
 
273. QUAN Qi (14/04/2008) 
“Privatization in China: Examining the endogeneity of the process and its implications 
for the performance of newly privatized firms”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008. 
 
274. DELMOTTE Jeroen (30/04/2008) 
“Evaluating the HR function: Empirical studies on HRM architecture and HRM 
system strength”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008. 
 
275. ORSINI Kristian (05/05/2008) 
“Making work pay: Insights from microsimulation and random utility models”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008. 
 
276. HOUSSA Romain (13/05/2008) 
“Macroeconomic fluctuations in developing countries”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008. 
 
277. SCHAUMANS Catherine (20/05/2008) 
“Entry, regulation and economic efficiency: essays on health professionals”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008. 
 
278. CRABBE Karen (21/05/2008) 
“Essays on corporate tax competition in Europe”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008 
 
279. GELPER Sarah (30/05/2008) 
“Economic time series analysis: Granger causality and robustness”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008 
 
280. VAN HOVE Jan (20/06/2008) 
“The impact of technological innovation and spillovers on the pattern and direction of 
international trade”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008 
 
281. DE VILLE DE GOYET Cédric (04/07/2008) 
“Hedging with futures in agricultural commodity markets”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008 
 
282. FRANCK Tom (15/07/2008) 
“Capital structure and product market interactions: evidence from business start-ups 
and private firms”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008 
 
228 Doctoral dissertations from the Faculty of Business and Economics 
283. ILBAS Pelin (15/09/2008) 
“Optimal monetary policy design in dynamic macroeconomics”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008 
 
284. GOEDERTIER Stijn (16/09/2008) 
“Declarative techniques for modeling and mining business processes”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008 
 
285. LAMEY Lien (22/09/2008) 
“The private-label nightmare: can national brands ever wake up?”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008 
 
286. VANDEKERCKHOVE Jan (23/09/2008) 
“Essays on research and development with spillovers”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008 
 
287. PERNOT Eli (25/09/2008) 
“Management control system design for supplier relationships in manufacturing: Case 
study evidence from the automotive industry”. 
Leuven, K.U.Leuven, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen, 2008 
 
 
 
229 